THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF A HEIDEGGERIAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY FOR THE ANALYSIS OF HUMAN ENGAGEMENT IN FIELD-BASED EXPERIMENTAL ARCHAEOLOGY:

A CASE STUDY FROM THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AN IRON AGE ROUNDHOUSE IN WALES

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~ABSTRACT~

Phenomenological approaches in archaeology are often accused by their detractors of lacking an explicitly articulated method and being centred on first-person 'subjective' accounts. As a result, phenomenological research is perceived to lack rigour, data and accountability. This thesis addresses these concerns through the development of a phenomenological methodology created to address the failure of experimental archaeology to account for those who take part in experimental projects and their influence on the theory, practice and explanations of such projects.

For its philosophical basis, the project draws on the thinking of Martin Heidegger, particularly Division I of his major work *Being and Time* (1962). This thinking is explored and developed in the context of the practice of roundhouse reconstruction. It is translated into a methodology to identify, examine and interpret the phenomena associated with everyday practice in the carrying out of skilled tasks in relation to a particular project.

For its grounding in the world, the research analyses the reconstruction of a large roundhouse a Castell Henllys Iron age Fort. This analysis, through an explicitly Heideggerian phenomenological methodology, uses multi-media sources (video, audio, transcription, still images) and Qualitative Data Analysis software to generate qualitative, third-person phenomenological data on the experiences and contextual understandings of being involved in that reconstruction project. These experiences and understandings are then explored for their broader implications for the practice of field based experimental archaeology in general – and reconstruction practice in particular – and for interpreting the practice of building a roundhouse in the Iron Age in Britain.

From the development and application of the methodology it is concluded that it is both possible and desirable to both create and express a phenomenological methodology and that contrary to popular belief, such studies can be rigorous and

generate vast amounts of data that can be re-examined by others either repeating the method expressed or in different ways.

In relation to reconstruction practice, it concludes that such practice is much more closely defined by those that take part in it than it is by 'scientific' methodological rigour and materials constraints, also that reconstruction is a deeply meaning giving practice and not at all 'neutral'.

Finally, the thesis concludes that the phenomena observed in reconstruction practice would have been present in past building and that this leads one to consider that even this apparently mundane and everyday practice was deeply meaningful at every level, from an individual's ways of dealing with their tools, to overtly symbolic practices associated with the stages and layout of a roundhouse in the Iron Age.

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The simpler things become, the more puzzling they remain.

(Martin Heidegger 21.03.1925)

PART I: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

~CHAPTER 1~
INTRODUCTION

This project concerns an examination of the practice of experimental architectural reconstruction through the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and *vice versa*. Its first aim is to develop a methodology for accounting for the interpretative content of experimental reconstruction arising as a consequence of the involvement of people with such projects. The second aim is to examine the possibility of grounding a complex philosophical system in the more prosaic world of the everyday practice of experimental reconstruction. This philosophical system will be discussed in some detail in this chapter, with a focus on a number of key phenomena that are considered to be useful in pursuit of the first aim of the project.

The research was prompted by a general interest in experimental archaeology and a particular interest in the reconstruction of later prehistoric architecture. More directly it was inspired by a desire to refute a statement made by the late Dr Peter Reynolds in 1998 that "no experiment can be designed to enhance our understanding of human motive or emotion in the recent or remote past" (Reynolds 1998: 33). As a result, it began life as an attempt to approach experimental archaeology in such a way that what Reynolds referred to as the 'human element' in the making of things could be systematically studied and interpreted. This broadly postprocessual agenda was originally conceived in terms of agency theory and the notion of meaningful material culture. After an initial period of research, it became apparent that these archaeological manifestations of theoretical positions developed in other disciples such as anthropology and sociology were inadequate, other than in terms of critique, to re-think the theory and practice of experimental archaeology; I could not find in them a position from which to start from scratch. Like many others, I took a step back in the history of the thought that underpinned archaeological discussions about the meaning of things and

the constructed character of human life-worlds to the likes of Bourdieu (*e.g.* Bourdieu 1973, 1977), Giddens (*e.g.* Bryant and Jary 1991; Giddens 1979), Geertz (*e.g.* Geertz 1973) and Taylor (*e.g.* Taylor 1971; Taylor 1983, 1985a; Taylor 1985b) and thence to Ricoeur (*e.g.* Thompson 1981; Valdés 1991), Merleau-Ponty (*e.g.* Madison 1981; Merleau-Ponty 1989) and Gadamer (*e.g.* Gadamer 1970; Gadamer 1976; Gadamer 1989). All of these highly influential thinkers seemed to share a common basic set of ideas which, it seemed to me, could be traced back to one man; Martin Heidegger and, for the most part, to one book; *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962). In Heidegger and *Being and Time* I found the philosophical background to much of the current avenues of thought in archaeology (explicitly acknowledged or otherwise) and what seemed to be the best starting point for my own small attempt to reconsider the particular corner of archaeology's broad church that interested me: experimental archaeology.

Having arrived at Heidegger from the starting point of an interest in reconstructed roundhouses, I was left with the problem of how to marry the two; how to press an abstract philosophical position into helping to understand the practice of experimental reconstruction. The resolution of this problem is the work presented herein. It was never my intention to embark on methodological research. The methodology that became the focus of this research came about by trying to 'do' a Heideggerian experimental archaeology by way of some quite fundamental questions: What, in Heidegger's terms constitutes data? How does one collect or generate such data in a way that is consistent with the philosophical position? And how might it be systematically and consistently analysed? Only by tackling these questions would it be possible to reconsider the practice of experimental reconstruction and what such practice may be saying about the past.

This research, therefore, became fundamentally concerned with the exposition of one way of doing a Heideggerian archaeology – which I hope will lead to others – but it also seeks to ask, What is roundhouse reconstruction? And more broadly,

What does building consist in? It is also presented as an alternative approach to phenomenology in archaeology which has tended to focus on sensory perception, particularly sight, in the study of cultural understandings of landscape (*e.g.* Tilley 1994). The phenomenology presented in the following chapters is both a *how* and *what.* It sets out a way of doing rigorous, detailed phenomenological research and suggests a number of phenomena that underpin the ways in which people understand themselves and their worlds that are open to study.

The presentation of this research begins with the two parts of the archaeological context of the background to the study *i.e.* approaches to the British later prehistoric roundhouse and the theory and practice of experimental reconstruction. In the former, the history of the discipline's understandings of roundhouse is reviewed. This review is somewhat at odds with the rest of the thesis in terms of structure and content but is necessary to set the research presented within a tradition of archaeological research. The review reveals that roundhouses appear in the archaeological literature fully formed, that is to say that while much has been said about their technologies and construction *i.e.* techniques and latterly meaning, little has been said about the actions, events and involvements in their building by people, in particular ways, for particular reasons. The ways in which this influences the employment of technologies, techniques and meaning is also seen to be under studied.

The latter is a critique of the Cartesian ontological underpinnings of subject and object which govern the theory and practice of experimental archaeology and marks the start of the core concerns of the research. This critique is realised through an examination of the theory of experimental archaeology in general and through the icon of roundhouse reconstruction theory and practice in Britain, exemplified by the work of the late Peter Reynolds of the Butser Ancient Farm Project (BAF). Reynolds' influence is visible in every reconstructed roundhouse in the country and his vision of experimental archaeology is fundamental to that practice *i.e.* that human involvement

should be excluded in any 'good' project and that roundhouses are logical, functional and technological objects and their building is a matter of the optimum employment of materials and technologies in functional terms. The rest of the thesis is, in many ways, an extended critique of that position.

The critique of Chapter three is built upon, in Chapter four, with an exposition of an alternative ontological scheme to the Cartesian one that currently dominates experimental archaeology. That chapter considers Heidegger's philosophy in the abstract and lays out the key concepts that governed the research that resulted in this thesis and that I consider to underpin an alternative vision of what experimental archaeology as a whole may be understood to consist in.

Chapters five and six discuss, in detail, the route by which I came to explore the practice of roundhouse reconstruction though the key concepts in Heidegger's philosophy, as laid out in the preceding chapter, and a case study which concerns the reconstruction of a large clear-span roundhouse, known as the 'Chieftain's House', at the site of Castell Henllys, Pembrokeshire, Wales. This is the methodological (and principle) component of the research which explores the kinds of data that a Heideggerian experimental archaeology may generate, its collection and analysis. Chapter seven is a Heideggerian look at the reconstruction of the 'Chieftain's House' and offers an alternative understanding of the practice of experimental reconstruction, based on an application of the methodology to a case study, which sees it primarily in terms of human involvement, to the most familiar form, which sees it primarily in terms of technologies.

During the course of this research into experimental archaeology, a number of ideas came to light with regard to the building of roundhouses in the Iron Age. These ideas, which concern the symbolism of building, of tools and materials and of being absorbed in the acts of building are offered, tentatively, in chapter eight as

enhancements to recent research and as an example of the outcomes of applying a Heideggerian approach to questions concerning the symbolism of roundhouses in the Iron Age and as avenues for further research.

Overall, this thesis presents an experiment in archaeology. Unlike other archaeological experiments, which are concerned with materials, processes and technologies, this is an experiment in ontological understandings, in thinking and in the application of that thinking. It is also experimental in the use and generation of data and its analysis. The focus is on multi media sources as primary data which includes text documents, audio and video out of which is developed a second tier of conceptual qualitative data. This qualitative data forms the basis for the analysis of the primary sources making this project both hermeneutic and reflexive. The use and systematic analysis of qualitative data is still in its infancy in archaeology and this thesis presents the first detailed study of this kind that the author is aware of.

The final note of this short, discursive introduction concerns the Appendices. These extensively cover the data generated during the development of the methodology. Although not essential for a reading of the thesis, they are included on the expectation that an archaeological audience may be unfamiliar with the depth and complexity of multi media qualitative data. The appendices principally detail the data generated by this project and indicate the sorts of data that a similar such project may be expected to generate. Another reason for their inclusion is to demonstrate that, contrary to popular belief, phenomenology can both use and generate a great deal of data as well as systematically and transparently analyse it in a way that is open to re-examination by other researchers. The data contained in the appendices shows that phenomenology is not an 'easy option' for the 'data shy' who do not wish to do any 'real' archaeology.

Parts I and II of the appendices (Appendix 1-7) are included on compact discs in Portable Document Format (PDF) because this format has the advantage of being fully

searchable by keywords or phrases, for example, searching for the word 'tool' in Part II of the appendices will generate 427 hyperlinked results which will allow the reader to follow contextualised understandings of that term and the ways in which passages containing that term were organised into data categories. Part III of the appendices is comprised of a further six compact discs which contain the video source data for the project in MPEG1 format. This will play on any computer video playback software such as Windows Media Player and is included both to complete the data set and, more importantly, to allow the reader the possibility of clarifying certain examples contained in the text that suffer from the restrictions of the presentation of multi media qualitative data on the printed page. Again, although not essential, it is hoped that the reader will find the time to explore their own route through the data, if only to find things that have not been said and to find a way of saying them.

In the work that follows the main aims will be to deconstruct the ontological underpinnings of experimental practice, propose an alternative ontology as drawn from the early philosophy of Martin Heidegger and to explore the development of a way of realising that ontology in practice as a counterpoint to the more familiar hypothesis testing framework of experimental research. In Chapters six to eight all of these aims are explored through the medium of the roundhouse of the British pre-Roman Iron Age and its reconstructed counterpart in the present.

~CHAPTER 2~
APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF THE BRITISH PRE-ROMAN IRON AGE ROUNDHOUSE

This chapter will review the ways in which the British Iron Age and particularly the roundhouse has been studied since the 1930s. This review is intended to situate the approach related through this thesis within the sequence of approaches to the period and to indicate some of the questions that have yet to be asked of the roundhouse. The review begins with approaches to the Iron Age generally considering how research into the period has developed from a normative, 'familiar' Iron Age to a more challenging Iron Age that is seen as strongly symbolic in character and much less familiar than it has long appeared. The focus of the review is the study of the Roundhouse. It considers the history of research on the roundhouse from its origin stories to experimental and socio-functional approaches of the 1960s to late 1980s and the structural and symbolic interpretations of roundhouse organisation and orientation that have been introduced since the 1990s.

2.1. ROUNDHOUSE AND ARCHITECTURE IN THE IRON AGE

Since Bersu's excavations at Little Woodbury in the 1930s (Bersu 1940), 'Architecture' has been conceptually equal to 'house' in the context of the study of the built environment of the pre-Roman Iron Age particularly in Southern England. Other types of construction that may be taken to have architectural qualities during this period *e.g.* hillfort 'ramparts' and the ubiquitous four-post structures, are seldom explicitly considered as 'architecture'. In fact it is possible to argue that until the late 1980s, with the work of Oswald (1991, 1997), Hill (1996a), Bowden and McOmish (1987), Parker Pearson (1996; Parker Pearson and Richards 1994a, 1994b), Hingley (1990a, 1990b) and others, a worked-out notion of an 'architecture' of the pre-Roman Iron Age for much of Britain had not yet begun to be formulated, a situation acknowledged in the recent *Agenda for Action* for the British Iron Age (Haselgrove *et al.*2001: 9).

It may be that the reason for this situation lies in the manner in which the built elements of the pre-Roman Iron Age have come to be classified. The classificatory scheme that has come into operation is typological in nature and is based on the relationship between the morphological characteristics and the supposed function of particular types of structure. There has been a prevalent tendency to treat such built structures as chronological and regional markers in a Childeian sense rather than as items of material culture in their own right with all the attendant possibilities for understanding dwelling, *habitus*, *praxis*, agency and symbolism that that brings.

An additional problem for the study of the architecture of the British Iron Age (as indeed it is for many of the other avenues of research into the period) is the focus on and extrapolation from southern Britain – particularly Wessex – to other regions of the country (Bevan 1999a). Understandings of the roundhouse, its form, function, technologies, and social roles are still dominated by a relatively small number of well known Wessex sites *e.g.* Winnall Down (Fasham 1985), Longbridge Deverill Cow Down (Chadwick Hawkes 1994), Pimperne (Harding 1963; Harding, *et al.* 1993), Little Woodbury (Bersu 1940), and from certain key sites from earlier periods and other parts of southern Britain; notably Black Patch in Sussex (Drewett 1979, 1980, 1982; Russell 1996) and Glastonbury Lake Village in Somerset (Barrett 1987; Bulleid and Gray 1911, 1917; Coles and Coles 1986; Tratman 1970) although some analyses have somewhat widened the net (*e.g.* Guilbert 1982). The roundhouse, wherever it is found throughout Britian, is often conceptually equal to the southern British roundhouse but, as dominant as it may be in research on the domestic architecture of the period, the southern British pre-Roman Iron Age roundhouse has not been studied in isolation. The various avenues of data with which it has been associated are vast, as J.D. Hill in his (1989) 're-thinking' of the Iron Age has pointed out, so it seems at first odd that studies of the Iron Age have taken until the 1990s to begin to receive the attention to theory that might make the best of the large quantities of available data. There are, however, strong reasons for this lag behind the research directions of the other studies of mid to late British Prehistory which are worth considering.

2.2. A NORMATIVE IRON AGE

Studies of the British Iron Age have, from the late 1960s until the 1990s, been dominated by systemic approaches to economies, site territories, settlement systems, exchange and inter-group contact alongside some of the concerns of the preceding culture-historical approach such as cultural groupings and affinities, typological classification and a 'Celtic' framework. This state of affairs may have pertained in large part due to the long-standing dominance of the approaches to the Iron Age taken by Barry Cunliffe who has been a major force in Iron Age studies since the publication of his doctoral research in the form of *Iron Age Communities in Britain* in 1974, now in its (substantially revised) third edition published in 1991.

By the 1990s, the Iron Age, for some, had become a period "consigned to the dustbin of history, written in our own image" (Parker Pearson 1996: 117); while others have felt that "the Iron Age is boring" (Hill 1989: 16). The Iron Age of southern Britain in particular, as theorised by Cunliffe and given substance by Reynolds is 'Celtic', rural, agricultural, rational, logical and systemic and has dominated interpretations of other regions of Britain. While there is a large amount of settlement data and estimates of populations, the Iron Age is, at a conceptual level, strangely depopulated save for a few high status individuals (most notably Boudica) attested in the classical accounts. Places have status and (mostly because of the lack of burial evidence) by implication do people, but the everyday people do not have either identity (apart from a comfortable pan-Celtic one) or gender (although they are occasionally attributed a sex).

The normative Iron Age is strangely familiar, in many ways a translocation of pre-war rural England only with round houses and more feasting and drinking. Its economy is measured much as we measure our own, in yields, produce and output. The products of sites and regions are sent to central places where elites redistribute them to non-food producers. In time of war, which is traditionally given to be often, the people rely on their hillforts to protect them and their centrally accumulated

produce. These hillforts are great defensive works whose primary role is the defence of a community in times of stress. Synthesis of the Iron Age is complex because of the large amount of information available, but from a normative perspective, despite the overwhelming amount of data in comparison to other periods of British prehistory, it is given to be readily understandable because of its apparent familiarity. Since the 1990s, however, challenges have been raised to this familiarity and the Otherness of the Iron Age is becoming increasingly apparent.

2.2.1. Challenges to the Normative Account

British Iron Age Studies have lagged behind the changes in approach that archaeology has seen in the last 40 years. Collis for example in his discussion of *An Approach to the Iron Age* still felt it necessary in 1977 to call attention to the "cultural approaches which still dominate much thought in Britain" (Collis 1977: 1), which was not true, even nearly 30 years ago, for other periods of British prehistory but was an accurate assessment of the state of Iron Age research. A dramatic change to this situation was begun in 1989 by J.D. Hill's short paper entitled *"Re-thinking the Iron Age"*. This was a direct challenge to the dominant approaches to the Iron Age and in particular to functional explanation within a framework of pan-European Celticity, but this re-orientation is still 10 years or so behind such 're-thinkings' for the British Neolithic for example (*e.g.* Thomas 1992). It was the catalyst for a series of dialogues in the *Scottish Archaeological Review* between 1988 and 1996 that sought to frame the Iron Age in a very different way, the intent of which is summarised by Hill in his discussion about *Hill-Forts and the Iron Age of Wessex* (Hill 1996a: 112). Two other significant monographs published in the mid 1990s also took this differing line, *"Different Iron Ages"* (Hill and Cumberpatch 1995) and *"The Iron Age in Britain and Ireland: recent trends"* (Champion and Collis 1996).

The 'Celticity' framework, having been attacked by Hill in a number of papers as irrelevant and constraining for understanding the British Iron Age (Hill 1989, 1993,

1995, 1996a, 1996b), was most effectively demolished by Simon James (James 1999; see also James and Rigby 1997). All of these discussions drew attention to the fact that the Celts are a literary entity, amalgamated out of different regions, times and sources, and in the case of the Atlantic Celts, an 18th century invention (James 1999). Iron Age archaeology had been used primarily to flesh out what was already 'known' about Celtic society, thus hillforts are the top of a hierarchy reflecting the hierarchical Celtic society, the seats of the (war) chiefs, while the enclosed farmsteads of the early Iron Age with their large houses belong to the next tier and so on. Such a framework it is argued, constrains the Iron Age to the romantically familiar, denying it its Otherness. It is this 'Otherness' that the approaches to the Iron Age of the last decade have sought to explore.

The Iron Age has recently come to be seen as regionally variable, the notion of a homogeneous Iron Age and the dominance of Wessex in the interpretation of other regions have begun to be superseded by archaeologies of regionality (*e.g.* Bevan 1999b). It has also been suggested the notion of the 'Iron Age' be dropped in favour of the study of the first millennium BC as there is a great deal of continuity from the later Bronze Age into the Iron Age (Haselgrove, *et al.* 2001: 3), the roundhouse being one example. Such a move would also remove the pseudo-problem of the Bronze Age-Iron Age transition and further direct attention towards regional and temporal variability and continuity, the details of which remain poorly understood (Haselgrove, *et al.* 2001).

2.3. THE HISTORY OF ROUNDHOUSE STUDIES

The study of the house in the British pre-Roman Iron Age has been shaped by three major bursts of activity that correspond to the shifts in approaches to the past taken by the discipline of archaeology as a whole, and their particular manifestation in Iron Age studies, though not necessarily to the broader timing of these shifts (Table 2.1.). While broadly applicable, these phases should only be considered as a guide to

the development of approaches to the roundhouse. That they are a little over simplified is most apparent with regard to the two periods of study that span from the 1960s to the present day. Processual approaches have maintained a longer dominance in Iron Age studies beyond that in the understandings of other prehistoric periods in Britain *e.g.* the Neolithic.

Period	Impetus	Focus	Conceptual Framework
1940–mid 1960s	The excavation and publication of Little Woodbury and the recognition of postholes as important archaeological features	Questions of morphology and origin	Culture-Historical approaches
mid 1960s-early 1990s	The issues raised by the excavation of Little Woodbury	Questions concerning roundhouse form and function	'Processual', systemic, scientific archaeology
early 1990s-present	The changing theoretical climate of British later prehistoric research and the publication of J.D. Hill's *Re-thinking the Iron Age.*	questions of meaning, symbolism and social significance	'Post Processual', Contextual and interpretative Archaeologies

Table 2.1. Phases in the development in studies of the roundhouse in British Iron Age archaeology.

2.4. THE ROUNDHOUSE: EXPLANATORY APPROACHES

It has already been stated that 'architecture' and 'house' have become synonymous in studies of pre-Roman Iron Age settlement and society. Moreover, 'house' has come to mean 'roundhouse', a situation that is largely the result of a long standing focus on the Wessex region, an area that for many years was itself dominated by one site; Little Woodbury.

Taken as a type, the roundhouse is well attested in the archaeological record, there are now over 1000 roundhouses known from all areas of Southern Britain alone (Cunliffe 1991), but the roundhouse has not always dominated explanations of the dwelling places of the people of the southern British Iron Age.

2.4.1. Before the Roundhouse: Pit Dwellings

Early excavations of Iron Age sites tended to focus on the more dramatic of those sites, particularly hillforts. They also tended to focus on the more dramatic of the features associated with those sites notably banks and ditches, or those archaeological features that might yield the most abundant and 'interesting' artefacts such as pits. It is in the ubiquitous pits found on hillforts that the Iron Age 'house' begins its interpretative life (Harding 1974; Reid 1993).

Pit-dwellings were the most popular way of interpreting the habitations of prehistoric people (or more accurately prehistoric *men*) in Britain up to the 1940s (*e.g.* Cocks 1909; Curwen 1934; Stevens 1934). For the Iron Age, as with other prehistoric periods, the popularity of the pit-dwelling prior to the 1940s rests with the preoccupation of the archaeologists of the time with discovering where the people, whose monuments and art was already known, lived out their everyday domestic existences.

For early excavators no discernable 'houses' could be identified (due largely to the fact that posthole scatters were not often recognised or considered important) but very large, easily identifiable pits often contained what appeared to be domestic debris and discarded food remains and in some cases even appeared to have hearths within them (Wheeler 1943). Iron Age people had to live somewhere, and these pits seemed the most likely candidates. The pit-dwelling hung on in the literature; Wheeler, for example still had pit-dwellings at Maiden Castle in his 1943 publication of that site (Wheeler 1943: 5). By this time however, the death-knell of the pit-dwelling, at least for the Iron Age, had already been sounded by Gerhard Bersu with the publication of his excavations at Little Woodbury, Wiltshire in the 6th proceedings of the then youthful Prehistoric Society in 1940.

2.4.2. The Legacy of Little Woodbury

Little Woodbury was a landmark excavation both in terms of its thoroughness as a piece of archaeological fieldwork for the time and its explanatory clarity. The illustrations of the visually minded Bersu (Evans 1989) left the archaeological community of the 1940s and beyond in no doubt as to the potential sophistication of the houses of the pre-Roman Iron Age. Prior to the publication of Little Woodbury and away from the pit-dwellings of Wessex, the only insight to be gained of the houses of the period was to be found at the 'Lake Village' at Glastonbury, Somerset (Bulleid and Gray 1911, 1917) and the upstanding archaeology of the highland zones such as Dartmoor, Devon. In contrast to Little Woodbury, the houses of the Glastonbury settlement seemed to be morphologically simple "huts". Bersu himself makes reference to Glastonbury and also to the Mere lake village (then being excavated) along with a number of other contemporary excavations of roundhouses, identifying only two of the same 'type' as the Little Woodbury House 1 at sites A and C at Frilford, Berkshire (Bersu 1940: 90, *ftn.* 3). Of Glastonbury he says, "the houses...are wall-less huts with dome shaped or conical roofs and vestibules" (Bersu 1940).

Little Woodbury rapidly came to be established as the 'type site' for a particular form of settlement, and House 1, the 'type fossil' of the buildings that could be expected to be found at such a site, a scheme crystallised by Hodson in 1964 with his identification of the 'Little Woodbury Culture' (Hodson 1964) as the 'type fossil' of the domestic architecture of one particular 'cultural grouping' among others that he identified on the basis of the sites, their features and associated artefacts. In fact very few houses like Little Woodbury House 1 have ever been identified, the often cited exceptions being Longbridge Deverill Cow Down House 3, Dorset (Chadwick Hawkes 1994); Pimperne, Dorset (Harding 1963; Harding, *et al.* 1993); and Old Down Farm, Hampshire (Davies 1981), and all of these are in a very small geographic location. The Frilford houses mentioned above, which were considered by Bersu to belong to this 'type', have since been dropped from the list.

All of these large double-ring roundhouses are limited to Wessex and to the 8th to the 5th centuries BC (Fitzpatrick 1994), although there are other large (*i.e.* over 10m in diameter) timber roundhouses, some of which may be of double ring construction, to be found elsewhere in Britain (Guilbert 1981). Never the less, the double-ring roundhouse of Little Woodbury type had such interpretative currency that it was considered for some thirty years to be typical of the houses in use in both the highland and lowland zones during the Iron Age (Harding 1973: 44) despite the (highly) visible evidence in the highland zone being dominated by stone-built structures.

The publication of Little Woodbury marks the beginning of the serious study of the house in the Iron Age that should perhaps have begun with Glastonbury. Within the framework of the Childeian culture-historical approach prevalent at the time, it became important to attempt to begin to identify house 'types'. Ultimately, after comparison with Continental European evidence, this came to be based around two primary categories of round and rectangular and for British roundhouses, two sub-categories of simple huts; exemplified in Wessex by those identified by Wheeler (1943) within Maiden Castle; and complex houses, exemplified by Little Woodbury. As it became important to classify house 'types', it also became important to explain their origins.

2.4.3. Insular Tradition or External Import?

By the 1960s circular patterns of postholes were sufficiently dominant in archaeological excavations of the pre-Roman Iron Age in Southern England to put the roundhouse in a pre-eminent position in Britain. Hodson (1964) felt that this was unlikely to undergo any serious revision in its dominance as a result of future studies and although many more rectangular structured have been identified through survey and excavation since 1964, the pre-eminence of the roundhouse in defining Iron Age (or first millennium BC) domestic architecture remains.

Up to at least the mid 1960s, explanations of the archaeological evidence for the settlements and societies of the Iron Age were dominated by a (hotly debated but fundamentally secure) framework of successive invasions (Hawkes 1959, 1956; Hodson 1964), after the development and widespread adoption of the 'invasion hypothesis' of the 1930s (Cunnington 1932; Hawkes 1931; Hawkes and Dunning 1932). In this context the question was: if the Iron Age 'cultures' of Britain came to be established as a result of a series of invasions from continental Europe, did the roundhouse come with them? The answer to that question seemed to be a resounding "no". In fact, the roundhouse was to be used by Hodson to argue against invasion (Hodson 1964).

Of the Round and the Rectangular

The typology of pre-Roman Iron Age houses put rectangular 'types' in Europe and circular 'types' in Britain. Hodson, in his discussion of British Iron Age 'cultural groupings' believed there to be only one isolated pocket on the Continent where circular vernacular architecture was regularly present (Harding 1973; Hodson 1964). These buildings from the northwestern Iberian 'Castro culture' were believed to date to after the first appearance of circular architecture in Britain. Moreover, they were built of stone rather than timber and therefore (in terms of morphological characteristics) could not be considered as a precedent to British timber forms by the standards of the day.

The dominant architectural tradition on the Continent, based on the evidenced of the archaeology and the pre-understandings imparted by a more or less binary classificatory scheme, was perceived to be rectangular and in contrast to the circular architectural tradition of Britain; a situation that would pertain until the 1970s when Rodwell, for example, argued for the regular presence of rectangular buildings in some areas in south-eastern England (Rodwell 1978). None the less, the division was so absolute that according to Harding (1973: 43):

> British archaeology in the 60s made it almost an axiom that British houses, in the Iron Age, were built to a circular plan, while rectangularity, long established on the Continent, remained there nearly universal.
>
> (Harding 1973: 43)

Classical Greek and Roman sources as well as the morphological characteristics visible in the archaeology were cited as evidence for the regional *i.e.* Continental or British, character of house forms. This is discussed mainly by Harding (1973: 47, 1974) who regarded such sources as a necessary part of the enquiry. Strabo's accounts of the Gauls (probably using Posidonius) states for example that:

> Their houses are large and circular, built of planks and wickerwork, the roof being a dome of heavy thatch.
>
> (Strabo, IV, iv, 3 – Quoted in Harding 1973: 47)

Harding uses this not only to argue for the presence of circular architecture on the Continent, but also to link such a tradition with British examples such as Little Woodbury (Harding 1963).

Harding's second avenue of Classical support is the Column of Marcus Aurelius. He uses the depictions of Roman soldiers setting fire to the dwellings of the "hapless natives" (Harding 1973: 47) of the region north of the Middle Danube in the 2nd century BC, to argue that houses in that region were more commonly circular than rectangular. This approach is not one that appears to have gained much wider currency but serves to demonstrate the importance of finding a resolution to this question.

The 'round or rectangular' debate has largely disappeared from the literature in recent years as the perceived need for 'origin stories' for the roundhouse is replaced by questions concerning their symbolic roles. This is perhaps an oversight as a greater prevalence of rectangular buildings in the British Iron Age would open out the debate about the meaning of roundhouse in British Iron Age societies by including a different architectural form into questions about what buildings represent.

Insular Bronze Age Precedents

The 'round or rectangular' debate was a part of a wider one concerning the development or 'evolution' of the roundhouses of Britain as a whole, although the focus was firmly on southern England, and served to direct the attention of scholars looking for the origins of the roundhouse towards the insular Bronze Age.

As was generally the case for the first 30 years postdating the publication of Little Woodbury, Bersu had already set the starting point for the debate. In his discussion supporting his interpretation of the Little Woodbury posthole pattern, Bersu had gone to considerable lengths to outline the 'evolution' of the roundhouse as a building form (Bersu 1940: 90-92). He felt that in terms of this 'evolution', Little Woodbury House 1 was related to conical-roofed house forms from the western Mediterranean but considered it an open question as to whether this particular example was "a form of house which first came to England with the Iron Age A civilisation, or whether old indigenous forms had been taken over." (Bersu 1940: 92).

Until the 1970s, the archaeology of the Bronze Age was dominated by funeral monuments, with comparatively little attention being directed at the settlement record; (Musson 1970: 267) although a significant number of Bronze Age settlement sites were known, the evidence of a few key sites in the south *i.e.* Shearplace Hill, Dorset (Rahtz and ApSimon 1962); Itford Hill, Sussex (Burstow and Holleyman 1957); Amberley Mount, Sussex (Ratcliffe-Densham and Ratcliffe-Densham 1966); Plumpton Plain, Sussex (Holleyman and Curwen 1935) and Thorny Down, Wiltshire (Stone 1941), was taken to point toward an unsophisticated and undeveloped Bronze Age architectural tradition; a view felt at the time to be borne out by westward comparisons with the stone 'hut circles' of the upland moors. Crucially, this apparent lack of sophistication attributed to mid-late Bronze Age roundhouses allowed for the Little Woodbury type houses to be seen as a leap in levels of sophistication that could be best explained as a result of external influence. Bersu for example, believed that roundhouses with

"advanced" (Bersu 1940: 90) plans, because they feature perpendicular walls, must have been "merely adapted from an already matured form of the rectangular building" (Bersu 1940: 90). This, given the then dominant notion of a British Iron Age created as a result of invasion, meant that the idea for the Little Woodbury type roundhouses had to have come from the continent. It would not be until the 1970s when this was challenged and Little Woodbury began to be seen as "unique rather than typical" (Musson 1970) that the link between Bronze Age and Iron Age building traditions could begin to be usefully explored.

Musson in 1970 (p.267) pointed out that the idea of Bronze Age buildings as mere 'huts', smaller than their Iron Age counterparts, with their roofs normally supported by a centre post, was a step too far in the interpretations of the original field reports. Musson, along with Avery and Close-Brooks (Avery and Close-Brooks 1969) – writing independently on the same topic at the same time – concluded, largely on the basis of reconsiderations of Itford Hill and Shearplace Hill, that the 'traditional' picture of small, centre-posted roundhouses in the Bronze Age developing into large multi-ringed and porched roundhouses in the Iron Age did not fit the observable patterns in the posthole arrangements for the Bronze Age. The proviso here however, one demonstrated by Thorny Down, was that it was possible to get different 'evidence' from the same posthole patterns (Musson 1970). This same discussion extended to the issue of potential rectangular and other non-circular buildings from the Bronze Age, which Musson identified again at Thorny Down (with attention to the same proviso) and at Itford Hill.

The discussions about the relative lack of sophistication of Bronze Age circular buildings in comparison with those of the Iron Age was taken a step further a little over a decade later in two papers by Graeme Guilbert (Guilbert 1981, 1982). Guilbert's aim with these two papers was to close the 'sophistication gap' between Bronze Age and Iron Age buildings from two distinct angles. The first concerned a point first recognised by

Musson (Musson 1970) and Avery and Close-Brooks (Avery and Close-Brooks 1969). This was the probability that many roundhouses that had found their way into the literature as single-ring structures may have been double-ring structures during their life but because of weathering, plough damage and, in the case of Danebury at least, covering over by soil build up at the base of the ramparts. Subsequent excavations a Danebury have refuted the possible existence of any double-ring buildings on that site (Cunliffe and Poole 1991). Guilbert develops this idea principally with reference to the mid first millennium BC sites of Crickley Hill (Dixon 1972, 1973a, 1973b, 1976) and Moel y Gaer, Clwyd, Wales (Guilbert 1976) but extends the discussion to include a considerable breadth of both Bronze Age and Iron Age structures.

Guilbert's second paper directly concerns what he called the "design-consciousness [of the] builders of everyday structures in later prehistory" (Guilbert 1982: 67). Here he is arguing that timber post-built roundhouses were often built symmetrically along an "axial line" that can be demonstrated to run through the centre of the building between the entrance and a single opposing post (*e.g.* Guilbert 1982: 70, fig. 3.2). Guilbert makes it clear that he does not feel that it is his place to offer any explanation as to why the Moel y Gaer and other selected roundhouses display this "axial line symmetry", but the point about this and his earlier discussion is to demonstrate, with as much data as possible, that roundhouses cannot be assumed to have normally been simple huts, although it is difficult to see why 'axial line symmetry' necessarily demonstrates sophistication over simplicity in structural terms.

The implication that these discussions were trying to make clear is that the few large Wessex Iron Age houses such as Little Woodbury did not represent the sort of jump in sophistication that previous explanations of the building tradition of the period had more or less taken for granted. This in turn meant that the unique/typical debate that had surrounded Little Woodbury House 1 was brought full circle. Little Woodbury House 1 had gone from an assumed typicality, to a position of uniqueness, and with

Guilbert's papers (see particularly Guilbert 1981), it had returned, if not to typicality, then at least to represent a possibly more commonplace form of structure. However, possibly because Guilbert erred on the side of caution in his (re)interpretations, the question of how it was that these buildings had come to be built in the ways in which they appeared to have been built, would not be addressed for a further decade. Instead the discussion of roundhouse form was left to individual excavators to decide and demonstrate, while others sought to better explain three-dimensional form and/or social function(s), which introduces experimental and socio-functional approaches to the roundhouse.

2.5. EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES

Throughout the period of the late 1960s to the present a number of individuals and organisations have attempted to explore the question of the morphological characteristics, durability, material properties and functionality of the roundhouse through scientifically styled experimentation. This will be explored in depth in a later chapter, but is raised here in outline to complete this review of approaches to the roundhouse.

Experimental research programmes, particularly those of Butser Ancient Farm (Reynolds 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1988, 1989, 1993) had a major impact on the creation of the image of the roundhouse, in particular the double-ring roundhouse. Bersu had already raised the question of what sort of structure the posthole patterns observable in the archaeological record could support. In his Little Woodbury report and during his excavation campaigns on the Isle of Man (Bersu 1977; Evans 1989) during his 'internment' there, Bersu had put considerable effort into visualising the structures as he thought that they would have appeared.

With more concern for their outward appearance than their correlation with the archaeology; Allan Sorrell's visually dramatic interpretations of roundhouses

(*e.g.* Sorrell 1981) were part of the same attempt to explain an unfamiliar architectural form. With the rise of 'scientific' approaches to the past, the idea that it might be possible to experimentally reconstruct a roundhouse based on a carefully excavated ground plan began to take hold, based on the idea that scientific rigour would produce a more secure 'truth' than artistic impression or the speculation of excavators.

The experimental archaeology of the Iron Age roundhouse is synonymous with the work of Peter Reynolds and the Butser Ancient Farm Project (est. 1972). Reynolds' major contribution has been to elucidate the structural engineering properties of circular, timber post-built structures of both single and multiple ring types. The dominant image of the form of roundhouses in prehistory is also directly attributable to Reynolds' work although there are many others who have done similar work, as is evidenced by the large number of reconstructed roundhouses currently standing inn Britain (*cf.* Guilbert 1981: 306; 1982: 67). It is interesting to note that despite this impact, which few would dispute, the work of the Butser Ancient Farm Project is not as often referred to in the academic literature as one might expect, appearing more commonly in popular accounts (*e.g.* Bewley 2003; James and Rigby 1997); discounting those written by Reynolds himself. For example, although the Longbridge Deverill Cow Down building appears on the cover of the recent *Agenda for Action* for the British Iron Age (Haselgrove, *et al.* 2001), the research of the farm is not discussed within.

2.6. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF ROUNDHOUSES

While research into roundhouse form was taking place from the different angles discussed above, a few researchers began to question their social function. The two key papers in this regard are David Clarke's analysis of Glastonbury Lake Village for the Iron Age (Clarke 1972), and for the Bronze Age, Peter Drewett's reports on Black Patch, East Sussex (Drewett 1979, 1980, 1982). Both of these ground-breaking

analyses have been challenged and subject to revision over time (Gilchrist 1999; Russell 1996) and ultimately, in Clarke's case to dismissal (Barrett 1987; Coles and Coles 1986).

Another important analysis in this vein is Ellison's model of Bronze Age society (Ellison 1978, 1981). None of these approaches or others in this vein (*e.g.* Barrett, *et al.* 1981; Fisher 1985; Halstead, *et al.* 1978; Mytum 1989) placed any social significance whatsoever with the form of the roundhouse beyond the identification of a major/minor house couplet, concentrating instead on the artefacts and ecofacts associated with the structures to delimit activity areas and to thus build models of social arrangements. One analysis that does take some account of house form (size) is that of John Barrett (Barrett 1989: 312) who argued that in the late Bronze Age/early Iron Age the large double-ring roundhouse filled the roles that had previously fallen to separate compounds and spaces as defined for example by Drewett (Drewett 1982).

These analyses can be seen as the final step in moving away from traditionally styled questions of roundhouse morphology that had dominated the study of these structures from the time of Bersu's landmark report. Settlements and societies instead became the foci for discussion and the roundhouse itself dropped into the background to play a supporting role as a container for socio-economic activities. The social significance of the roundhouse and thus its worthiness as an object for study in its own right was not to be investigated again until the 1990s.

2.7. THE LAST DECADE: INTERPRETATIVE APPROACHES

The discussion thus far has focussed on the 50-year period postdating the publication of the Little Woodbury excavations. It has also noticeably concentrated on two themes: 1. typology and classification and 2. form and function. In the 1990s the study of the roundhouse returned to questioning form. After theoretical developments in the wider discipline, this came not from the technological or typological viewpoint

of earlier research, but rather from the concern with the notion of *significance* (although classification and functional explanation were by no means superseded, *e.g.* Barrow 1990; Strang 1991). The other major change in approach was from that of social *function* to social *meaning*. The possible range of meanings of the roundhouse within Bronze Age and Iron Age societies has come under increasing scrutiny. This shift was brought to wider acceptance for the Iron Age by J.D. Hill (Hill 1989). Although already common in the study of other British prehistoric periods and their features, it was a new way to begin to talk about the Iron Age. During the 1990s a few key works emerged that sought to understand the role of the roundhouse in the Iron Age (Fitzpatrick 1994; Hill 1993, 1996a; Hingley 1990b; Oswald 1991, 1997; Parker Pearson 1996; Parker Pearson and Richards 1994b). In these studies there are three distinct phenomena that are focussed upon: 1. the organisation of internal space, 2. the cosmological referents of the building itself and 3. entrance orientation.

The first of these phenomena to come under scrutiny was the organisation of the internal space of the roundhouse. Guilbert, writing from the perspective of observations made during the excavations at Moel y Gaer, Rhosesmor, Wales argued for the regular division of roundhouses into two halves divided down the centre by an 'axial line' (Guilbert 1982). Hingley, expanding both on Guilbert and on Cunliffe (Cunliffe 1978: 175) argued that the timber post-built roundhouses of southern Britain of both single-ring and double-ring construction had an internal space divided into a central and a peripheral area (Hingley 1990b). A spatial division also identified in northern British roundhouses (Reid 1989) and attested in classical accounts (Ross 1970). Hingley sees this division as much as a conceptual division as a physical one, referring to the "symbolic universe" (Hingley 1990b: 133) of their inhabitants. From this point of view, the house became more than a shelter, the form of which was dictated by a vague concept of continuity of tradition, to an active item of material culture that referred to and perhaps acted as a metaphor for the social world of Iron Age peoples. This world and therefore the house, was to be to be understood in a

"embody ritual and cosmological concerns" (Hill 1995: 51), the focus of this ordering being the entrance porch as a boundary situated between inside and outside. As well as representing a boundary, Parker Pearson (1996) further considered the porch or doorway to be the focal point of the roundhouse due to its often relatively massive construction and the occurrence of foundation deposits in the postholes of some sites such as Haddenham (see Evans and Serjeantson 1988).

Roundhouse entrances had long been recognised to have been oriented on an east-west axis (*e.g.* Musson 1970; Boast and Evans 1985). Previous explanations for this had cited protection against the prevailing winds or maximising the available light (see Giles and Parker Pearson 1999; Hill 1996b for a critique of this). Within a framework of structural and symbolic archaeology however, this orientation to the rising sun came to be regarded as symbolic rather than functional (Hill 1988, 1993, 1996a; Oswald 1991, 1997; Parker Pearson 1996; Parker Pearson and Richards 1994b) while still allowing for the possibility that the availability of light in the different parts of the house did play a part in the locating of activities within (Giles and Parker Pearson 1999). The most detailed analysis of this phenomenon to date is by Oswald in his PhD (Oswald 1991, but *cf.* Oswald 1997). He identified that the majority of roundhouses face due east towards the equinox sunrise, with another significant number oriented on the mid-winter solstice, finding these to be primarily symbolic orientations, a major catalyst for Fitzpatrick's later development of the 'sunwise' model (Fitzpatrick 1994). Oswald also considered Bronze Age roundhouses and found that in contrast these tended to face towards the south and south-southeast, which, in a somewhat surprising contrast to his interpretation of Iron Age orientation, he has interpreted as due to a desire to minimise wind exposure and maximise the potential of the available sunlight.

Parker Pearson's treatment of the significance of entrance orientation makes a number of important observations and interesting interpretations beyond those

of earleir authors (Parker Pearson 1996). He suggests that the Bronze Age/Iron Age division may not be helpful, preferring instead to consider the phenomenon as belonging to the first millennium BC. Like the earlier attempts of Hingley (1990) and Fitzpatrick (1994) to rethink the layout of the roundhouse, Parker Pearson further develops the themes of these papers through the use of structural oppositions, coupled with artefactual distributions across a range of sites from the first millennium BC. Specifically, he concludes that entrance orientations signify light/life/fertility when towards the east and dark/death/infertility when towards the west, drawing on the 'usual' meanings of the front or eastern part of the house or the back or western part of the house respectively. Accordingly, he suggests that front may mean east and the rear west, with all their attendant symbolic associations, even if they do not face west or east *per se*.

Grounding this interpretation in the archaeology, Parker Pearson notes that in contrast to the 'normal' eastern orientation of roundhouses there are a small number of houses that have a reversed orientation *e.g.* Old Down Farm (Davies 1981), Winklebury house 3870 (Fisher 1985) and Crickley Hill (Dixon and Bourne 1977; Guilbert 1981: fig. 8N) these, he suggests might be buildings that were "profane, dark, associated with death and barrenness" (Parker Pearson 1996: 127), with a role other than a place for the activities of life. He also picks up on the major/minor houses couplet and suggests that the major house is associated with food consumption while the minor houses its preparation and production, he does not, unlike Drewett, interpret this along gender lines.

The recent approaches discussed above remain heavily dominated by structuralist ideas of the existence of binary oppositions; inside:outside, right:left, male:female, public:private, life:death *etc.*, all of which are to a greater or lesser extent lifted primarily from Bourdieu's analysis of the Kabyle house (Bourdieu 1977) and Claude Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropology (Lévi-Strauss 1963). There is clearly room for the development of other theoretical perspectives to account for the

lived-world of the British later prehistoric roundhouse – whether conceived of as a Bronze Age, Iron Age or first millennium BC phenomenon. One such approach has been recently identified as an "archaeology of inhabitation" (Haselgrove *et al.* 2001: 9), which takes the world as experienced by the body in space as its starting point. Only a small number of such studies are currently in the public domain (Barrett, *et al.* 2000; Hughes and Woodward 1998). Barrett's classification of the artefacts from Cadbury Castle by the ways in which they relate to their use by embodied people (such as things for eating) rather than the usual classificatory schemes based on materials or artefact types is a good attempt to move away from understandings of artefacts abstracted from their contexts of use. Barrett's approach is all the more interesting as it structures the site report rather than being relegated to later synthesis, and as such promises much for the continued re-thinking of the Iron Age, although, from the perspective of this review, his failure to recognise roundhouses as material culture in the same way as the rest of his classificatory scheme can only be lamented.

2.8. A SUMMARY OF UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE ROUNDHOUSE

What, then, of the results of these different approaches, what have they contributed to understandings of the pre-Roman Iron Age house in southern England? In the middle years of last century the roundhouse, as defined (however selectively) by Little Woodbury 1 (Bersu 1940), was a grand structure and exciting evidence that Iron Age man (*sic.*) did not live in the squalid pits to which he had previously been consigned (*e.g.* Buttler 1936; Cocks 1909; Curwen 1934; Stevens 1934). As more settlement sites were excavated and more buildings were uncovered it became apparent that there were a range of building types of broadly circular form, corresponding to different settlement patterns at different periods of the Iron Age. This accumulated evidence pointed towards the overwhelming dominance throughout the period of circular buildings leading archaeologists to ask why the house in Continental Europe was rectangular in plan whereas in these islands it was circular; a question that has never really been answered in such comparative terms.

It was quickly realised that the roundhouse in all its Iron Age forms represented a continuity in building tradition from the preceding insular Bronze Age; not imported as a result of the various invasions that these Isles were reported to have seen. This realisation went some way to dispelling the long-lived 'Invasion Hypothesis' in later years. Despite their evident diversity, roundhouses were for many years seen as unsophisticated huts, notwithstanding the few exceptions that fitted into the double-ring Little Woodbury 'class'.

The experimental reconstructions of the 1970s did much to put paid to this notion of the rude 'hut'. They indicated that in structural engineering terms at least, a post-built circular structure of cylinder and cone form is structurally sophisticated, stable and potentially long lived (Reynolds 2000, pers comm.). Beyond these experiments it also began to become apparent in the 1980s and developed into the 1990s, that roundhouses were sophisticated in other ways. It was argued that there were probably many more double-ring structures than had previously been recognised (Guilbert 1981) and that in some of these, possibly many of them, there was a deliberate symmetry (Guilbert 1982), internal division of space (Cunliffe 1978; Fitzpatrick 1994; Hingley 1990b) and alignment (*e.g.* Boast and Evans 1986; Musson 1970; Oswald 1991, 1997).

The alignment and internal divisions of roundhouses (Boast and Evans 1986; Fitzpatrick 1994; Giles and Parker Pearson 1999; Hingley 1990b; Musson 1970; Oswald 1991, 1997; Parker Pearson 1996; Parker Pearson and Richards 1994b) turned out to be particularly significant for the complexity of the roundhouse, not in engineering terms but in terms of its social and ideological referents. Roundhouses began to be seen as referring to and signifying the beliefs and ideologies of the people that lived in them or interacted with them (Boast and Evans 1986; Hill 1988, 1993, 1996a; Musson 1970; Oswald 1991, 1997; Parker Pearson 1996; Parker Pearson and Richards 1994b). They began to be seen as symbolic entities, structuring and being structured by the worlds of the peoples of the Iron Age.

An obvious next step is to expand on what constitutes the lived-worlds of the different Iron Ages across Britain and how they are manifest in the archaeological record of the roundhouse. In contrast to the relatively abstracted extent that pertains at present where roundhouses have begun to acquire meaning but it is not clear to whom, how and why, this thesis centres on how phenomenologies of the experienced roundhouse may develop our understanding of what it is to be involved with such entities. One particular concept that is seen to be useful in this regard in that of the 'ritual of the everyday'. Developed phenomenological approaches that take this notion to represent a phenomenon that may be broken down and studied in relation to the ways in which it is constructed and negotiated by through engagements with material culture in the past have the potential to 'flesh out' what the ritual of the everyday consists in across the Iron Ages of Britain.

2.9. RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR A PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF BUILDING

The questions asked of the roundhouse have been predominantly technological, with social, symbolic and, more recently, phenomenological approaches developing only in the last two decades. Through these approaches, roundhouses have been studied from a few key perspectives: as finished products in their own right, as technological entities that require building (making) and what that building requires materially and technically and, to a very limited degree at present, as experienced entities. The question of how roundhouses were built is particularly interesting because of its apparent mundanity; it is assumed to have been answered, particularly by experimental reconstruction projects. The view taken here is that this is misleading because the question has only been answered in terms of materials and perceived technological constraints. If the question of how they were built is rephrased in phenomenological form to, "What is involved in *being* a roundhouse builder?" attention is drawn away from the roundhouse itself as an isolable technological artefact towards those that built the roundhouse. This is a necessary step as building is

an activity that is taken for granted and no attention is currently given to building as a social act or builders as involved, self-interpreting agents. Building can be understood as a situated activity that involves the relationships of individuals with tools, materials and other individuals, engaged in activities that structure self interpretation in one particular context of everyday living within the broader milieu of Iron Age life.

This raises seven broad research questions for a phenomenology of building:

- What is building? Is it a technological means to an end or a meaning giving activity?
- Who are roundhouse builders? How might they be brought into focus and understood
- What constitutes the 'world' of the roundhouse builder? Is it specific, shifting and context dependent or is it broad?
- What is the relationship of builders to the building of a roundhouse? Is it one of abstraction or immersion?
- What part does being involved in building play in structuring people's understandings of themselves and their specific roles in this context?
- Is building primarily about theoretical knowledge or practical skill?
- How do people enact their understandings of raw materials, structural elements and tools in the contexts of building? Are they primarily understood in abstraction as things to be known about or in terms of their roles in building? Can we expect this emphasis to alter? If so, under what circumstances.

The main goal of this thesis is to develop a phenomenology of everyday activity applied to the building of a roundhouse. The kind of phenomenology proposed here

~CHAPTER 3~
A CRITIQUE OF THE ONTOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EXPERIMENTAL ARCHAEOLOGY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON ROUNDHOUSE RECONSTRUCTION

The preceding chapter discussed the background to the study of the Iron Age in Britain in general and of the roundhouse in particular with the aim of setting this thesis in a context of research on the Iron Age in Britain. This chapter develops the themes of general background and specific manifestations by considering the theory and practice of experimental archaeology. The first half of the chapter will discuss the explicit and implicit classificatory schemes and theoretical groundings of experimental archaeology in general, while the second half will focus on the practice of experimental reconstruction of the Iron Age roundhouse. This latter focus will be developed in relation to the ways in which the philosophy and theory of experimental archaeology creates its object through the well-known and influential 'Pimperne House', which stood between 1976 and 1990 at the 'Demonstration Area' of the Butser Ancient Farm Project (BAF), Queen Elizabeth Country Park, Hampshire, England (BAF moved in 1991 to its current location at Bascomb Copse, Waterlooville, Hants.) (see *e.g.* the Butser Ancient Farm Website). The subtext to these discussion is the critique of the Cartesian ontology of subject and object as it underpins the theory and practice of experimental archaeology in general and roundhouse reconstruction in particular.

3.1. SETTING THE GROUNDS FOR CRITIQUE

The discussion and critique that follows is specifically targeted at 'field-based' experimental archaeology in a general sense and experimental reconstruction in particular. The latter occupies the pre-eminent position in this critique because it is, alongside an interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy and the development of a phenomenological methodology, a main focus of the thesis, however, it is felt that the issues discussed are also broadly applicable to other field-based experimental

programmes such as flintknapping, tool use, metalwork and all other forms of experimental archaeology where a major component of the conducting of those experiments is the input of those involved. The following issues will therefore be addressed:

- Why experimental archaeology is formulated in the way that it is
- Whether this is the only possible formulation
- What this formulation excludes and how any exclusions might be redressed.

The principle notions critiqued are:

- That the 'scientific' approach advocated and practiced by experimental archaeologists is the only valid one,
- That an such approach is 'neutral', 'natural' and 'obvious',
- That little or nothing is presupposed,
- That experimental approaches have and should have nothing to say about people, that technologies and materials are all that is accessed in practice and all that is accessible in theory
- That 'explanation' is achieved and nothing is 'interpreted'.

I will suggest that experimental archaeology, in its current formulation, creates a mythical hyper-rational past, a material fiction authored by the experimenter as scientist that cannot account for human involvement in building.

3.2. EXPERIMENTAL ARCHAEOLOGY IN BRITAIN

In order to set this discussion in context we might begin with a brief overview of experimental archaeology in Britain. Experimental archaeology began to

develop as a loosely defined sub-discipline in the early 1960s, reaching a peak of popularity as a scientific exercise in the mid to late 1970s with the rise of the 'New' Archaeology. From its formalisation in the midst of this period of popularity in the early 1970s through to the present day, there have been few direct expositions of the general principles and methodological and theoretical underpinnings of experimental archaeology. This is only done explicitly in a very limited number of publications (Ascher 1961; Coles 1973; Coles 1977, 1979; Hansen 1974; Hobley 1973; Ingersoll, *et al.* 1977; Johnson 1987, 1989; Kelterborn 1987; Reynolds 1978; Reynolds 1986; Reynolds 1999b). Otherwise, the topic is given small treatment in wider works such as introductions to archaeology (*e.g.* Green 1996; Hayden 1993; Renfrew and Bahn 1996; Rice 1998), archaeological method or theory (Dark 1997; Hodder 1982 and 1999; Neustupný 1993; Renfrew, 1996; Schiffer 1987; Stone and Planel 1999). In all of these publications, covering over 30 years, the tone is descriptive, and the subject is taken as empirical and/or scientific. This is as true of the earliest publications on experimental archaeology of the 1960s (*e.g.* Ascher 1961) as it is of the most recent, published in 1999 (Stone and Planel 1999) despite the efforts of the editors and one of the contributing authors (Rasmussen and Grønnow 1999) of the latter to introduce some interpretative thinking to the subject.

Experimental archaeology, as it is currently practiced, has two major concerns: the manufacture and use of the technologies of past societies, and the formation processes of the archaeological record. The four people who have played the largest part in the development of the general principles and practices of experimental archaeology have been, in Britain, John Coles (Harding 1999 contains a complete bibliography of Coles' work) and Peter Reynolds, Hans Ole Hansen in Scandinavia (Hansen 1959, 1974, 1977) and Erret Callahan in the USA (Sidoroff 1991). The history of what we now call experimental archaeology long predates these key protagonists. Something like it, *i.e.* the exploration of technology and production by physical/practical means, extends well beyond the formalisation of the discipline of archaeology. The earliest attested

'experiments' being underway on musical instruments before 1850 (Coles 1979: 12), and others on stone tools probably a good deal earlier.

Despite this considerable history, the formal, 'scientific' sub-discipline of 'Experimental Archaeology' came to coherence only on the back of the 'New' archaeology of the 1960s. It was developed as a methodological tool to produce secure explanations of the "prime data" (Reynolds 1978) of the archaeological record. Its appeal was based on the perceived strength and neutrality of explanation derived from the methodology of experimental science.

3.3. CLASSIFICATION AND CONCEPTUAL SCHEMA IN EXPERIMENTAL ARCHAEOLOGY

Experimental archaeology is often classified to reflect the way in which experiments tend to be divided in practice: lithics, ceramics, metallurgy, organic artefacts, food processing, agriculture, boats and watercraft, militaria, architectural reconstruction and site formation processes.

Such a characterisation is not, however, very helpful in considering how experimental archaeology is formulated except in so much as it is clear that the focus of study is the material. In this regard, this object centred classification demonstrates that experimental archaeology does not see itself as concerned with the social in any direct sense, it also suggests universality; that all archaeological materials are amenable to study in this way. There are other ways in which to classify experiment in archaeology that are more revealing.

In what remains the standard textbook, Coles (1979) takes a thematic approach by which he sets his chapters: 'discovery and exploration', 'subsistence', 'settlement', 'arts and crafts', and 'life and death'. This scheme is potentially more revealing as it appears to suggest that experimental approaches may have something more to say

about the "experience of life" (Coles 1979: 1). In the event, what is revealed in a reading of this text is a sense of optimism that this should be so, but a failing of the conceptual scheme and methodology employed so to do.

Experimental archaeology may also be defined conceptually. This is much more revealing from the point of view that the closely related theoretical and methodological constitution of experimental archaeology reveals its potentials and limitations far more clearly that does its subject matter. Coles outlines a conceptual scheme for the 'types' of experiment that may legitimately be engaged in, a scheme that he reiterates some years later (Coles 1997). This scheme is developed from his 1973 book *Archaeology by Experiment*, and an earlier paper (Coles 1977). The scheme divides 'experimental' projects into Level I – display only, Level II – production and manufacture and Level III – manipulation and purpose. For Coles only Levels II and III are properly experimental. The scheme is dominated by method and object, making level III the most explanatorily secure.

Differing from Coles' definition of types of experiments is the scheme devised by Callahan in the US (Sidoroff 1991). Callahan's is a tri-partite division of Class I – Simulation, Class II – Replication and Class III – Reconstruction, in ascending order of validity. For Callahan the object does not play as strong a defining role as it does for Coles. Several steps in detail beyond both Coles and Callahan's scheme is that of Peter Reynolds. Reynolds' scheme is not fully articulated until 1998/9 with the publication of *The Nature of Experiment in Archaeology*, first published independently in a Butser Ancient Farm Occasion Paper (Vol. IV) in 1998 then later in *The Constructed Past: Experimental Archaeology, Education and the Public* (Stone and Planel 1999). Like Callahan and Coles, Reynolds' scheme has three basic divisions: Experiment, Experience and Education. Within the first of these he defines four categories: the Construct Experiment, Process and Function Experiment, and the Simulation and Eventuality Trial. For Reynolds, more like Callahan than Coles, method is the principle defining characteristic of 'proper' experimental practice.

Given the stated focus of this thesis, one may feel inclined to ask: "where is the philosophical element of the types of study outlined above?" The materials and technologies that experimental archaeology takes as its focus have, as material culture, been studied in a number of ways outside the specific concerns of experimental archaeology that are informed in their own ways by different philosophical and theoretical discourses. Often such studies have a strong anthropological focus dealing with such issues as the meanings that technologies and technological processes have for traditional societies. Such studies have been particularly enlightening for example in attempts to understand the roles of metals and metallurgy (*e.g.* Hosler 1994). These types of study are quite different in character because of the philosophical traditions that ground them, as opposed to those that ground experimental studies. The philosophical underpinning to all of the different approaches to experimental archaeology outlined above is essentially the same: they are based in a philosophy of science that asks 'how' questions and seeks to answer them through a secure and universally applicable methodology that will result in robust explanations. This applied model of experimental science often masquerades as 'common sense' though it is in fact a high level philosophical position that has become naturalised in Anglo-American thought, an important point that will be discussed further below.

3.3.1. The Tenets of Experimental Archaeology

Lying behind all of these conceptual schemes are a number of basic tenets (Table 3.1.), adherence to which qualifies a particular project as 'experimental' in the 'true' sense *i.e.* Callahan's Class III, Coles' Level II and Reynolds more prosaic 'Experiment'. As indicated above there are a number of versions of this, each of which differs in accordance with the particular interests of the experimenter (Coles

Tenets of Experimental Archaeology
Precise replication of 'prime data'
Removal of the 'human element'
Repeatability
Testability
Refutability only
Conclusions as explanation
Separation of interpretation from experiment

Table 3.1. The tenets of experimental archaeology.

1977, 1979, 1997; Reynolds 1986; Reynolds 1999b; Sidoroff 1991). Despite this it is possible to identify six fundamentals of experimental practice.

Organised hierarchically, the first of these is that the 'prime data' *i.e.* the archaeological 'evidence' is replicated precisely. This means that only materials and technologies from only one archaeological context may form the basis for any subsequent experiment. This is held to be important because it is this and only this 'prime data' that is to be explained. This presupposes the second tenet that the "human element" (Reynolds 1999b) must be removed from any experiment. This means that under no circumstances must the experimenter as scientist be detectable in the formulation, practice or result of an experiment. This is held to be important if the neutrality of the exercise is to be preserved, the focus on the materials and/or technology is to be consistently maintained and the result to be free of 'bias'. On this rests the third tenet of 'repeatability'. An experiment must be repeatable at the hands of any other experimenter/scientist where the material and technological conditions of the original experiment are duplicated. This tenet, then, is formed of two parts: repeatability of process and duplicability of basic conditions. This is held to be important because consistent repeatability and duplicability will render any conclusion more secure, either in terms of affirmation or refutation. Upon this rests the fourth tenet that technological and material conditions of an experiment must be testable against the 'prime data'. This is held to ensure that no conclusion may be reached that does not refer back directly to the 'prime data'. The fifth tenet is that no conclusion may be held to be 'true' other than if it is in the negative. This essentially means that nothing may be proven only disproven. This is held to be important because it permits greater security of conclusion and acts as a filter for the sorts of things that may be said about the 'prime data'. The sixth tenet is that any conclusion is offered only as an explanation of the processes and results of any given experiment. This means that any conclusions must be descriptive in character and at each stage transparently related to the 'prime data' and basic processes of the experiment. This is held to be important in

order to facilitate comparison with repeated or like experiments. Upon the sixth rests the seventh tenet that interpretation is a process that occurs only after explanation has been forwarded and has no bearing on the experimental process at any stage. This cycles us back to the first tenet thus maintaining internal coherence and consistency of approach. Or does it? This question and all the above points will be considered later in light of the Pimperne roundhouse reconstruction experiment.

3.4. THEORETICAL GROUNDING

Forming the ground upon which the classifications, conceptual schemes and tenets of experimental archaeology rest is a rigid philosophical/theoretical doctrine, familiar to most as the 'hypothetico-deductive' approach. This was the favoured approach of the 'New' archaeology from the 1960s to early 1980s and still dominates most of the science based archaeological sub-disciplines such as archaeobotany and archaeometallurgy. It also continues to dominate the discipline in general in many countries and archaeological fieldwork almost universally, particularly in the context of developer-funded excavation (but see *e.g.* Barrett, *et al.* 2000; Bender, *et al.* 1997; Hodder 1999, 2000; Tilley 1994).

Experimental archaeology could be argued to be the definitive application of this hypothetico-deductive approach in its most distilled form. The overwhelming majority of experimental archaeologists would be happy to describe their work as composed within the following basic formulation (Fig. 3.1.):



Figure 3.1. Simplified formulation of experimental archaeology.

This basic formulation can be elaborated slightly to clarify the procedural distinction between positive and negative conclusions and the need for comparison such as the following two examples (Figs 3.2. and 3.3.), which do not differ significantly:



Figure 3.2. Coles' simplified trajectory of an experiment (redrawn after Coles 1997: 309, fig.1).



Figure 3.3. Reynolds' 'philosophy' of experimental archaeology (redrawn after Reynolds 1978: 143, fig.1).

Essentially, an experimental approach begins with observation of the archaeological data, followed by the formation of a hypothesis relating to those observations, the testing of the hypothesis against the archaeological data by means of experiment and finally, the formation of a conclusion(s) based on the results of that test, that conclusion then takes on the character of hypothesis and so the process may begin again.

If the above reads a little like the grounding theory and philosophy has been passed over in favour of method, or that I have confused method with theory, then this is deliberate. To do so highlights the confusions under which experimental archaeology operates. It will be remembered that the most exciting thing about the 'New' archaeology was its eagerness to discuss and debate philosophical and theoretical positions resulting in a raft of publications that were unashamedly theoretical in their constitution (*e.g.* Binford 1962; Salmon 1982; Schiffer and Skibo 1987; Watson, *et al.* 1971), something that, with the exception of a few authors such as Childe, had not happened before.

The main figures of Anglo-American experimental archaeology, Callahan, Coles and Reynolds picked up this excitement and the challenge of transparently accessible thinking that came with it. Rather than deal directly with the system of thought that they and their contemporaries were so excited about however, they set to translating it into a unitary method that could be readily and transparently applied to all archaeological materials. The result of this is that from the outset, archaeology by experiment passed over the positivist theoretical position upon which it relies. It also confused theory with method; a situation that is entirely transparent in any publication that purports to outline or discuss the philosophy or theory of experimental archaeology (Table 3.2.).

Author	Date
Ascher	1961, 1970
Bahn	1999
Coles	1963, 1967, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1997
Dark	1997
Hobley	1973
Hodder	1982
Ingersoll, *et al.*	1977
Kelterborn	1987
Reynolds	1977, 1978, 1999
Shaw	1966

Table 3.2. Example of authors addressing the theory or philosophy of experimental archaeology.

3.4.1. Epistemology

Experimental archaeology is founded upon the philosophical doctrine of Positivism. Originally put forward by Auguste Comte (d. 1857) (Comte 1957), Positivism was a rejection of the knowledge claims of metaphysics – described in the *Oxford Companion to Philosophy* as "having to do with the features of ultimate reality, what really exists and what it is that distinguishes that and makes it possible" (Hamlyn 1995) – in favour of those based on the observation of that which is directly available to the senses. Later Positivism was transformed by a group of philosophers known as the 'Vienna Circle' into 'Logical Positivism' which was concerned with evaluating the truth claims in terms of their linguistic construction *i.e.* how a statement might be deemed to be true or not true. In its archaeological formulation, Positivism brings these two variants together and is more closely linked to the work of the influential philosopher of science Carl Hempel, writing around one hundred years later (*e.g.* Hempel 1942, 1952, 1962, 1965a; Hempel 1965b; Hempel 1966), particularly his *Studies in the Logic of Explanation*, co-authored with Paul Oppenheim (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). In these works is set out the grounds by which truth claims may be made and the process by which one arrives at them in terms of the physical sciences and the language they employ. Hempel developed the notion of a deductive-nomological approach to reasoning (Hempel 1962); that from a given set of premises a conclusion must follow (deduction) and that those conclusions can lead to scientifically lawlike (nomic) statements.

The work of Karl Popper – who never, in fact, claimed to be a positivist – (Popper 1959, 1963, 1974) is also central to the archaeological (particularly experimental) formulation of positivism. One important tenet of this work is known as the falsification principle; *i.e.* that the truth of any given hypothesis cannot be known, only that its falsity can be proved. Thus any hypothesis which resists attempts to falsify it represents the best available conclusion. Inference drawn from any such

conclusion is adductive *i.e.* that it explains the majority of the evidence, this is often referred to as 'inference to the best explanation' (Harman 1965).

Experimental archaeology is also identifiable with an explanatory doctrine of functionalism. This has meant that any explanation that is derived from a set of conclusions arrived at by the process of deduction is couched in terms of 'what something is for'. Thus we understand pits from Iron Age sites as being *for* the storage of grain, or roofs and walls being *for* protection from the elements, or the eastward orientation of doorways being *for* capturing the most available light. This assumes that all things have one primary and fundamental use, that any other role for them is secondary, and derivative, or to use Binford's oft quoted phrase "epiphenomenal". As Lucas has pointed out (Lucas 2001: 181), it also assumes a basic action or basic event that underlies the truth of archaeological/technological material.

Allied to functionalism is the notion of adaptation; that archaeological/ technological objects are adaptations to (usually) environmental circumstances. So for example, a roundhouse conceived as an object that is functionally adapted to its environmental setting of lowland Britain will be reconstructed in terms of the most efficient way that this may be achieved.

All of these theoretical concepts underlie experimental work in archaeology. This means that at an epistemological level experimental archaeology, which often purports to simply be based on common sense (*e.g.* Reynolds 1999), is deeply theoretical. In order to make any sense at all, experimental archaeology must assume that these theoretical formulations are true, essentially and incontestably. Such a truth relies for its foundation upon even more deeply theoretical notions of the nature of the world and the things in it; its ontology.

3.4.2. Ontology

The ontology of positivism is Cartesian, that is it is a system of thought that is identifiable with the 17th century French philosopher and mathematician, René Descartes. The core of Cartesian ontology is the subject/object dichotomy *i.e.* the world and everything in it may be divided into two types of entity; the *subject* and the *object*. The subject is usually taken to equate to the individual while the object is everything else. The equation of the subject with the individual is in fact a common misunderstanding. The subject, called by Descartes the *res cogitans,* is a thinking thing; a mind essentially, while the object is the *res extensa,* the external thing; anything outside the mind. The Cartesian mind is a disembodied, fully autonomous entity that can only have certain knowledge of its own existence (hence Descartes' familiar "I think, therefore I am"). The object is given to exist outside the subject in an independent reality.

The epistemological concerns discussed above are born of the fundamental problem that this ontological scheme sets up, which is how the *res cogitans* can know that anything beyond itself exists? In archaeology the adoption of this ontology means that the past and the present, and the things of both, are taken to have the character of objects whilst the archaeologist is taken to have the character of the subject. Again, in order for experimental archaeology in its current formulation to make any sense, or for it to have the power to explain not only the past but also itself, this ontological scheme must be irrefutably true; there must be no other way of understanding the world other than in terms of the subject and the object. If there were, the epistemological schema that this ontology supports would collapse. Unfortunately for traditional experimental archaeology, there are other ontologies, one of which is the focus of this thesis. However this is far from a disaster, founding the discipline on an alternative ontology is an exciting opportunity to re-construct it, to overcome its limitations and to consider much more in its execution.

3.5. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXPERIMENTAL RECONSTRUCTION

At this point, I would like to draw this discussion in from the abstract to the concrete and to begin to address that area of experimental archaeology that is the focus of this theses *i.e.* the practice of roundhouse reconstruction. The reconstruction of past architecture has a long history in continental Europe, as part of the phenomenon of the open-air museum (see several papers in Stone and Planel 1999). Before the 1960s, architectural reconstruction was not as popular in Britain as it had been on the continent. There have been a few reconstructions of roundhouses, ramparts and fortifications from the 1930s (*e.g.* Childe and Thorneycroft 1938; Percival-Westell and Harvey 1939), but experimental reconstruction as it has come to be practiced did not really begin until prompted by Reynolds' early work (*e.g.* Langley 1972a, 1972b; Stokes 1972). Architectural reconstruction took off in Britain as the scientific, experimental study of past structural engineering. It was done, like most of the concerns of experimental archaeology, to examine the conjecture and best-guess work that surrounded paper reconstruction, whether technical *e.g.* Bersu's many drawings (Evans 1989) or artistic (*e.g.* Sorrell 1981). The many vagaries of written archaeological interpretation were however, the principal targets. The tradition of reconstruction in North America is a mixture between that of Britain and that of continental Europe. As in Britain, it has sought to be scientifically rigorous, but there has been a little more willingness to embrace human involvement in that scientific rigidity (Callahan Forthcoming), at least in its execution if not in its wider acceptance, as is traditionally the case in Britain.

3.6. THE PRACTICE OF EXPERIMENTAL ARCHAEOLOGY IN RELATION TO ROUNDHOUSE RECONSTRUCTION: THE PIMPERNE EXPERIMENT

In the remaining parts of this chapter I would like to consider how experimental archaeology is structured and understood through the specific example of the reconstruction of the 'Pimperne House' (Harding *et al.* 1993). This will serve both as an explication of current understandings of field-based experimental practice and

as a contrast to a view of experimental reconstruction based on a phenomenology of everyday activity that will be developed throughout this thesis and discussed at length in chapter 7.

I am cognisant of the fact that the Pimperne project does not represent the 'perfect' experiment and that many experimental archaeologists would consider it deeply flawed. I am also aware that experimental reconstruction does not equal experimental archaeology and that there are many ways of doing experimental archaeology both in the laboratory and in the field. However, I contend that these caveats are something of a smokescreen; that no experiment is or can be 'perfect', that the Pimperne experiment does not misrepresent what good experiments – or archaeological experiments more generally – should be. Rather, I would suggest that the Pimperne experiment is a good project through which to examine the short-fallings of experimental archaeology as it is currently conceived.

3.5.2. Background to the 'Pimperne House'

In 1961 the ground plan of a large double-ring timber framed roundhouse dating to the Early Iron Age was uncovered and excavated by Harding and Blake (Harding 1963; Harding, *et al.* 1993) near the village of Pimperne in Dorset. At the time of excavation it was one of only three roundhouses of this kind known in Wessex, the others being Little Woodbury (Bersu 1940) and Longbridge Deverill Cow Down, then still under excavation – and like Pimperne not published until the mid 1990s (Chadwick Hawkes 1994). Unlike those other examples, the Pimperne roundhouse had not been significantly affected by plough damage and so retained some shallow features which were to prove significant in the later reconstruction. The excavation report was produced in 1993; 30 years after the excavations were completed (Harding, *et al.* 1993). The report covers not only the excavation of the roundhouse and its later reconstruction, but also the excavation of other parts of the Early Iron Age enclosure within which the roundhouse was stood.

The 'Pimperne House' was not the first large double-ring roundhouse to be reconstructed. That distinction belongs to a reconstruction of the roundhouse from Little Woodbury which was built in 1946 for a film made by Graham Wallis for the then Ministry of Education (Hawkes 1946). The 'Pimperne House' was also not the first to be built in consultation with its original excavators; again this distinction goes to the Little Woodbury reconstruction (Hawkes 1946). The reconstruction of the 'Pimperne House' was however the first building project of a large double-ring roundhouse to be undertaken as a scientific experiment rather than purely as a piece of representation.

The reconstruction of the 'Pimperne House' was undertaken by the late Peter Reynolds at the Butser Ancient Farm Project's 'Demonstration Area' on their Queen Elizabeth Country Park site. The construction of the building was begun in 1976 and completed in the following year. The completed building stood for some 24 years before being dismantled in 1990 due to a forced move of the Butser Ancient farm Project from both the Queen Elizabeth Country Park site and the nearby 'Research area' on Butser Hill, Hampshire.

Reynolds had undertaken a number of reconstructions of British later prehistoric roundhouses prior to attempting the 'Pimperne House', all of which were without a ring of more substantial supporting posts inside the wall line, although one was attempted with a central supporting post. (Reynolds 1979; Stokes 1972). The earliest of these reconstructions predate the instigation of the Butser Ancient Farm Project and were built at the Avoncroft Museum of Buildings, Stoke Prior, Worcestershire in the late 1960s and early 70s (Langley 1972a, 1972b; Reynolds 1971, 1972; Thomas 1970). Once Reynolds had taken up the directorship of the Butser Ancient Farm Project, the next few buildings were built there on what would, by the time the 'Pimperne House' was being constructed, be known as the 'Research Area' (Reynolds 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980). These earlier buildings are relevant to this discussion because their building will have been instrumental in establishing Reynolds perceptions of the

appropriateness of technologies and materials on the one hand and of the experimental approach on the other.

It is fairly clear that, from the outset, Reynolds was committed to experimentation, which he conceived as a radical research methodology that, with time and accumulated data, would be able to overturn many of the received dogmas of archaeology at the time. With regard to experimental reconstruction, the short notes in, and one extended special edition of the *Worcester Archaeological Newsletter* published between 1970-72 are particularly revealing. Although the first of these is not written by Reynolds himself (Thomas 1970), he is mentioned as the "director" of a reconstruction project (Thomas 1970: 15) and it is clear that wattle and daub has already made an appearance in an earlier roundhouse reconstruction as a technology that is in some way 'appropriate' (Thomas 1970, 15). There is no immediate sense discernable in this note of whether this 'appropriateness' is related to wattle and daub as a technology to be tested. It may be assumed however that, given that the house that is discussed in the 1970 paper (based on a example from Conderton, Worcs.) is of dry-stone construction, that this represents an alternative material against which the efficiency of the wattle and daub may be tested. This raises the question of the statement and development of Reynolds' theoretical position. This is extremely important in terms of the critique that follows and so will be returned to later.

Since its construction the 'Pimperne House' has achieved an iconic status. It stands out not only as an explanation of Iron Age architecture but also as an example of experimental practice in architectural reconstruction. Images of the 'Pimperne House' appear in most of the introductory guides to archaeology published in Britain that contain a section on 'experimental archaeology', including Renfrew and Bahn's *Archaeology: Theory, Methods and Practice* in which the 'Pimperne House' appears in all three editions (each in a special section) spanning 1992 to 2000. No other roundhouse can claim such a position in the collective consciousness of British archaeology except

Little Woodbury. The difference between these two, however, is that the dominant image of Little Woodbury is of the archaeology, whilst the dominant image of Pimperne is of the reconstruction. This latter image dominates to such an extent that it is difficult to picture how even the Little Woodbury roundhouse might have looked in the Iron Age without interference from the image created by the 'Pimperne House'. The power of the technological and stylistic statement made by one man's vision of early Iron Age domestic architecture through the 'Pimperne House' is clearly visible in the majority of porched roundhouses (double-ring or otherwise) that have been built in Britain over the last 25 years. These buildings, in terms of both technology and style very closely resemble the 'Pimperne House' (Appendix 5). In these respects, to deconstruct the 'Pimperne House' is to deconstruct the whole tradition.

3.5.3. The Theoretical Positions Underpinning the Reconstruction of the 'Pimperne House'

Above we have discussed the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of experimental archaeology largely in the abstract. I would now like to locate this specifically in the case of the construction of the 'Pimperne House'. As stated above, the 'Pimperne House' was conceived as a scientific experiment. Reynolds makes this theoretical position explicit in a number of papers published both before and after the commencement of the project (Reynolds 1972, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1999a, 1999b). Through the 1970s and 80s Reynolds develops a theory of experimental archaeology that closely mirrors that of John Coles (Coles 1963, 1967, 1973, 1976, 1977, 1979), but is more explicitly positivist in its formulation. In fact Reynolds' theoretical orientation appears to alter very little during his career in its details as well as its broad formulation. Reynolds' position at the time of the construction of the 'Pimperne House' is articulated in a paper entitled *Experimental Archaeology and the Butser Ancient Farm Research Project.* Although published in 1978, it was written in 1975; the year before the establishment of the 'Demonstration Area' and the building of the 'Pimperne House'.

Reynolds' articulation of positivism is always clear if undeveloped, uncritical and, it would seem, at times confused (*e.g.* Reynolds 1986, which displays the common confusion – in the 'New' archaeology at least – of empiricism with positivism). It should be noted that at no time does Reynolds state that he is a positivist, most often equating his position with empiricism, science and the scientific method. This may perhaps be because he was keen not to alienate the lay reader (see *e.g.* Reynolds 1979, 1980, 1988, 1989, 1999b), and felt that this was unnecessary jargon. It may also lie in the confusion of positivism with empiricism noted above; the latter a position he was happy to identify himself with. That his orientation is positivist can however be in no doubt, as the following extended quotation demonstrates.

> The philosophy is most simply explained as a cyclical formula [Fig. 3.3. above]. The most important element of the formula is the prime data. These are the archaeological features and artefacts upon which any hypothesis is based. The term 'hypothesis' is deliberately employed since it allows for re-assessment to take place... Further the experimental process is designed to test the validity or otherwise of an hypothesis. It must be clearly understood that more than one hypothesis can be mounted from a particular set of data and that of these hypotheses more than one may be proven valid. The experiment, whether it is designed to test a structure or a process, yields its own data. Because the experimental process is conducted within rigorous and known constraints the data yield is scientifically acceptable and provable. The test for validity lies in the comparison between the experimental data and the archaeological or prime data. With negative correlation a second hypothesis is necessary. Positive correlation allows the tentative acceptance of the hypothesis as valid. Yet validity does not indicate that the hypothesis is factually correct.
>
> (Reynolds 1978: 142, emphasis in original)

In this passage we can see every facet of the epistemology of a positivist position as discussed above *e.g.* dominance of sense data, hypothesis testing, inference to the best explanation, the falsification principle *etc.* clearly stated. This of course should

come as no surprise, but what is to be gained from restating the obvious? The answer to this is *clarity*. We should be in no doubt, as we come to unpick this position and the tradition that it supports, as to precisely what it is that we are unpicking. Why we are unpicking it will become clear in due course.

3.5.4. Deconstructing the Traditional Ontology of the Pimperne Experiment

The first major report on the 'Pimperne House' appears in 1982 (Reynolds 1982), five years after its construction. The main report on the project that accompanies the excavation report was produced in 1993, three years after the building was dismantled. Both reports are descriptive in character and focus on technologies and technological choices, engineering principles and materials. As we might expect, each of these foci are couched in terms of data, hypotheses, testing, logic, efficiency and function, and each account is carefully constructed in the third person. The focus of this discussion will be on the main report published 1993.

The final report on the reconstruction of the 'Pimperne House' appears in the second half of the report on Pimperne Down (Harding, *et al.* 1993: 93-125). In terms of its ontological position, the report clarifies that the ground plan of phase one of the excavated roundhouse was the principle *object* for explanation, and asserts that the scientist/experimenter in the abstract takes the role of the *subject*.

The Object

Reynolds defines the principle object of enquiry in the following passage:

> The critical evidence for the structure comprises a plan of two concentric rings, the inner of postholes and the outer of stake-holes, being respectively 32 feet (9.75m) and 42 feet (12.80m) in diameter. A complex break exists in the outer ring in the south-east quadrant, comprising a rectangular plan *c.* 10 feet x 5 feet (3.04m x 1.52m) of four massively disturbed large postholes. The stake-holes fall short of the inner pair of postholes by some 4 feet (1.21m).

> Beyond the ring of stake holes are further disturbances comprising curving slots and elongated scoops, located concentrically to the ring and some 5 feet (1.52m) from it.
>
> (Reynolds 1993: 93)

Reynolds also has in mind another object, "the actual building as represented by one of the phases" (Reynolds 1993: 93). The reconstruction project shares these objects with the archaeological project, but whereas the archaeological project goes from there to produce the report as the final explanatory account, the reconstruction project introduces the reconstruction itself as a further class of object.

From this we can see that the reconstruction project assumes three object categories that are hierarchically organised in terms of problems of knowledge. The "actual building" is the most difficult thing to know about because it no longer exists, the archaeology is problematic but because it is empirically observable it is more readily explained than the "actual building", and the reconstruction, because it is a created object, can be known about with the greatest possible security.

Reynolds' account of the reconstruction exercise is sequential; it begins with the locating of the postholes and concludes with the daubing of the walls. The driving forces behind this narrative are the definition of the objects of enquiry, problem solving and the exclusion of the subject. The objects of the reconstruction exercise include the stages of construction, technologies such as the roof supports or jointing technology and materials. Another class of objects that the account of the Pimperne reconstruction passes over are tools. As we might expect, he considers that the only relevant study of tools in an archaeological context is "the tools themselves, in that one's major interest is in the effect of the work on a replicated tool" (Reynolds 1993: 97). He equates the use of tools in the production of something with the human element and with time, neither of which can be accounted for experimentally and are thus dismissed (Reynolds 1993: 97). This points to a flaw in Cartesian ontology that allows for this link to be

recognised but, not only is it not accounted for, it is also considered to be unimportant and thus covered over. If we rephrase Reynolds argument without losing its meaning we can see that the use of tools in the construction of something is enmeshed in *Being* and *Time*. In this I entirely agree with Reynolds but whereas he dismisses the human element and its involvements I will later adopt an alternative philosophical position which picks them up as central themes.

The problem-solving element of the narrative is interconnected with the definition of the objects, *i.e.* the objects are implicitly defined as those elements of the reconstruction process that are subject to problem solving, for example Reynolds writes on the problem of the porch:

> The roof of the porch had to necessarily integrate with the cone but still to obey the pitch requirement. The only conceivable way this could be achieved was to build a simple pitched roof over the porch, and to marry it with the cone. This led to the inevitable 'valley' problems between the cone and the porch rooves...
>
> (Reynolds 1993: 97)

In this passage (one of many such passages) the objects; porch roof, porch and cone, are defined in terms of the problem *i.e.* connecting them. Problem solving such as this is the main focus of the account because although description and definition are important supporting elements, the purpose of the account is primarily to draw conclusions. In the Cartesian tradition this means surmounting the problem of knowledge posed by the object, in other words the reconstruction and the account are framed as epistemological exercises *i.e.* creating 'knowledges' (conclusions) on the basis of other 'knowledges' (theories) that are founded in the presupposition of the object nature of things.

The Subject

In the account of the building of the 'Pimperne House' the subject is clearly identifiable with the scientist/experimenter. Crucial to the ontological and epistemological security of the project is the exclusion of that subject. Reynolds is very clear on the importance of this:

> The impossible step is the inference of human activity and the presumption of human relationships...
>
> (Reynolds 1993: 94)

He states this even more explicitly in a paper written five years later (published elsewhere in the following year):

> There are... *caveats* to be aware of in the conduct of experiments, the most important of which is to dismiss the human element...
>
> (Reynolds 1998: 33; Reynolds 1999b)

The Cartesian root of this thinking is inescapable; the role of the sciences is to explain the object world. The subject, being the opposite of the object is, therefore, beyond what the sciences can access. As such the subject must be discounted in favour of the production of knowledge as that knowledge mediates between subject and object. It is interesting to note here that the quantifiable human body is regarded as a legitimate object, for example the height of the outer wall was chosen on the basis of "headroom within the building" (Reynolds 1993: 95), a position that is entirely in keeping with the Cartesian view of the human body as a thing external to the subject.

Although this position is clear from Reynolds' explicit statement and the overall tone of the account, it is also clear that he signally fails in this regard. The clearest example of this is the height of the main doorway which was "determined by purely aesthetic reasoning" (Reynolds 1993: 97). In addition to specific examples such as this, the human element of a reconstruction project cannot be excluded because

a reconstruction cannot be built without people. Attempts may be made to exclude the human element from the account but they cannot be excluded from the activities that generate the account. Reynolds' answer to this criticism is that "no experiment can be designed to enhance our understanding of human motive or emotion in the recent or remote past" (Reynolds 1998: 33) and he is right in as much as Cartesian ontology will allow that statement to be framed. In order to account for the human element of the reconstruction exercise our understanding of the ontological character of what up until now we have defined as the subject and the object will need to be redrawn, in so doing the emphasis will also shift away from the explanatory power of knowing to the interpretative character of doing, and so towards a phenomenology of everyday activity and a focus on human involvement.

The value of developing a way in which to enable attention to be focussed on human involvement in experimental reconstruction practice is to provide the basis by which the influence which human involvement has in that practice may be interpreted. This is necessary because experimental reconstruction, to perhaps a greater degree than any other form of field-based experimental archaeology, relies on the actions of people, which determine to a large extent the outcome of a reconstruction project.

3.5.5. Reconsidering the Tenets of Experimental Archaeology

In this chapter I have outlined seven tenets of traditional experimental archaeology (Table. 3.1.). I would like to reconsider those in relation to the Pimperne project in the same manner in which traditional ontology was re-considered above.

Precise Replication of 'Prime Data'

This tenet of experimental archaeology relies on a particular conception of the archaeological record, related to an understanding of its ontological character as an object as discussed above. It takes as given an understanding of the archaeological object as a passive, static remainder of a fixed and knowable single past, a view that is

embedded in broader processual discourses on the archaeological record (*e.g.* Binford 1962; Schiffer 1972) and reinforced in fieldwork practice, particularly MoLAS style single context recording.

On this view, the Cartesian archaeological object is given to be an independently existing thing with attributes that are separable from the subject and only indirectly knowable by it. This also underpins the idea that the experimental archaeological object is replicable because it allows a view of the object as fundamentally unembedded in either time or space and disconnected from either the archaeologist or past people. In other words all the archaeologist has to do is to replicate the attributes and one is able to constitute essentially the same object. These notions of the material character of the archaeological record, its fixity and un-embeddedness can however be challenged.

Much page space has been given over in the archaeological literature of the past 15 years or so to precisely this challenge. The most devastating critiques were early to appear but slow to catch on in what we are now familiar with as 'postprocessual' discourses (*i.e.* Hodder 1982b; Shanks and Tilley 1987a). The most significant aspect of these discussions is that what we uncover as archaeologists is both "active" and "meaningfully constituted" (Hodder 1982b). The meaningful constitution of material culture relates to the life-world of an object in the past and to the understanding of it as an archaeological object in the present. It also means that an object does not become meaningful only when it has some overt decoration or inscription applied to it but that it is always already meaningful and that meaning is constantly being transformed by the context of the object in both time and space. In this sense an item of material culture is 'active' that is, it plays a part in the meaningful constitution of its social, temporal and special context which in turn plays a part in the re-constitution of the object.

This has two implications for experimental archaeology, first an archaeological object, even something as seemingly utilitarian as a posthole means something.

The posthole 'mattered' to the people who put it there; it had a part to play in the constitution of their world, even as something created in order to achieve some end. It is enmeshed in a web of signification that is implicated in the way that people understood their world, so we see for example the familiar site of the early Iron Age double-ring roundhouse whose postholes 'respect' the postholes of an earlier structure as at Pimperne (Harding, *et al.* 1993). The posthole also matters to the people that excavate it. Its very identification as an archaeological object indicates that it has meaning to a group of people who understand it within a particular tradition. One can make a career out of the meaningful constitution of postholes. Those who do are called archaeologists and the posthole feeds into their identity, their interactions with others and their understandings of other entities both of the past and of the present.

The second thing to draw from this is that such 'active' material culture does not merely exist as a thing with attributes. Its embeddedness means that it does not possess an intrinsic original state that can be replicated precisely. Such an entity cannot be the thing that it is without the place that it occupies or the role that it plays in some world or another. The idea that a thing can simply exist without any involvements of any kind is untenable. This is not only true at a conceptual level but it also physically impossible to precisely recreate something. One flint, for example, may fracture in the same general manner as another, but no one piece of flint will fracture *exactly* the same as another.

Taken together then we can see that in the first instance the notion of 'prime data' as fixed and static is unsupportable. The active, meaningful character of any object together with the impossibility of its not being embedded temporally, spatially and socially clearly militates against this. Similarly, any physical entity that is active, meaningful and always already embedded, taken with the fact that no object can be precisely physically replicated means that the tenet of precise replicability is unsustainable.

One might wish to argue that these 'active', 'meaningful' and 'embedded' material culture arguments are purely subjective, that experimental archaeology does not seek to replicate these elements of things, that whichever way one looks at it, a posthole, for example, *is* a quantifiable physical object, and moreover, *exact* replication is known not to be possible but an approximation of its general physical characteristics is sufficient, and indeed some of the best experimental work is done precisely on these grounds (*e.g.* Cotterell and Kaminga 1987). Experimental archaeology need not, therefore concern itself with such 'epiphenomena'.

To these points I would reply first, that subjectivity is only sustainable if one accepts the idea of the subject as a transcendental thinking thing, essentially detached from the object world outside it as we have discussed above. Second, if the subject is taken to be something like a human being, then it cannot be anything other than an entity that is located somewhere temporally, spatially and socially. As an entity so situated, it must be involved with other entities both like and unlike itself; embeddedness is not an option. It is true that experimental archaeology does not seek to replicate these conditions but what it does do is unavoidably 're-construct' them, that is, create them anew in the 'replication' of its objects; embeddedness is not only not optional but it is not fixed.

As to the example of the posthole, it is not essentially a quantifiable object. It may of course be understood as such, but even that is part of the 're-construction' of the object as meaningful, in this case within a scientific sub-disciple of archaeology. If it has an essential character at all then it is as some kind of entity that is understandable as different from the kind of entity that is capable of understanding it; anything else is a particular instance of the constitution of that understanding. While the physical creation of another thing based on the general characteristics of the archaeological thing may be possible, any explanation can only ever be of those characteristics in general or about that new thing in particular and give only a very thin description

of the archaeological thing entirely divorced from the social worlds that make it the particular thing that it is.

Removal of the 'Human Element'

This was touched on above in relation to grounding ontology and in the examination of the notion of 'prime data'. The 'human element', as it relates to its role in experimental theory and practice, is grounded in the Cartesian notion of the subject as existing in separation from the object world. It is this fundamental presupposition of distantiation that allows even for the suggestion of its removal. If however, as has been argued above, the 'human element' is taken to mean something like a human being then it is inconceivable that such an entity can be extracted from an experiment.

At a very basic level, an experiment cannot exist without the input of the person or persons who concieve it or carry it out. I have already said for example that *roundhouses do not build themselves*, at every stage of inception and construction people are implicated; it cannot be otherwise. Given the argument above for the active, meaningful and embedded character of material culture, whether that material culture is of the past or the creation of the process of 'experimentation', I would argue that not only can the 'human element' not be removed from experiment but that it is fundamental in the constitution of its very existence. It is also fundamentally re-constructed in the act of experimentation. By this I mean that the active, meaningful relations between objects and people in the process of conducting an experiment, like the building of a roundhouse, are created anew in that context by those embedded within it. In other words, not only is the human element not removed in such experiments but it is re-interpreted, re-inscribed, re-embedded in a different context.

Repeatability

Repeatability is popularly given to define experiment. It relies heavily on the two notions discussed above, the precise replicability of the object and the removal of

the human element, so it is ultimately grounded in the Cartesian subject and object. If all of these elements are flawed, as we have discussed above, then an experiment is, both in principle an actuality, never repeatable. This is particularly true of 'field based' experiments such as the building of a roundhouse, where none of the basic conditions of the original experiment can be precisely reproduced and the 'human element' is neither removable nor static but always present. This creates problems for comparison because each entity created will differ substantially in its constitution, meaning that true like-for-like comparison is never achieved.

Testability

In practice a test is a systematic comparison of one object against another or of a hypothesis/idea using created data against 'original' data. In experimental archaeology the former usually means that the results of a programme of experiments should be equivalent to the 'original' archaeological material, for example the fractures produced in experimental lithic material should be the same as those observed in archaeological lithic material. In the case of the building of a roundhouse, strictly speaking this should mean that the building of the roundhouse produces the same physical evidence as is observable in the archaeology. As in the three tenets that we have already discussed this relies on the notions of replicability – that the *same thing* – is being produced and the removal of the 'human element'. These flaws have already been discussed so there is no need to repeat them, but there is another flaw, which is that the archaeological evidence *i.e.* the postholes, are re-created *first* in order to build the structure at all. Where this is the case the archaeology is therefore not being tested, only the structure itself.

In terms of the latter, testing should be of hypotheses directly related to observations of the archaeological material. If for example the observation is that there exist enlarged postholes at the front of the porch of a large excavated roundhouse and the hypothesis is that repeated replacement of those posts created this pattern, then

a test of this hypothesis would be that the repeated replacement of posts in the front of a porch in a large reconstructed roundhouse produces or does not produce the same pattern. Here again we have a clear reliance on the idea that the past is replicable. As we have seen above the result of this sort of activity is not replication but creation anew because of the way that all material culture and action is embedded. This suggests that 'testing' does not neutrally assess a real, static past but creates and is created by understandings of the past that take their relevance from a material dialogue between present understandings, present action and past material. For this reason the 'test' is more accurately described as a dialectical hermeneutic.

Refutability

Most practitioners of experimental archaeology would argue that it is not possible to *prove* that something was in such and such a way in the past, only that it is possible to *disprove* a particular case. This notion is also very firmly rooted in the Cartesian distinction between subject and object. It refers particularly to the problem of the existence of the outside world and everything in it. The Cartesian mind cannot directly access the object world but as a thinking thing it is able to bridge the gap between itself and the outside world with mental representations of it; it can access them only theoretically. Because knowledge of the outside object world exists only internally to it, its reality cannot be proven, only refuted in relation to what is observable. As in all the discussions so far, for proof or disproof to be viable concepts we must first posit the truth of the subject and the object, and again if we except that the experimenter is something like a human being and is embedded in a world and inextricable involved with the things in it and that the 'test' that generates any conclusion is more of the character of a dialectical hermeneutic, then what is created is a fluid, contextualised understanding, not absolute proof or absolute disproof.

Conclusions as Explanation

I make a clear distinction here between *understanding* and *explanation* (Wright 1971). These are distinguished by the intentional character of human action and the non-intentional character of natural events. In seeking understanding we attempt to make sense of that intentionality and its relationships to the products of human agency, rather than an explanation of those products *in vacuo*. There are two modes of explanation generated by the experimental process, the first is in the structure itself, which forms a physical explanation of both the archaeological evidence and the reasoning and decision making of the experimenters, the second is the report on the work. The former is more common in relation to architectural reconstruction than the latter. Common to both is an unacknowledged assumption that only the material characteristics of both the products of the experimental process and the original archaeological 'evidence' are explained. This assumption carries with it the idea that the agent is not being interpreted. As we have seen, it is implausible to suggest that any activity carried out by people and enacted upon things does not interpret and re-inscribe the interactions of those agents with the thing in the worlds within which they are also embedded.

Separation of Interpretation from Experiment

This tenet fits into the long running archaeological debate about the separation of 'theory' from 'practice'. Again there has been a vast amount of literature produced on this problem since the theoretically conscious 'New' archaeology of the 1960s that there is no need to trawl through here. Over the last fifteen years or so something like a consensus has emerged that all archaeological practice is inherently theoretical (*e.g.* Hodder 1999). I do not quite agree with this. I will concede that all archaeological activities may be understood theoretically, but for it to be true that they are inherently theoretical posits the subject/object dichotomy. It relies on the idea embedded in this that the subject can only know about the object by theorising it, and we have already discussed how unstable this notion is. I would argue instead that practice is inherently

interpretative; that it is quite possible to carry out a task without explicitly theorising it but quite impossible to carry out a task without implicitly interpreting and re-interpreting it, the place it occupies in a tradition and that tradition itself. A carpenter for example, is constantly interpreting and re-interpreting that tradition within which she or he works, the actions of other carpenters being not reproduced but interpreted. In this regard interpretation, as with the 'human element' is inextricable from an experiment such as the building of a roundhouse.

3.6. CONCLUSIONS

If we take all of the above and look again at the Pimperne experiment, we can see that the 'prime data', as an unembedded bookmark by which the past may be turned back to, does not exist. It is neither replicated nor replicable but always interpreted and re-inscribed with different meanings associations and significance in different contexts. The postholes that founded the 'Pimperne House' were not *the same* as the archaeological ones, they were created instead out of understandings and pre-interpretations about what was significant about them in terms of a 'scientific' archaeological tradition of practice and based on a series of implicit theoretical positions. In the building of the 'Pimperne House' the 'human element' was not removed, nor even successfully written out at the report stage. On the contrary, the project relied on this 'human element' for its very existence, its explanatory and its interpretative power. These factors contribute to the uniqueness of the 'Pimperne House', which has never been, nor could it be repeated. There have of course been many other roundhouse reconstructions that have drawn from the 'Pimperne House' (*e.g.* Bodrifty, Longbridge Deverill Cow Down, probably, in fact, any roundhouse built post 1975), but they do not repeat the experiment, rather they re-interpret that entity both conceptually and physically at varying degrees of intent. We can therefore say that the 'Pimperne House' does not test the 'prime data' of the archaeological record but interprets the building of a structure in a context that is utterly alien to the context of that structure that was built in the early Iron Age. The refutational aspect

of the Pimperne project is directed primarily towards the technological but it is hard to see what past technology is actually refuted because it is considered only through a very shallow notion of what technology consists in (for an alternative see *e.g.* Dobres 2000; Dobres and Hoffman 1994; Pfaffenberger 1992) and even then only in terms of maximum efficiency models which are so strongly embedded in the present that their impression onto the past must be questionable. The Pimperne House represents an interpreted entity, fully residing and making sense only in the present. It is fundamentally interpretative and re-contextaulising of both past and present traditions of action and significance as well as of technology and materials.

At the beginning of this chapter a number of principle notions were outlined for critical consideration:

That the 'scientific' approach advocated and practiced by experimental archaeologists is the only valid one. We have seen that it is highly questionable that such an approach is in fact being exercised, despite the rhetoric of the experimental community.

That such approach is 'neutral', 'natural' and 'obvious'. For a scientific approach to be natural we would have to accept the subject object divide and concede that the only way to know the world is to treat it like a problem, theorise about it first and then act on those theories in an attempt to prove or disprove them. I have suggested that is not the way in which we accesses our world for the most part. Although we can chose that route, it is far from 'neutral', 'natural' and 'obvious'.

That little or nothing is presupposed. I have argued above that an experimental project such as the 'Pimperne House' in fact relies on presupposition and pre-understandings in order to both exist and to be understood at all. This is constituted in it's being built.

That experimental approaches have and should have nothing to say about people. We have seen that experimental approaches have everything to do with people and unavoidably interpret their place within a web of material and non-material involvements at every stage.

That technologies and materials are all that is accessed in practice and all that is accessible in theory. The embeddedness of both agents and material culture that has been discussed strongly militates against this suggestion; the non-material is accessed and accessible but in terms of the latter, not for a scientific approach. To account for the ways in which these elements may be accessed and usefully understood, will require shedding the Cartesian subject/object dichotomy.

That 'explanation' is achieved and nothing is 'interpreted'. The past is never 'explained' in an experimental project such as the 'Pimperne House', but it is always interpreted.

Finally, in light of the discussion of the limitations, both perceived and real, of current experimental theory and practice in archaeology, we must ask, whether it is, in fact, possible to design an experiment that accounts for the human element of active involvement, and if it is, what it may be possible to learn about an active involvement in the making of something as a result. Some of these possibilities were stated at the end of chapter 2 in the form of research questions specifically in relation to building. It is believed that a phenomenology of everyday action will provide the theoretical and methodological tools through which the active involvement of the making of things may be approached and understood.

The following chapter describes an alternative ontological position from which it will be possible to understand experimental archaeology in a way that puts people and human involvement into the currently depopulated practice of reconstruction. In

so doing, it will also lay out the theoretical basis for a phenomenology of everyday action which will then be methodologised (chapters 5 and 6) and its implications considered in light of the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction, built at Castell Henllys Iron Age Fort in 1998 (chapter 7) and for the practice of experimental reconstruction in general. Finally, these implications will be extended to understanding the constitution of the everyday action in the building of a roundhouse in the Iron Age (chapter 8).

PART II: THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THE STUDY

~CHAPTER 4~
THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF EVERYDAY ACTION: HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY IN ABSTRACT

The failure of traditional experimental archaeology to address the 'human element' as a consequence of its reliance on a Cartesian subject/object division of reality has been discussed in the preceding chapter. Exploration of any human involvement in the theory and practice of experimental archaeology in general, and for reconstruction projects in particular, has tended to be discounted in favour of questions concerning technologies and materials. This situation arises from two points of view on human engagement and experimental practice in archaeology: 1. that human involvement has no influence on the results of an experiment that is carried out 'scientifically', and/or 2. that the people involved are so far removed from the past both temporally and culturally as to constitute at best a distortion of past realities and at worst a complete fabrication. The philosophical/theoretical and methodological contents of this project are fully interdependent, in this regard this project is in itself a re-formulation of experimental archaeology; an experiment in theory in archaeology.

The previous chapter discussed the short-fallings of Cartesian ontology and its consequences for experimental theory and practice. In order to get over these problems and bring the 'subjective' into focus and give it some interpretative power, an alternative ontology is required. In archaeology generally, there has been a strong 'interpretative turn' marked by the emergence of the various strands of 'postprocessualism' (Bapty and Yates 1990; Hodder 1985, 1991, 1992, 1999; Preucel and Hodder 1996; Shanks and Tilley 1987a, 1987b, 1989; Thomas 2000). If a route through much of this thinking is traced back through the anthropology, sociology and philosophy that grounds it, most of it leads back to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger particularly to his most influential book *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962). One of

the main projects of *Being and Time* is to destroy the Cartesian project and to explore an alternative ontology that does not split the world into the internal and the external and thereby overcome what Heidegger sees as the pseudo-problem of access to the world outside the mind. The specific aim of this chapter is to elucidate this alternative ontology and to indicate the value of this ontology for approaching the human element in experimental reconstruction practice.

One of the tenets of postprocessual archaeologies that leads back to Heidegger and *Being and Time* is that all human engagements are interpretative (see *e.g.* Hodder 1991). A consequence of this position is that experimental reconstruction (and much of experimental archaeology generally) is viewed as a mode of archaeological interpretation that is enacted, in contrast to all other forms of archaeological interpretation with the exception of recent phenomenological approaches (*e.g.* Bender, *et al.* 1997; Cummings and Whittle 2003; Gifford and Acuto 2002; Thomas 1995; Tilley 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Vranich 2002). A further consequence is that while experimental reconstruction appears to be 'scientific' it is, simultaneously and more fundamentally, interpretative. The question then arises of what it is interpretative of and how this might be accessed methodologically and analytically. From a position rooted in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, one answer to this question is that experimental practice is interpretative of the ontological conditions (in an abstract sense) that make its execution possible in the first place. It is also tacitly interpreting of those conditions as they may have been played out in the past. I am not suggesting here that the act of reconstruction *explains,* in any absolute sense, the precise playing out of these ontological conditions in a specific context, rather that they are tacitly *interpreted* by action, absorption and involvement.

Through my own analysis of Heidegger's phenomenology of Being, I identify a number of phenomena among many others discussed in his analytic (particularly in Division I of *Being and Time*) which re-define the ontological conditions for

experimental practice in contrast to the subject and object of Cartesian ontology. In later chapters these will be explored as the basis of a data definition, collection and analytical methodology which examines how they are played out in the building of a roundhouse, how such a project is structured through those phenomena and how what is being interpreted of those phenomena, both for the 'reconstructing' of the roundhouse in the present and for the building of a roundhouse in the Iron Age, may be understood. Its wider applicability will be considered at the conclusion of this thesis. Before any of this, however, it is worth looking briefly at the role Heidegger's philosophy has played thus far in archaeological research.

4.1. 'HEIDEGGERIAN ARCHAEOLOGIES'

Heideggerian archaeologies have increased in popularity from the mid-1990s, particularly in studies of prehistory. Although there are earlier uses made of Heidegger's philosophy, for example Williams' attempt at pottery classification for the royal cemetery at Qusto (Nubia) (Williams 1986), Chris Gosden's *Social Being and Time* (Gosden 1994) was the first to explicitly introduce the core concepts of Heidegger's early philosophy into archaeology particularly that of time. The best-known and most influential Heideggerian approach to archaeological phenomena, however, is Julian Thomas' *Time, Culture and Identity* (Thomas 1996c). *Time Culture and Identity* is a landmark publication in the development of an explicitly Heideggerian archaeology. It is also the first 'true' phenomenological archaeology, considering the phenomena associated with relational ways of Being rather than privileging certain sense data (Tilley 1994). Its thematic approach (which contrasts with that taken here) attempts to integrate a body of thinking with a body of data in order to interpret places, practices, things and time under the broad theme of ways of Being in the Neolithic. The 'companion' paper to the book, *A précis of 'Time, Culture and Identity'* (Thomas 1996a), sparked a considerable debate in volume 3, issue 1 of the journal *Archaeological Dialogues* (Gosden 1996; Küchler 1996; Oudemans 1996; Patton 1996; Reybrouck 1996; Thomas 1996b; Weiner 1996) concerning the

applicability of Heidegger's thought to archaeology and the ethical problems of his Nazi involvement.

The two key publications by Gosden (Gosden 1994) and Thomas (Thomas 1996c) concentrate, for the most part, on Heidegger's philosophy as expressed in *Being and Time*. There is currently only one book-length treatment of Heidegger's later philosophy in an archaeological context, Håkan Karlsson's *Re-thinking Archaeology* (Karlsson 1998b). This book (a publication of his PhD thesis) largely takes the theme of thinking as its subject and is directed at the task of re-conceptualising the ways in which archaeologists think about what they do, and what archaeology *is*. Karlsson (1998, 2000) has argued that Heidegger's later work is important and useful in its own right, despite the majority of 'Heideggerian archaeologies' being directed towards his earlier thought (but see Gosden 1996 on the thorn of Heidegger's Nazi involvement in the context of archaeological interpretation).

Beyond these book-length treatments of Heidegger's thought there are a growing number of publications that are either centred on, or treat in some way, aspects of that thought (*e.g.* Gardner 2001; González-Ruibal 2002; Ingold 1993, 2000; Karlsson 1998a, 2000; Piccini 1999a, 1999b; Townend 2001; Turner 2001). With these publications, which mainly address questions of technology, the situatedness of human experience, the concept of dwelling, historicity, the task of thinking, and time, a balance between the influences of the earlier and the later Heidegger in archaeology is beginning to be achieved (*e.g.* González-Ruibal 2002).

The appropriation of Heidegger within archaeology is by no means uncontroversial, the matter of his Nazi involvement has already been noted (Gosden 1996; Thomas 1996c: 5-8) and even among those who are drawn to Heidegger's philosophy beyond the politics and ethics there is disagreement about what the different strands of his thinking lends to interpretations of the past (Karlsson 1997;

Thomas 1997). To those who do not accept that Heidegger's philosophy is relevant to archaeology, there is often outright hostility (Thomas 2001; Webster 2001a, 2001b). While this makes for exciting and interesting academic debate, there is a danger of polarisation between those who 'do' Heidegger, who tend to be passionate in its defence it and those who do not, who tend to be equally passionate; a situation that is applicable to phenomenological approaches in archaeology in general (Hamilton, *et al.* Forthcoming).

The discussion that follows fits into this growing area of archaeological thought first by explicitly defining a set of phenomena that may be identified and examined in order that they may be carried into other archaeological dialogues, rather than burying them in broader, more thematic, discussions. Second, by appropriating them into an explicit methodology this research directs Heidegger's phenomenology away from the interpretative uses that are most common in archaeology – by which I mean the 'tagging on' of a theoretical position after data collection and analysis – towards a full integration with all aspects of an archaeological research project. Heidegger's philosophy, therefore, will be seen to inform every aspect of the research presented here rather than being introduced as an 'add-on' at the interpretation stage.

4.2. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE KEY POSITION AND PHENOMENA IN HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY FOR A PHENOMENOLOGY OF EVERYDAY ACTION

Heidegger's work is divided, by him, into earlier and later periods marked approximately by the year 1930 (Risser 1999); this division is referred to by Heidegger himself as the *"die Kehre"* – the Turn (Inwood 1997; Polt 1999). Heidegger's philosophy – particularly that of his early work – is concerned with doing 'fundamental ontology' (Taminiaux and Gendre 1991). An ontology in the sense intended is an enquiry into the types of Being that a specific entity has and its intelligibility, amidst the Being of other entities and their intelligibility. As has been noted in the preceding

chapter, this is not the usual understanding of ontology, nor is it the one that grounds archaeology. *Being and Time* is widely acknowledged to be Heidegger's most significant contribution to philosophy, and of all his work has had the greatest impact on other disciplines such as theology, sociology and anthropology.

Heidegger's later philosophy (see Heidegger 1977a for a collection of key works) has proved to be less influential and its ideas less durable (for example in relation to the questions concerning the origins of art). This later work becomes increasingly cryptic and poetic, and as his style changes so does his focus – away from the question of Being that dominates *Being and Time* (although it is not entirely abandoned), towards thinking and language, a shift that is known as 'the Turn' [*die Kehre*] (Inwood 1997; Polt 1999; Risser 1999). This later philosophy is also tainted to a greater degree than his earlier work by his involvement in the German National Socialist movement in particular his notion of the Being of Dasein which shifts to a collective Being of the German People as *Volk*. His Nazi involvement is discussed in a number of works (see *e.g.* Bourdieu 1993; Dallery, *et al.* 1992; Farías, *et al.* 1989; Kisiel 1992; Milchman and Rosenberg 1996; Rockmore and Margolis 1992; Sluga 1993; Sluga and Ocker 1992; Wolin 1993) and is a major area of debate in its own right, which will not be entered into here except to say that it should be considered by anyone wishing to appropriate Heidegger's though for archaeological (or any other) enquiry (see *e.g.* Gosden 1994, 1996; Thomas 1996c).

If *Being and Time* is a result of earlier unpublished thinking, it is also a result of hasty publication; for that reason it is an incomplete work (Kisiel 1993). It was rushed into print, with a hastily added second division (only Division I was originally submitted), to meet the government's requirements for full Professorship status at Marburg University. This incompleteness is to some extent closed off by some of Heidegger's later works, which are helpful in ironing out some of the knots and inconsistencies in *Being and Time*, itself a notoriously difficult work. The project

of *Being and Time* is, therefore, essentially unfinished, however, some of its central themes can be identified in his later papers (*e.g.* Heidegger 1977b; Heidegger 1977a) and lecture notes, most of which are now publicly available (Heidegger 1927-1988) although not all have been translated into English.

After "the Turn" of the early 1930s, Heidegger's philosophical priorities shifted from the question of Being to the role of technology and later, of language, particularly a fascination with the German language and the poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) as a route to truth (Kockelmans 1984; Pattison 2000). During this later period, Heidegger published much more widely than in the time prior to the *Turn*. Although there is a distinct change of focus in his writing, he did write a number of pieces which expanded on the themes begun, but never finished, in *Being and Time i.e.* The Question Concerning Technology, The Thing, Building Dwelling Thinking (Heidegger 1977a).

Heidegger's complete works are extensive. In his later years he expressed the wish that no thought ever articulated in a lecture should be lost (Inwood 1997: 6); the majority of which has now been published in as the "*Gesamstausgabe*" (Heidegger 1927-1988). These collected works contain published pieces, previously unpublished lecture and interview transcripts and letters, but there is some question as to whether everything will eventually be made publicly available, particularly that which pertains to his involvement with the Nazi Party in the 1930s (Wolin 1993). In addition to this, a collection of correspondences between Heidegger and his one-time student, lover and life-long friend Hannah Arendt have recently been published in English (Ludz 2004), which throw considerable light on the extent to which Heidegger saw the world he lived in in the terms expressed in his philosophy.

4.2.1. The Basis of Heidegger's Philosophy: Ontology over Epistemology

One of the primary targets for critique in *Being and Time* is epistemology, which concerns the knower, the known and their relationship. Heidegger is suspicious

of epistemology because epistemological questions posit a basic problem which has been discussed in the previous chapter in relation to experimental archaeology. It begins by positing that there is 'that which knows' on the one hand and 'that which is known about' on the other. The problem created by this philosophical dualism is how 'that which knows' – usually in the western or post-Socratic tradition called the subject – comes to have knowledge of 'that which is known about' – usually called the object. Most enquiries in archaeology are of this type, and everything from subjectivism and relativism through to scientific archaeologies presuppose the reality of this basic problem. The differences between these positions in archaeology lie in which side of the dualism is considered to be most important: the subject or the object. It is for this reason that Heidegger says that epistemology "continually sharpens the knife but never gets round to cutting" (Heidegger, 1982: 4) He questions epistemology on all three of its constituent elements; the knower, the known and the relation between the two; knowing (Guignon 1983).

The Knower

Heidegger is troubled by the assumption that there is a knower. He wants to know what that knower is. Heidegger's knower is always "I", which requires him to ask something like, "what am I?" For him it is clearly not adequate that such a question be framed as an epistemological one *i.e.* it would not help me to question that I am a knower of some kind if I could define the bio-chemical composition of my body, or to realise that I am an archaeologist, although I am these things too. That would be to keep sharpening that metaphorical knife and, at least in Heidegger's view, to avoid the real question.

Knowing

To simply assert that the "I" is a knower is also inadequate because it assumes that the "I" 'knows' something; Heidegger would again question that 'knowing'. Is knowing the only and the primary way in which somebody like me understands

a subject. None the less, this way of thinking has had powerful currency as the basis for all scientific enquiry.

Completely contrary to the Cartesian Tradition, Heidegger starts off, not by asking 'is there a real world and how can I come to know it if there is?', but by saying 'of course there are real things in a real world but what are they, what character do they have and how is it that they are intelligible?' Given that there is a world of some sort, he wants to question the Being of the world and that of the beings in it.

4.2.2. Heidegger's Challenge

How does Heidegger overturn the apparent primacy of epistemology and what does he put in its place? To clarify this question and its resolution in Heidegger's philosophy, it is useful to again to review the three concepts discussed above in relation to epistemology: the knower, knowing and the known.

Heidegger's Knower

Heidegger argues forcibly against the adequacy of Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*, which he sees as the embodiment of a much older way of thinking that he traces back to Aristotle and rather scathingly refers to as "the Tradition" (to understand why this is intended as a derogatory expression of Cartesian ontology see Heidegger 1962, 42-43, *cf.* Marx 1971). For Descartes and the Tradition (everybody in Western philosophy except Heidegger himself essentially) that which knows is the only entity that there can be secure knowledge about and that knowledge can only be held by the knowing subject itself; everything else is a problem, *i.e.* the world outside and other minds. Descartes specifically identifies the knower as *res cogitans*, a disembodied thinking thing, and anything beyond it as *res extensa.* Edmund Husserl, Heidegger's old mentor, saw things in much the same way, positing a transcendental ego that intended essences which correlated with its mental representations and thereby came to have knowledge of the world beyond itself (Husserl 1960). Heidegger turns Descartes and

Husserl on their collective heads by positing that there is no *res cogitans* or Husserlian transcendental ego and neither is there a *res extensa* or external world, but rather some type of Being that is capable of questioning its Being and that is always already in the world. We will return to this kind of Being when we come to further consider Heidegger's ontology.

Heidegger and Knowing

Heidegger wonders whether, and for the most part, knowing is the relation that we take towards the world and the entities in it. He does not dispute that it is one that we can take but he thinks that "proximally and for the most part" [*zunächst und zumeist*] we encounter other people and things in the world in which we live (or dwell) in a different way. Knowing, for Heidegger, is a disinterested 'theoretical' stance that is only possible because people and things *are* in the particular ways in which they can be. Moreover, he argues that the only reason we think that this is the main and normal way in which we encounter people and things is the fault of the Greeks (who generally have a lot to answer for in Heidegger's view). Plato was the first to express the view that it was possible and desirable to have a theory of everything, a view that today most disciplines that are even vaguely scientific, including archaeology, subscribe to. Heidegger thinks that although we can and do create such theories, they are derivative of another way of understanding the world that is based in our everyday practices, and that we, in fact, learn quite late in life to take this disinterested view. For example, when I open a door I do not formulate a theory about how my hand comes to encounter and manipulate a spherical metal object placed to the centre right of a flattish wooden rectangle before I do it; I simply open the door. My ability to open that door is in no way dependent or predicated on my possessing any knowledge of biomechanics, lock mechanisms and the laws of leverage, although I might. For Heidegger this means that we have a 'pre-theoretical' understanding of the world that is a result of our always already Being-in it; the complete reverse of the view of traditional epistemology.

A similar reversal pertains with regard to people. In traditional epistemology the problem with people is not only their corporeality (their existence as things) but also the very existence of other minds. For Heidegger this is another pseudo-problem of traditional epistemology. Although I can adopt the attitude of the biologist to their bodies and the psychologist to their minds, for the most part that would not be the attitude I would take, far example, towards a lover, a parent or a teacher. For Heidegger this means that we always already have some sort of understanding of others, and he sees it as his job to describe to us what that is.

The Known

As we have touched upon above, the known is not so much 'known about' in an abstracted sense as that which we are already there with and amidst in whatever world we inhabit. There are different kinds of entities in the world for us to encounter, in fact the world itself is something that we mostly encounter in an *everyday* way. The question then becomes what is it about the Being of these entities and of the world that means they can be encountered at all? This brings this discussion to a point where it is necessary to discuss the details of both 'traditional' and Heideggerian ontologies in more comparative detail.

4.2.3. Questioning 'Traditional' Ontology

Heidegger is not content simply to challenge the primacy of epistemology in ways of understanding the world, he also strongly critiques 2500 years of what he calls 'traditional' ontology: "*Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at it disposal,* remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task" (Heidegger 1962: 31, italics in original, my emphasis). In fact, Heidegger's project in Division I of *Being and Time* can be understood as an extended critique of 'traditional' ontology and its project.

Heidegger clearly thinks that the proper subject of ontology is Being; that which things are in themselves. In this there is no argument with traditional ontology, his problem is rather in how 'the Tradition' has tackled the question of Being. He identifies three pervasive mistakes (Dreyfus 1991: 10-11):

1. That Being is the most universal of concepts; a general property of everything. This means that Being is the final abstraction. If, for example one takes all the different types of pot known, one can abstract to a general pot-ness that makes them all identifiable as pots, one might then be able to abstract to a more general quality of tool-ness, then to a still more general quality of thing-ness and finally when one runs out of abstractions one arrives at Being-ness as the only property that pots have in common with every other kind of entity in the world.

2. That Being is indefinable and thus an empty concept. If Being is understood as described above it does not contrast with anything. If that is the case then neither does it refer to anything because nothing is differentiated so it must, therefore, be an empty concept and not a problem.

3. That Being is self-evident and thus not a problem. Because Being is readily identified in everyday language by terms like 'is' and 'am' then we must already know about Being; I know that I am a student and my object of study is roundhouses so where is the problem?

Traditional ontology has always tried to understand its objects in these terms, and has tended to attempt to ground all kinds of Being in a causally self-sufficient source (Dreyfus 1991: 12).

For Heidegger this is to miss the question completely. Being cannot be an ordinary predicate because it is not possible to abstract from numbers or imaginary

the scientist aware that there are fundamental problems that he or she is not aware of. "Laying the foundations...into some area of Being, discloses it for the first time in the constitution of its Being, and, after thus arriving at the structures within it makes these available to the positive sciences as transparent assignments for their enquiry" (Heidegger 1962: 30-31). The 'scientist's' job is then to look again at their objects of enquiry with this enhanced understanding. Having illuminated the link between traditional ontology and epistemology as manifested in the sciences, and now being clear that there is a link between ontology and Being, we are left to ask: what is Heidegger's conception of Being and what kind of ontology is he proposing?

Heidegger never talks in terms of 'right' and 'wrong'. He never suggests that traditional ontology is wrong rather that it did not penetrate deeply enough into the question of Being and, moreover, never learned to ask the question properly. This sort of sideways manoeuvring is typical of Heidegger's philosophy, each time that he sets out to tackle something the first thing that he does is to reset the question. Heidegger does this by working backwards through a problem's various manifestations to the point at which it first appears. This, in turn, is an important element of Heidegger's phenomenological methodology.

4.3.1. Being Rather than Beings

Having pointed out that western thought has been unknowingly short-sighted for many years, Heidegger offers a conception of ontology that is (again as we might by now come to expect) completely the opposite of the usual conception. As discussed above ontology concerns the Being of things; what – fundamentally – things *are* whether they are numbers, people, fish, unicorns, spaces, places, disciplines or ideas. Aristotle's ontology saw Being as an actual thing that had something like an essential nature upon which properties were founded; on this view, everything that exists is of this character. Heidegger's ontology does not see Being as an actual thing, neither does he see Being as the same for all things; the Being of the world and of the people

and things in it are each of a different character. Heidegger's ontology concerns the way of Being of three types of Being: Dasein, World and Equipment. Heidegger's philosophy discusses over 100 phenomena that constitute the ways of Being of people, the world and things. A major component of the current study has been to identify, among this detail, a manageable number of key phenomena that are both accessible to observation and useful for interpretation in the context of experimental archaeology. These are discussed below (see also table 5.1. pp. 102 in the following chapter for a summary).

Dasein

Dasein is the key to understanding Heidegger's ontology; as that which asks the question, it is the starting point for the questioning of Being and it is that which interprets everything with which it is involved. Dasein does not, as is often supposed, equate to or stand for human being or person; that would be to make it a factical [*Factisch*] thing. Neither is Dasein a property that you or I may possess. To take both of these lines would be to drop us back into traditional ontology. Dasein is rather that which in each case you or I am; it exists as its possibilities to be (Heidegger 1962: 67). This means that it is not an undifferentiated 'essence of humanity'; each Dasein, as possible ways to be, is different.

Heidegger sums up the usual constitution of Dasein at the beginning of Chapter IV:

> *Dasein's "average everydayness"* can be defined as *"Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the 'world' and in its Being-with Others"*
>
> (Heidegger 1962: 225, italics in original)

This "average everydayness" (what Dasein is primarily and most of the time) is framed at one end by its basic way of Being as existence and at the other by its basic state as care. Heidegger's definition will need to be re-arranged and added to in order to be clarified:

Existence [*Exitenz*]: This defines Dasein's fundamental way of Being. Only self-interpreting Being can exist in the sense that Heidegger intends. This means that cultures, disciplines and institutions, as well as any individual Dasein that defines itself in terms of 'I', exist because they have within them the capacity to interpret themselves. Trowels and pots do not exist in this sense although they are part of something that does *i.e.* archaeology; in this sense they rely for their existence on Dasein. But what is the "concrete constitution" (Heidegger 1962: 274) of Dasein's existence?

Being-in [*In-sein*]: This is the "basic state of Dasein" (Heidegger 1962: 78). Dasein is always already in something; always finds itself in some situation, not in the sense in which a group of students might be in a lecture theatre but more like the sense in which they are in the world of academe.

Being-with [*Mitsein*]: A relation characterised by solicitude. As well as always already in a world, Dasein is always with Others. This is not to say that it cannot be alone in an ontic sense, I could clearly be in a room by myself, but rather that ontologically, if its mode of Being was aloneness, it would not have the capacity to comprehend another Dasein should it encounter one anymore than a trowel can comprehend a pot when it touches it.

Being-alongside [*Sein bei*]: A relation characterised by concern. Dasein is also always alongside a myriad of other types of entities in the world that do not have the same character as that of Dasein itself *i.e.* not only Things such as trees and rocks but also Things such as buildings, pots, tools and postholes.

Thrownness [*werfen/Geworfenheit*]: Although Dasein is its possibilities to be, it is not completely free to be whatever it wants; I can never be a fish or I might prove to be too ill informed to be a philosopher, neither can I choose to be born. If Dasein's basic state is Being-in, it gets there by Being thrown. In this sense Dasein is always thrown into whatever situation that it finds itself. As a further example I could be said to have been thrown into being English, my possibilities are always constrained by such thrownness. Thrownness also has a temporal character; I have been thrown into the 21st century, which further constrains my possibilities to be; I can choose to be a Heideggerian experimental archaeologist within the tradition of British prehistoric archaeology but I cannot be an Iron Age farmer.

Falling [*Verfallen*]: Dasein is always fallen into its world, its concern with things and its solicitude towards others as it encounters them most of the time. In other words it is always caught-up in its involvement with things and its relation to other people in the world of which it is a part, so much so that for the most part it does not recognise that this is the case.

Projecting [*Entwurf/entwerfen*]: Once thrown and fallen into the world Dasein is always projecting forwards into its ownmost possibilities to be; always looking ahead. This does not mean that it has to have some future goal 'in mind' as it were (given that Dasein does not have a mind in that sense); it is rather that nothing that happens in Dasein's world 'goes nowhere'. For example, my writing this chapter looks ahead, however tacitly and however uncertainly to my including it in my thesis. This does not mean that I have to have this in mind while I am writing; in fact if I did I would not be able to write about anything else.

Absorbed [*aufgehen*]: Dasein's normal way of coping with the things that it uses and the people that it is with in its everyday world is to be absorbed into them. For example, most of the time I do not see the screen of my computer while I am

writing, my concern is rather with the ideas that I am trying to express, the only time my computer screen comes into view, so to speak, is when something that I don't expect happens like the computer crashes and the screen goes blank and my attention is drawn to its not doing what it is 'supposed' to.

Disclosed [*erschliessen*]: This describes how Dasein comes to be aware of itself, world, things and Others. It is not the kind of awareness that comes from theoretical or analytical study but describes the way in which they are understood by Dasein in its average everydayness, on top of which understanding theoretical analyses are made possible. To use the example of my computer again, it is disclosed to me in the sense that Heidegger intends when I am simply using it, paying it no explicit mind but rather thinking about what I am writing.

Interpreting [A*uslegung* and *Interpretation*]: There are two senses in which Heidegger defines interpreting which are distinguished in the German by two words *auslegung* and *interpretation* but in the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Being and Time* by capitalising or not capitalising the 'i' (Heidegger 1962: I, *ftn.* 3), a convention which will be followed throughout this thesis. 'Interpreting' [*Interpretation*] is used to refer to ways of understanding things that are more deliberate or considered and is related to, but contrasted with 'interpreting' [*Auslegung*], which describes the more normal way in which Dasein comes to understand things in it's everyday dealings. The former definition is what allows a trowel, for example, to seem to have different 'proper' roles to an archaeologist and a bricklayer. The latter definition also applies to Dasein itself, as for the most part, as Dasein is always already interpreting its world and itself. Dasein's being self-interpreting or, in fact, for the most part mis-interpreting, is what its possibilities to be are built on.

Care [*Sorge*]: All of these structures are brought together and in a sense made possible for Dasein through its Being as care. Dasein is care in the sense that things

'matter to it'. Care in the sense that Heidegger intends is not to be confused with emotions such as caring about something, love, being weighed down by the cares of the world, or more negative emotions like hate or disgust; even not caring about something is ontically possible only because existential-ontologically Dasein's Being has care as its unifying structure.

Each of these "equiprimordial structures" of Dasein also has various "existential possibilities of modification" (Heidegger 1962: 22). In other words no one of the elements of Dasein outlined above is more originary than any other that the others may be founded upon it, and each one is a field of possibility for each Dasein in its existence to be whatever it chooses to be or not.

World [Welt]

If we accept that Dasein exists and that it's basic state is Being-in, this raises the questions of where it exists and what it is 'in'. This can be made clearer if we take the (unusual) step of translating Dasein. Dasein means Being-there (or there-being); straight away we see that not only *is* it but also that it is *somewhere*; it cannot be nowhere; but where is the 'there' of Dasein's existence? Heidegger's answer to this is that Dasein is always in the 'world', and he describes four senses of World (Heidegger 1962: 93):

- A world of co-occurrent objects, a collection together of everything that Dasein is not. The world as the sciences see it.
- "A set of particulars specified in terms of the essential characteristics that make up the set" (Dreyfus 1999: 89)
- The world as self-interpreting Dasein encounters it proximally and for the most part *e.g.* the world of an archaeologist.

- The Worldhood of the world itself *i.e.* the Being of Dasein's world that is interdependent with Dasein and revealed though Dasein's involvements within it.

The last two definitions are those that concern Heidegger the most as for him Dasein is in *the* world first and *a* world only secondarily. As will become clear later, when Heidegger's philosophy is considered as an extended critique of Cartesianism, this conception of 'world' is an inversion of the more familiar view that any individual mind is primarily in *its own* world and can only access *the* world derivatively.

Equipment [Zeug]

Equipment is Heidegger's term for 'things' (Heidegger 1962: 97). 'The Tradition' has tended to see things as just that: mere things and nothing more. Heidegger argues that it is this view of the materiality of the world that allows science to see things (and this includes the human body and its organs which are also things in this sense) as objects for analysis and theoretical circumspection – what Heidegger will later refer to as "standing reserve" (Heidegger 1977a: 323). Heidegger's alternative term 'equipment' is intended to remove any notion that the world is made up of mere things so long as Dasein is there in the world alongside (amidst) them, which given that Dasein *is* Being-in-the-world, it always is. In this sense equipment relies for its existence on Dasein. This raises the questions of the ontological character of equipment, and Dasein's role in the definition of this character.

Equipmental totality: The use of the term 'equipment' also indicates that there can be no such thing as an equipment (Heidegger 1962: 97, *cf.* translator's footnote 1). Not only must there be Dasein for there to be equipment in the first place, but also there must be other equipment for it to relate to. Even an apparently undifferentiated brick in a wall is equipment to Dasein; *something in-order-to [etwas um-zu]* to use Heidegger's technical language, not a mere thing that Dasein has no involvement with. This does not mean that it has a 'use' or 'function' in the sense that traditional ontology might

lead us to expect rather, through Dasein, a brick has an assignment with a wall that has an assignment with an archaeological site, which, through the activities of excavation Dasein defines its possibilities to be an archaeologist. That brick is, for the most part, disclosed to Dasein in this way; as referring an equipmental totality that by-and-large Dasein does not think about but cares about because it is a constitutive part of Dasein and its world. This example also reveals Dasein's thrownness and temporality in that our brick shows up for this possible Dasein in a completely different way than it might show up for that Dasein which put it there in the past and for many other possible Daseins, such as a developer for whom it might show up as a costly annoyance or a public relations opportunity.

Ready-to-hand [*zuhanden*]: Ready-to-hand does not simply denote things that are near by in case one wished to use them. Heidegger's favourite example of equipment is the hammer, perhaps the most intuitively accessible archaeological example of something ready-to-hand is the trowel. An experienced archaeologists trowel is not ready-to-hand while it is sitting on the baulk just nearby, it becomes ready-to-hand while the archaeologist is using it, say, to clean a surface while she is looking for changes in soil colour or texture. The more totally the archaeologist is absorbed in the task of cleaning, the less she is paying attention to the trowel-Thing, the more ready-to-hand the trowel becomes. This absorbed coping with the ready-to-hand is proximally and for the most part the way in which the trowel is disclosed to self-interpreting, concernful Dasein in its possibility to be a good archaeologist. This does not mean that a trowel has a primary function, one thinks immediately of builders who use the same Thing to lay bricks. As equipment that relies on Dasein for its existence a trowel is not dis-covered for what it is until ready-to-hand for some Dasein, indicating that no item of equipment is inherently *for* anything.

Un-ready-to-hand: This denotes equipment that "stands in the way" (Heidegger 1962: 103) of our continued engagement with it. It is to be thought of as

a deficient state of readiness-to-hand, one only revealed through its use and Dasein's concern with it as something in-order-to and the disruption, in terms of my skilfully coping with the task at hand is hardly noticed.

Conspicuous [Auffälligkeit]: Equipment is revealed as conspicuous when it does not quite fulfil the role we expect of it. This state of conspicuousness is a very short lived one and is a very minor disruption to Dasein's concern. For example, if my concern is with uncovering a delicate pot, I may find my trowel to be too cumbersome in which case I might reach instead for a plasterer's leaf. In a situation like this my trowel becomes conspicuous in its unreadiness-to-hand but it is easily surmounted and my concern remains with the task in hand.

Obstinate [Aufsässigkeit]: Obstinacy is more of a problem. It denotes a greater disruption in Dasein's dealing with the task at hand and a need to deliberate on that which would otherwise be ready-to-hand. Unlike conspicuousness, which is almost immediately recovered from, obstinacy reveals the other things that are involved in the task at hand. To take the example of the trowel again, if I am using my trowel to uncover a pot and as before, I find to be too cumbersome, I again reach for the leaf but discover that I do not have one and am therefore forced to continue using the trowel, this forces me into a sustained awareness of the trowel in its un-suitability for the task at hand, whereas if I had picked up a leaf I would have stopped thinking about the tool and got on with the job. With obstinate equipment I can continue the task at hand but the tool does not 'disappear from view' in the way that it does when everything is going as it should.

Obtrusive [Aufdringlichkeit]: Obtrusiveness is still more of a problem to Dasein's concernful dealings. This is the point at which the handle comes off my trowel and I cannot continue with the task at hand. Ultimately this reveals equipment as present-at-hand.

Present-at-hand [*Vorhanden*]: This is an interpretative term that Heidegger uses very early on in his analytic to challenge the essentialist connotations of the traditional term *existentia* (Heidegger 1962: 67). Something is present-at-hand for Dasein when it is subject to deliberate study, reflection or theoretical appropriation. This is only possible when Dasein's usual skilled coping is no longer taking place and can no longer take place. Dasein's attitude towards the present-at-hand is no longer characterised by skilled coping it is rather created by a breakdown in that coping. The present-at-hand is something that requires an explanation in order to be fitted into Dasein's world. The sciences see everything as present-at-hand in this sense.

Pure presence-at-hand: This denotes something that Dasein is just staring at for the sake of a distraction, it is not being manipulated in any way as something in-order-to, nor is it being carefully considered. This is not something that Heidegger gives much attention to but there are a number of examples in *Being and Time* of the phenomena perhaps the clearest of which is given in his example of the vehicle indicator (Heidegger 1962: 110-111). Small finds are often encountered in this way in archaeological excavation as the things that lead to all work stopping and everybody standing around the trench to stare in wonder at the thing uncovered.

If what we have discussed above denotes the ways of Being that belong to the world and to equipment, then we are left to consider the structures that allow such equipment to show up for Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Heidegger summarises this in the following passage, "Being-in-the-world... amounts to a non-thematic, circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment" (Heidegger 1962: 107). In other words, things show up for Dasein as what they are through Dasein's un-thought everyday dealings with them. The entry point to an understanding of these dealings is *concern*.

Concern [*besorgen*]: Above we outlined care as the unifying structure of Dasein, the type of care that Dasein exhibits toward equipment Heidegger calls concern. Things 'matter' to Dasein. That is why things can never be mere things to it but rather have the kind of Being that has been outlined above; as equipment. The way in which Dasein relates to things as equipment Heidegger calls its concernful "dealings" (Heidegger 1962: 95) which are characterised by circumspection.

Circumspection [Umsicht]: This is the special kind of 'sight' that belongs to Dasein's everyday dealings with equipment. In the context of Heidegger's philosophy, it means something like the way in which one looks around for a way to get something done. In this sense it is 'non-thematic' in that it does not take a particular entity in isolation and study it to exhaustion rather, it relies on Dasein's already pre-theoretical understanding of things in their place.

Closeness [Nähe]: Concern is also that which brings things 'close' to Dasein. Again Heidegger does not mean the trowel on the baulk just to our right; in fact he is not talking about physical proximity at all. The trowel in my hand as I clean a surface is distant in this sense, I am hardly aware of it; the entity that is closest to my concern is the surface in all its aspects. A clearer example may be the contact lenses that I am wearing. In terms of proximity they could hardly be any closer but in terms of concern they could not be more distant as I look out of the window and watch some local teenagers poking around my car. Equipment is at its closest to Dasein when it is ready-to-hand. Through its various stages of breakdown it becomes more removed until it is reveales only as purely present-at-hand.

This is all very well, but we may still be tempted to ask (and often are as archaeologists) what a piece of equipment is *for*. Heidegger's answer is that equipment is not *for* anything, rather it is always *something in-order-to*, this in turn has a *towards-which*, which ultimately has a *for-the-sake of which*. This does not mean

that equipment is simply 'functional' or has a 'function' in the sense that we expect if we ask what it is for.

In-order-to [*etwas um-zu*]: This technical term describes the basic ontological structure of 'having to do with' things and tasks. It does not mean that something might be 'for' something in a functional sense; that would be far too narrow a definition for Heidegger. A pair of spectacles for example are not, in the way that I use them most of the time, 'for' correcting my vision, although they can be understood in that way. Proximally and for the most part I wear spectacles in order to be able to write, drive, cook, walk along the pavement etc. The structure of the in-order-to is expressed in terms of references or assignments and involvements.

Reference or Assignment [Verweisung]: These two terms are Macquarrie and Robinson's translation for Heidegger's use of *Verweisung*. The meaning of reference or assignment has, in part, been indicated above in the example of the brick in the wall on the archaeological site. This example suggests that things, as equipment, are in some sort of relation with other things in a totality of relations. This relation has the character of referring in the sense that a doctor might refer a patient, indicating that Heidegger has in mind a 'pointing away' of something from itself toward something else (see Heidegger 1962: 97, ftn. 2). To be understood fully, its meaning has to be thought of from the perspective of Dasein's encountering of things and should not be mistaken as suggesting that things have inherent agentic qualities. It accounts for the way in which Dasein's circumspective concern 'slides about' from one thing to the next. Heidegger also points out particular kinds of references or assignments, "serviceability-for, detrimentality, usability, and the like" (Heidegger 1962: 114), he also indicates that, with equipment there is also a reference or assignment to other Daseins (Heidegger 1962: 100). Ontologically, these kinds of reference or assignment are the conditions upon which it is possible for things to be encountered as having relations at all.

Involvement [Bewandtnis]: This term describes the ontological condition for the kinds of relations that characterise 'having to do with something' in terms of the in-order-to structure that will be discussed below. Whereas reference or assignment describes the relations between items of equipment (*e.g.* trowel and soil), involvement, describes the ontological condition for Dasein's relationship *with* something *in* something (Heidegger 1962: 115). To further the example used above, it describes Dasein's involvement *with* trowelling *in* cleaning an area, so trowelling has an *involvement* with cleaning an area. Involvement is one way in which Heidegger gets around the notion that things have properties while further elaborating on the idea that things are what they are only in relation to Dasein's 'having to do' with them. Trowelling is therefore not a property of trowels but is rather one among many possible involvements that allow a trowel to 'show up' for circumspective Dasein as the thing that it is. When I discuss involvement in this thesis, it is this 'having to do with' that I have in mind. Trowelling, for a bricklayer, reveals a trowel as a very different entity than to the archaeologist because in the world of the bricklayer, there is an involvement *in* trowelling *with* building a wall. This gets over the idea that a thing may inherently be *for* something. Heidegger defines the kinds of involvements that make up the in-order-to structure:

Whereof [das Woraus]: This describes the other items of equipment from which something is made up. To use the example of the trowel again, the involvement *whereof* that particular item is composed is the metal from the mine and the wood from the forest.

With-which [das Womit]: This describes the involvement character of equipment in any task or role; it is that equipment *with-which* something is attempted so, as already noted, a trowel is something *with-which* one trowels.

In-which [das Wobei]: This describes a task or role in which some item of equipment might be involved, so the involvement *in-which* a trowel might show up for that item of equipment that it is may be trowelling but it may also, in the case of a heavily worn trowel, be how experienced an archaeologist she understands herself to be.

For-which [das Wofür/das Wozu]: This terms describes the task or role *for-which* an item of equipment may be selected, so in trowelling, the role *for-which* the trowel is most suited, in terms of my Being an archaeologist, is revealed.

Towards-this [das Dazu]: This describes the involvement of any equipment in the goal of any task or role for-which it has an involvement. As an archaeologist I will wish, for example, to clean the area that I have been allocated, it is *towards-this* goal that I am trowelling.

For-the-sake-of-which [das Worumwillen]: This term is intended to convey the role that equipment has as part of Dasein's possible ways to be. For the trowel, it is ultimately for-the-sake-of being an archaeologist of the particular kind that I interpret myself to be that I use it.

The in-order-to structure conveys the inadequacy of thinking of things in a purely functional way as something for something. My spectacles being for correcting my vision in no way accounts for how they fit into my world as I understand it in terms of my everyday dealings. To be *for* something also suggests that there is a right and a wrong way to use a piece of equipment. As we have seen with the example of the trowel this is little more than a value judgement based on a particular Dasein's self-interpretation.

Dealings [Umgang]: The way in which Dasein's concern manifests itself in its dealings with equipment, which may be understood as an everyday kind of coping with things. He uses this term to denote the fact that the way one 'goes about' things are not for the most part consciously thought about (Heidegger 1962: 950). For example, the excavating archaeologist in the use of the trowel or mattock or any of the tools with which she is most familiar does not have to think about them when she is using them, her attitude (or comportment [*verhalten*] in Heidegger's terminology) towards them is rather one of skilled coping. We have already mentioned this situation in discussing the manner in which those tools are disclosed to Dasein through the example of the computer; Dasein is mostly unaware of this disclosure because it is skilfully coping (dealing) with the equipment at hand.

Others[Andere/fremd]

As it is always alongside equipment in the world, Dasein is also always with Others. Of Others Heidegger says they "are encountered as what they are; they *are* what they do" (Heidegger 1962: 163). This suggests that Others are encountered by Dasein for the most part in terms of the roles that they occupy in relation to Dasein defined as 'I'.

Solicitude [*Fürsorge*]: Above we outlined care as the unifying structure of Dasein, the type of care that Dasein exhibits toward Others Heidegger calls solicitude. Others 'matter' to Dasein, but not in the same way as equipment (although the body can take on this character).

The 'One' [*das Man*]: Dasein is with others to such an extent that most of the time, Dasein and Others are absorbed into what Heidegger calls *das Man*, usually interpreted as the 'They'. This term is given an alternative translation by Dreyfus as the 'One' (1991: *xi* and Chapter 8) which will be followed here in preference to Macquarrie and Robinson's standard translation because 'They' is potentially

misleading in that it could be understood to indicate that Dasein can exist outside of the 'They', which is not what Heidegger is actually arguing.

Absorption into the 'One' is not intended as a moral judgement on pop culture, although it has been read this way. For Heidegger the 'One' is largely a positive state of Dasein. Without the 'One' and its shared understandings, Dasein's average everyday world would not be intelligible. For example, our trowel is what it is to an archaeologist, or to the bricklayer because it is possible to say "That is the way *one* uses it"; it has a shared intelligibility based on its social context. But this same sort of publicness also obscures certain understandings; the question of Being for example. The 'One' makes practices seem normal, Heidegger would probably argue that were it not for Dasein's tendency towards absorption into the 'One' we would not have a concept of normal. Equipment as well as Others as are made intelligible by the 'One'.

4.4. LOOKING FORWARD

The debates surrounding Heidegger and archaeology have been considerable (Gosden 1996; Karlsson 1997; Küchler 1996; Oudemans 1996; Patton 1996; Thomas 1996a, 1996b, 1997, 2001; Webster 2001a, 2001b; Weiner 1996). Oudemans in particular, speaking from the point of view of a philosopher, considers that Heidegger's philosophy has nothing to do with studies that take place in the physical world such as archaeology, that it is solely a system for accounting for the ontological constitution of Being which is not a 'thing' that can be studied as one might study pots and postholes. This is true in as much as that was Heidegger's own project and that, for philosophy generally, application is always the handmaiden of pure thought. There is, however, no essential reason why the conclusions and ideas developed as a result of that project should not be directed towards the concerns of research outside pure philosophy. Heidegger himself says that an analytic of Being must come before studies such as anthropology (Heidegger 1962: 71) and that all 'sciences' already operate on an

understanding of Being that, if it were made clearer, would provide them with a better understanding of the objects of their study (Heidegger 1962: 31). It is therefore not out of keeping with Heidegger's thought to take his worked out understanding of Being and examine just what difference it does make to the sorts of understandings that are the aim of a particular discipline, rather than simply rely on the truth of this assertion; Heidegger would possibly consider the latter to be 'inauthentic'. To that end, we might now begin to look forward to the development of a methodology that attempts to realise that aim.

The concepts discussed above represent an Interpreted body of ideas that underpin such a methodology, the interpretations towards which it is directed and the Interpretations that result. These will be the main focus of the remainder of this thesis. The phenomenological concepts discussed here will be taken forward and re-worked in the following chapters through data collection and generation, analysis, presentation, application and Interpretation. They are presented here, not as a glossary – as it is intended that the reader return to and reinterpret them through the reading of the sections that follow – but as an introduction to the conceptual 'toolkit' with-which the methodology that follows was constructed, in-order-to Interpret that methodology in the readers own terms for-the-sake-of their own roles as archaeologists in relation to the one that I carve out for myself herein.

PART III: METHODOLOGIES

~CHAPTER 5~
METHODOLOGISING HEIDEGGER: GENERAL CONCERNS

In the preceding chapter a number of phenomenological concepts were discussed which are intended as a basis for the development of a distinctly Heideggerian phenomenology of everyday action. It was noted that the development of such a methodology does not do violence to Heidegger's project as some might contend (Oudemans 1996) but takes it in a different direction which, even if he may not have approved of it, Heidegger may at least have considered to be 'authentic'.

5.1. BEGINNING TO 'DO' A HEIDEGGERIAN PHENOMENOLOGY

One of the stated aims of this thesis is to develop a rigorous, transparent methodology for a phenomenology of everyday action with the broad goal of answering the question of whether or not it is possible to design or conduct experimental archaeology in such a way that the human element in the making of things may be systematically studied and interpreted (*contra.* Reynolds 1998: 33). In order to 'do' a Heideggerian archaeology which includes data gathering and generation, analysis, presentation, application and interpretation, one is forced to ask the question, "How?". Answering this question has required the development of a phenomenological methodology, currently conspicuously absent from phenomenological investigations in archaeology (*e.g.* Tilley 1994), although this is not so for other disciplines (*e.g.* Giorgi 1975). Heidegger was clear to carefully lay out his own conception of a phenomenological methodology for the project of *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962: 49-63). For him, phenomenology is a *how* of research rather than characterising the *what* of that research (Heidegger 1962: 49-50) – most archaeological phenomenologies are, by contrast, defined by the *what* of their studies; a fundamental error. Heidegger's formulation of phenomenology as a *how* of research is "to let that which shows itself

be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself" (Heidegger 1962: 58), in other words it is a way of allowing the hidden phenomena that underpin everyday existence to be revealed. This is the position taken for the development of the phenomenological methodology described in this thesis. This 'method' as it applies here, is not intended as a 'cookbook' which may be uncritically applied, rather it signifies a way of doing phenomenological research that comes as a result of a highly contextualised understanding and application of Heidegger's philosophy and conception of phenomenology. Beyond the methodology described here, the closest thing to an explicit methodology based on Heidegger's philosophy that is directed outside philosophical discourse is James Weiner's *Tree Leaf Talk* (Weiner 2001). Other than this, the author is not aware of any explicitly methodological formulations published outside philosophy (within philosophy see Faulconer and Wrathall 2000); there are certainly none in archaeology.

In keeping with the theme of earlier chapters of moving from the general to the particular, this chapter will outline some broad methodological concerns that result from my own appropriation of Heidegger. It will discuss how the phenomena discussed in chapter 4 may be observed in everyday action and may be understood to support a method for approaching and interpreting that way of acting. These phenomena have, so far, been discussed in a more or less abstract manner; here their applicability will be defined and discussed, as will a number of example questions that may be set in their light. This will be done following a somewhat different structure to that laid out in chapter 4 with the specific Heideggerian terminology and conceptual separation being largely dropped in favour of a language and structure that integrates the philosophical with the observable. This will be done in two main sections; the first will consider the methodological steps and interpretative consequences of viewing people from the point of view of the philosophical position already outlined. It will cover the concepts of *Dasein, existence, Being-in, Being-with, thrownness, projecting, absorbed, falling, interpreting, the 'One'* and *solicitude*. The second will deal with

the methodological steps and Interpretative consequences of viewing things from that philosophical position. It will cover *Being-alongside, disclosed, interpreting, equipment, concern, closeness, in-order-to, reference or assignment* and *coping.* In addition, the observability and interpretative consequences of the third sense of Heidegger's conception of World (Table 5.1.) will be discussed. Furthermore the translation of these phenomena through the methodologies presented in this part of this thesis to understanding both the practice of roundhouse reconstruction and the past contexts of everyday action where direct observation is not possible will be considered. A number of specific questions will also be posed throughout this discussion *i.e.* How might the phenomena be identified? How might they be recorded? What are the most appropriate sources and techniques? What constitutes phenomenological data? How is that data collected? How might that data be managed? What are the principle constraining factors for a Heideggerian phenomenological methodology? The answers to these questions will be summarised at the end of the chapter, and developed in further detail in chapter 6 in the context of the particular manifestation of a phenomenological methodology that underpins the case study of the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction project.

5.2. WAYS AND MEANS

A phenomenology of everyday action is a 'situated phenomenology' *i.e. within* a context and *of* a context with a view to illuminating the interpretation of something and explicitly Interpreting it. Although it relies on a philosophical phenomenology of Being for its theoretical grounding, such a phenomenology should not be seen as a purely theoretical exercise. In order for it to be more that a pale imitation of Heidegger's original project, it must direct those concerns towards a situated context of action and demonstrate and develop the observability and Interpretability of the phenomena that he identifies. The phenomena that particularly concern this project are those that were discussed previously and which are summarised below (Table 5.1.).

Dasein	World	Equipment	Others
Existence	Of co-occurrent objects	Equipmental totality	Solicitude (positive) • *Leap in* • *Leap ahead* • *Take over*
Being-in	A set of particulars that define a set	Readiness-to-hand	
Being-with	As self-interpreting Dasein encounters it	Un-readiness-to-hand • *Conspicuousness* • *Obstinacy* • *Obtrusiveness*	Solicitude (deficient) • *Being-for* • *Being-against* • *Being-without* • *Passing by* • *Not mattering*
Being-alongside	The Worldhood of the world itself		
Thrownness		Presence-at-hand	
Projecting		Pure-presence-at-hand	
Absorbed		Concern • *Circumspection* • *Closeness*	The 'One'
Disclosed			
Falling		In-order-to • *Reference* • *Involvement* • *Whereof* • *With-which* • *In-which* • *For-which* • *Towards-which* • *For-the-sake-of-which*	
Interpreting			
Care			
		Coping	

Table 5.1. The philosophical components of a phenomenological methodlogy of everyday action.

Observation of the phenomena previously discussed raises its own problems. Heidegger's system is extremely intricate because it attempts to account for every ontological underpinning of what it is to be human, from the broad position of Being in the world at all, to the details of an attitude towards things in a room or a tool in one's hand. To realise every aspect of this in every conceivable context – which would amount to an anthropology of everything – is manifestly an impossible goal. An effective, usable situated phenomenology therefore requires boundaries to be set with regard to what it is possible or desirable to study and how. The proposing of a phenomenology of *everyday action* has already gone some way towards bounding one possible application of Heidegger's philosophy. This is implied in the idea of 'everyday action' by limiting study to the sorts of things people do as part of their everyday

5.3. FACTORS GUIDING A HEIDEGGERIAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH PROJECT

At a coarse level of phenomenological detail it is possible to study enacted human involvement in real-time if only a small number, or broad category, of phenomena are of interest. If, for example, one wishes to understand how one individual situates themselves with a selected number of others in a particular task with a view, say, to interpreting how people interact with each other manoeuvring a rafter, then it would be possible to observe and note who steps in for whom and under what circumstances, or who is disregarded by whom and under what circumstances – to take the example of the enacting of solicitude. Indeed, any phenomenology of everyday action must, at some point, deal with real-time, but a study limited to real-time can only be very restricted in scope because to understand and interpret everyday action in the fullest possible way for any given activity, requires a greater level of detail than it is possible either to observe or analyse in real-time. The view expressed here, based on the experiences of this research, is that a full real-time project to study anything more involved than a single task produces far more research material than is reasonably manageable. The data overload that is a consequence of restriction to real-time is, therefore, seen as partly responsible for the assertion that experimental archaeology cannot shed any light on human interaction in so far as it is too complex. The solution to the problem of real-time observation is the use of a number of different source materials side by side, the most effective of which are video, dialogue transcriptions and interviews. Video allows time to be revisited, situations, activities and engagements to be reviewed both in light of each other for the same time frame and in comparison to others; time frames which may only last seconds in real-time but carry a lot of information about the use of tools, or attitudes towards things and others. As well as the visual element, video contains the potential to record dialogue. That dialogue can contain information that provides another perspective on that which can be observed, but will obviously contribute to the amount of information generated.

Observation of everyday acting outside the strictures of real-time has the potential to generate vast quantities of data. It is important to make a clear distinction here between *source materials i.e.* video, dialogue and interviews and *data i.e.* the sum of observed and recorded phenomena. For any one project, the amount of source material may appear to be very limited *e.g.* three hours of video, but that apparently small source may generate thousands of phenomenological observations if every phenomenon and each instance of its manifestation is recorded. This is demonstrated for this project by the inclusion of the source materials and data in the appendices. It is all too easy to become mired in the amount of detail and the number of phenomena that it becomes possible to observe through the use of multi media sources. This can be a crippling as the real-time inability to observe any phenomena but the coarsest. It is therefore important to consider how the potential torrent of data may be managed.

In managing the data generation (assuming the use of at least one video source), interviews with those under study become useful. At one level, interviews may provide a check against getting lost in detail. If they are at least semi-structured *i.e.* are conducted with broad research questions in mind but with enough leeway that the informant guides them so that their understanding of what they are being interviewed about is foregrounded, not that of the researcher, they can be analysed for the major concerns that emerge from them. These major concerns can be used to target an approach to what is observable through the video and make the amount of information more manageable.

More important than concerns over data management, interviews should be seen as a complimentary research source which may add to as well as assist in the management of the potential phenomenological information obtainable from video-based observation alone. The principle distinction between the sorts of information available from interviews compared to that available from video is between *explicit* and *implicit* understandings or interpretations, although this is by no means an absolute

division. Video will tend most readily to reveal the 'taken-for-granteds' of activities and engagements, whereas interviews will tend most readily to reveal the explicit more considered understandings of protagonists. In practice, this means that the two different sources provide comparable perspectives on everyday action; one situated in activity, the other in language.

Awareness of the distinctions and interconnections between video and interview sources raises the question of what sequence they should be conducted in. There are two stages to this that require careful consideration *i.e.* the shooting of video and conducting of interviews on the one hand, and their analysis on the other. Unless video is pre-recorded, a deliberate decision is taken by the researcher to have no input in the shooting of video, no interviews are planned or interviews are conducted only after the video has been shot, the questions and responses of the interview process are likely to affect the way a video is shot. Unless a camera is left static and rolling throughout the entirety of the project under study (impossible for some projects such as architectural reconstruction, which may take 8-10 hours a day over several weeks, but feasible for small focused projects), decisions have to be made as to what to shoot and when, what to focus on, from where and for how long. These decisions fundamentally affect what it is possible to observe and, in essence, influence data generation and introduce a level of pre-interpretation into the resulting data. The reason for this is that such decisions will result in artificial breaks in real-time or 'cuts', which serve to pre-structure the data that may be generated as a consequence of later observation and analysis. Between cuts, one is left with what are referred to here as 'units of continuity' (UCs). These should be seen, not as analytical units in their own right (unless the motivations of the researcher are being studied), but as 'windows' on a continuum of engagements. It is therefore important to be explicit about why the decisions that result in the cut/UC sequence have been taken so that their impact on the resulting data can be accounted for.

If video is shot prior to interviews then the principle impact on data generation will be on interview sources, where they are to be used. The decisions as to what to shoot and when, what to focus on, from where and for how long still have to be made, and the reasons for them documented. This is because these decisions are likely to solidify the researcher's preconceptions, by making them real in the form of the resultant video if the video is shot in rigid accordance with pre-expressed research priorities. This may have the effect of constraining a researcher's questioning of, or discourse with, an informant to those preconceptions. It is therefore considered preferable to approach the shooting of video in a manner similar to that discussed for the interview process above *i.e.* in a semi-structured way with research questions in mind but in response, more directly, to what is observed during the course of a project. This way a more nuanced, contextualised study of what is occurring can be achieved rather than one based too heavily on research preconditions. Restricting the number of phenomena is also a way to manage the potential depth of data generated and was part of the strategy adopted for this research.

Of equal importance to the concerns noted above are the tools with which to manage and analyse the selected source materials. The materials used to construct the kind of Heideggerian analytic that is the focus of this research are qualitative in character, so the normal statistical and database tools that archaeologists use in the analysis of their source materials such as Access, Excel and SPSS are unsuitable for the generation of qualitative data from the kinds of sources proposed here as the aim is not in the main to produce comparative statistical results but contextual qualitative interpretations. The most effective tools for this kind of qualitative data analysis (QDA) and methodological development are, therefore, the numerous computer software packages designed specifically for this kind of research, each of which handle the different source materials discussed above more or less effectively. The main QDA packages currently available are ATLAS.ti, NUDIST, *hyper*RESEARCH, NVIVO and The Ethnograph although there are several others. The speed at which these packages

are developed defies adequate synthesis (but see Miles and Weitzman 1994 for an attempt at this), so the best way to asses which software is best suited to the project at hand is either to attend one of the regular comparative software seminars run by groups such as the Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) Networking Project, or to download the evaluation versions of a range of packages (which are usually free of charge but restricted in their functionality in some way) directly from the developers and compare them against the materials that are specific to the project. This latter approach was the one taken for the research presented here. For a Heideggerian phenomenological analytic and for the development of the methodology to conduct that analytic ATLAS.ti [Archiv fur Technik, Lebenswelt und Alltagssprache] (developed by Thomas Muhr of Scientific Software) proved to be the most suitable (Townend 2001, 2003) because it was felt to be capable of handling the combination of different source materials of video, text and images, as used in this project, more effectively than the others and because it is more manipulable in the theoretical positions that it will support; this latter point proved to be crucial in the development of the methodology presented here. These points will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

Having discussed the types of source materials that may be used in pursuit of a Heideggerian phenomenology and pointed out some of the difficulties associated with such a project in the broad senses of data generation and management, I would like now to move on to three broad themes that concern the situated interpretations of such a phenomenology: the self interpreting life of people (Dasein and existence), a place in the scheme of things (space, place and situatedness), Being one among many (the impact of the 'They') and the interpreted life of things (equipmentality).

5.4. THE SELF-INTERPRETING LIFE OF PEOPLE

It has been noted that Dasein does not equate to people, but that people have the character of Dasein. How is this manifest? People tend to define themselves

in terms of their possible ways to be, these can be broad identities that are either stated or imposed such as "I am/she is a carpenter", or they can be more specific such as forgiving, reluctant, powerful, self-critical or abusive which may not have been consciously adopted but are perceptible in an individuals way of Being. Each of these may be identified as a possible way of Being if any form of the verb 'to be' can be attached to them. Possibilities can be defined as either 'positive' or 'negative', 'enabling' or 'disabling' depending on research priorities. 'Negative' possibilities need not be 'disabling'; as ways of Being, they are always in relation to something. For example, being frustrated may be a negative way of Being in relation to certain sets of things; disabling an ability to cope with a task at hand, but it may result in attention being directed elsewhere and thus enabling some other task or relation, thereby being positive. Context is therefore important; what or whom is a particular way of being in relation to? What does it enable? What does it constrain? Why and how?

In practice there are two routes to understanding people's possible ways of Being, the first is from the perspective of the researcher and the second is from that of the informant, both of which should, ideally, be complimented by the use of different source materials as outlined above.

Observation, whether it be in real-time or through the use of video such as is advocated here, will tend to foreground the researcher's interpretation of an individual or group's possible ways of Being. It will also give some indication as to how that individual or group is perceived by others, because the researcher is, in this sense, Other to those being studied. The implication of this is that the researcher is always situated within the context under study. This has long been recognised in 'postprocessual' accounts of interpretation (which themselves are in large part founded on Heidegger's philosophy) but it often not possible to track that involvement or it must be assumed (*e.g.* Tilley 1994). A phenomenology of everyday action is, in part, a phenomenology of that involvement, the goal of which is to gain access to how people *are* in relation to

something most of the time, in terms, not primarily of how they think they are (although this is also obviously interesting), but how they can be understood 'to be'. For this reason, and in contrast to usual phenomenological approaches in archaeology, the kind of phenomenology being advocated here does not focus observation and interpretation on the involvement of the researcher but on the involvement of others. Although a researcher's observations and interpretations of phenomena are foregrounded in such an approach they are not interpreted from within a context rather from outside it. The involvement of the researcher is therefore more readily separable and her position becomes accountable. This is an important distinction because becoming locked into people's own interpretations of their ways of Being constrains research too strongly to the present context, whereas focussing on how people can be understood 'to be' opens up the possible range of contexts to which that understanding can be applied. A researcher's involvement should therefore been seen as enabling rather than restricting interpretation but it must, none the less, be taken account of explicitly.

Methodologically, this can be achieved by separating out the interviewer's questions and comments from the responses of the interviewee and analysing them for the major concerns that they exhibit. In this manner an account can be made of both the extent to which the interviewer is involved in generating the data of a phenomenological project and, through comparison with a similar analysis of the responses, the results of that project (Appendix 7).

A research programme that is restricted to a particular context under observation in the absence of an account of the researcher is not necessarily problematic as long as one is clear that this is the principle focus of study. Indeed, it would be useful to conduct such research in relation to different experimental projects with regard to how different possible ways of being – their combinations and relations – constrain, enable or otherwise affect experimental practice within particular settings and tasks. Even so, comparative data on the involvement of the researcher should be considered

as a desirable, integrated component of a research methodology because experiments in archaeology, particularly those that are task based or field based, have tended to dismiss the researcher's involvement as irrelevant to experimental theory, practice and explanation. One way in which this may be achieved is for the researcher to explicitly define their own way of Being in relation to the task of the research project take a data set with this in mind and compare it with the explicit and implicit understandings or interpretations of those involved in other aspects of the same or similar projects. Both aspects of this methodology for reflexivity were adopted for the current research, the data from which is featured in appendix 7, and which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

Interviews are perhaps the most effective way to access an individual's own interpretations of their ways of Being as they can be targeted to reveal this either implicitly, by guiding the discourse, or explicitly through direct questioning. This approach will tend to foreground an individual or group's interpretation of their own ways of Being, while retaining access to that of the interviewer. As well as providing information in it's own right, informants' ownmost Interpretations can be contrasted with observed interpretations in light of the idea that people are given to mis-interpreting their own ways of Being (see chapter 4.3.1.). Viewed in this way, an individual or group's ownmost Interpretations can act as a check on what has been observed, *i.e.* do they match up? If not, why not? What part does the interviewer play in this perceived interplay? Alternatively they may be viewed as prior information through which observations may be channelled, or a combination of the two.

The Interpretative consequences of identifying and comparing people's interpretations of their possible ways to be relate to the contextualised self-interpretation of individuals or groups. People's engagements within a context are directed by their 'attunements' towards things, others and settings. Adopting a phenomenological methodology that brings these into focus means that either specific

instances or possible ranges of the ways in which these are manifest becomes possible. In effect, one is looking to make explicit the everyday ways in which people interpret their roles in a task and how that affects the ways in which equipment is used and the kinds of solicitude through which others are drawn in or excluded. Archaeologically, it becomes possible to ask whether what is being observed can reasonably be expected to have been the case in the past, to consider the possible range of influences that may affect its precise manifestation and to consider the effect this has on the forms, roles and thereby understandings of material culture.

The interpretative consequences of identifying and comparing the researcher's interpretations of their possible ways to be with regard to their involvement in the research are to more fully understand the constitution of the practice of research and the ways in which it creates it's subject and object, and to transparently account for the influence of the researcher on the outcome of the research. This latter consequence must be seen as of great importance not only for experimental archaeology but also for archaeological phenomenologies which have hitherto assumed the constitution of the researcher or otherwise masked or confused situated, involved Being in past and present. Adopting a phenomenological methodology that brings the researcher's interpretations of their own ways of Being into focus in a particular context allows the identification of possible ways of Being, to examine their constitution and influences in detail, and to consider what may usefully be carried over from present contexts to past contexts.

All material and human engagements are filtered though a self-interpreting individual or group. Through looking at the constitution of this self-interpretation in one context, the possibility is opened up of Interpreting it in others that bear other (although never all) contextual similarities.

5.4.1. A Place in the Scheme of Things

People understand their worlds and engagements from a position of being in some situation or another. Situations are contexts for involvements with things and others. They are fundamental analytical units for a phenomenology of everyday action because it is from a fallenness *within* these situations that people interpret the roles of things and others, and *through* which they interpret themselves. Many hundreds of situations may be adopted in the course of a task or project; often they will overlap one another and/or cross-cut particular tasks. Being-in a situation is much more than an abstract theoretical notion, it may be readily observed through the use of video; a task that would be all but impossible in real-time observation. Situations are defined as discrete units of 'care'. They are the main analytical units upon which the UC provides a 'window'. In some cases situations may coincide with UCs, in others with tasks; sometimes both. This is, however, coincidental as a situation cannot be broken down to a task as it is more fundamental, *i.e.* being in a situation makes engaging in tasks possible in the first place, neither can it be equated with a UC as these are imposed linear temporal units which, in themselves, exhibit only the cares of the camera operator.

Situations are demarcated by shifts in care, *i.e.* where the attentions of an individual or group shift, manifest as sequences of 'adoption' and 're-adoption'. Note that there is no 'abandonment' here; because of the nature of engagement as continuous and the ever-shifting character of care, there is no sense in which a situation is abandoned, rather another is adopted that redirects the concern displayed in the former. If video source data is composed of cuts and UCs, situations may also be demarcated by the points at which a group or individual comes into or goes out of shot, *e.g.* in cases where it is possible to pick out more than one situation in a particular UC – where there are two or more individuals or groups that are clearly in different situations.

There are two basic ways in which people can find themselves in some situation or another; as part of a group or concerned with something on their own terms. These will often interconnect, which can make it difficult to clarify the kind of situation being observed. For example, when an individual who is getting on with something on their own interjects with a group for a time and then returns to what they were doing, it may not appear to be clear whether, or at what point, the individual adopts the situation of the group or whether this has resulted in the group adopting a different situation. Similarly, when the individual leaves the group to return to what they were doing, have both individual and group adopted another situation as a result? The keys to sorting out such confusing observations are the notion care and the adoption/re-adoption sequence. For example, does the interjection of the individual alter what the group is concerned with? If not, the group's situation has not altered. Is the individual's interjection related to what they are concerned with? If not, the individual's situation has not altered. If, on the other hand, they take on the cares of the group, then the individual's situation has altered to such an extent that a new situation is adopted by the group as a result of the absorption of the individual. When the individual steps back out again, is their concern with the same situation as before the interjection? If so, the individual has re-adopted that situation, if not, they have adopted another. In such a way the dynamics of the ways in which people create and define their place in a project through their various engagements may be observed and untangled.

The observation and definition of situations creates a mass of data which may appear to be jumbled, it is, therefore, useful to note and organise situations in the order in which each is revealed within any given UC where possible. The artificial boundaries of the UC can be useful in this respect as a route can be followed through the UC in terms of each individual or group situation, from where it is revealed (comes into shot) to where is ends (goes out of shot). The disadvantage of this is that the situations are not necessarily real; rather they may be imposed by the boundaries of the UC. Where the boundaries of the UC cannot be used in this way (and this should be

considered preferable) the particular situational route of a group or individual may be followed through the UC in terms of their shifting care and the adoption/re-adoption sequence. Following the routes of individuals and groups in this way also gives a sense of the temporal sequences that are experienced by them rather than trying to impose one in concordance with the linear temporal sequence dictated by the UC.

Dialogue is very useful in defining situations because it makes the cares of individuals or groups more explicit. Dialogue can, however, also be misleading because people may interpret their concerns with things in a way that is inconstant with what is observable. It is useful in such instances to consider whether the overall goal of a particular phenomenological research project is explicit or implicit understandings and what impact one has in light of the other in terms of what it adds to interpretation. Situations can be readily defined in the absence of dialogue, but they cannot usually be defined through dialogue alone because they are defined by the care exhibited towards things and others in context of action.

The Interpretative consequence of defining situations is the ability to clarify the shifting contexts of involvement through which people interpret their place in a project. Ordinarily, a complex task such as the building of a roundhouse is seen in terms of the number of smaller tasks that contribute to its conclusion. This is a reasonable way to explain how such a task is conducted from a perspective that views the end product only in terms of a technological object. It does little, however, to clarify how it is that people find themselves in the sorts of situations that allow those tasks to be taken on. It is often implicit in archaeological interpretations of technical practices that people simply do a task and then move on to the next one in a mechanical fashion. This is a consequence of a mechanistic view of projects, tasks and things. An analysis of the situational contexts of action destroys this mechanistic view by demonstrating that tasks are derivative of a flow of the interpreted and negotiated places that people take up in a project.

5.4.2. Being One among Many

The part of the discussion above that concerns the place of individuals in relation to groups raises the question of the understanding of Others. Heidegger suggests that people are always possessed of some kind of understanding of Others; that they are not a mystery that has to be discovered but rather, they are pre-understood from the self-interpretation and place in the scheme of things adopted by an individual and in relation to Others.

Understandings of Others are manifest in two ways: in terms of actions and interactions in a situational context and through what an individual might say of another. The ways in which Others 'matter' may take either a positive or negative form. Observing these pre-understandings involves looking closely at the situational context in which they occur in combination with how they are explicitly expressed. In situational contexts, pre-understandings of Others can be observed in relation to the individual's or group's possible ways to be discussed above. People will tend to interpret the possibilities of Others in relation to their own, in accordance with this way of interpreting the place of Others in the scheme of things an individual may be observed to 'stand in' for Others *i.e.* take what one person is concerned with and make it their own, thereby effectively pushing the other into the background (Heidegger 1962: 158, *ftn.* 1). They may 'lead the way' for Others to become concerned and involved with some thing or task. On the other hand, Others may be disregarded or openly opposed.

There are many possible ways in which an individual or group's pre-understandings of Others may manifest in or across different situational contexts. This again raises the problem of data overload as there may be several manifestations of pre-understandings observable in any one situation, and there may be several situations in any one UC and many UCs covering a given project. It may, therefore, be neither possible nor desirable to account for all manifestations of the pre-understanding of

Others. While the ability to account for every such manifestation represents an ideal, it is achievable only if unlimited time is available for analysis. As this will rarely, if ever, be the case, this element of a phenomenology of everyday practice benefits from a targeted approach. One way to achieve this is to take one individual who stands out for some reason – for example, this could be because they are observed to be very much in the background for the most part – follow them through the project and compare the ways in which their pre-understandings of Others are manifest and how that effects their particular self-interpretation with those of someone who does not particularly stand out.

This might be considered to be a 'curiosity driven' approach that does not seek to answer a particular question, but to come to a context specific understanding of a set of relations. Another approach would be question driven and based in some specifically articulated pre-understanding *e.g.* how does the pre-understanding of one individual as "she is the engineer but she used to be a carpenter" affect the person who holds this understanding and whose self-interpretation is as a carpenter? What conflicts and concordances arise from these interpretations? Can such conflicts and concordances, in a general sense, be understood to occur in other contexts and what might their material consequences be? Both of these approaches are phenomenological in that they concentrate on elucidating a particular phenomenon.

Dialogue and interview data can be of considerable assistance in defining the relations and interpretations that individuals or groups take to Others, because they make them more explicit. Again it should be noted that the attitudes that individuals take to Others as explicitly expressed may differ from that which is observable. This should be anticipated and noted as, taken together, implicit and explicit manifestations of solicitude will give an indication of the dynamics of interpersonal relationships and their interpretability.

In analysing sources for the understanding of Others, research will be assisted by following routes through that material based on particular situations as described above. In addition, one may wish to have certain broad questions in mind, such as, How are attitudes towards other manifest? What steps are taken by an individual or group as a result? Does a relationship characterised by Being mistrustful, for example, result in one individual 'standing in' for another? What do such relations indicate about the place of different individuals in the scheme of things? The sorts of questions that are asked will be effected by the use, or otherwise, of interviews or dialogue.

Another consideration for the analysis of interpersonal relations is the tendency for people to become lost into the cares of Others. This is particularly the case for groups (depending on what level the 'group' is conceived at) as people will tend to lose themselves in what the cares of the group are directed towards and will interpret themselves in relation to those cares over and above their own. This tendency makes the group a viable analytical unit and helps to manage the amount of possible information by removing the necessity to consider uniquely every individual, although this can be done and should be done in those instances where individuals can be observed to be 'pushing against' the cares of the group, for example.

The Interpretative consequences of identifying the manifestations of solicitude towards Others relate to the possible dynamics of interpersonal relationships. They give an indication, not only of what one person may think of another (which in itself has limited Interpretative currency) but also the kinds of understandings of others and the actions that might result and how this effects power and socialised positioning in the comparatively micro-contexts of particular tasks and projects.

5.5. THE INTERPRETED LIFE OF THINGS

It has been noted that things are not 'mere things' that simply exists without some level of pre-interpretation, but can be more usefully though of as 'items of

equipment'. This means that people experience things, on the whole, in relation to something that is being done or needs to be done, or some task or goal towards-which their actions are directed. Occasionally (or more frequently depending on their self-interpretation and situation), they may adopt a more explicit attitude towards things which, in effect, distances them from those things. Most actions are made up of a combination of these 'practical' and 'theoretical' attitudes. Methodologically, the two modes of engagements with things can be defined and recorded as involvement and distance, practical and theoretical attitudes and/or practice and planning which related to Heidegger's conception of readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand respectively. Each couplet can be adopted individually or they may be seen as a hierarchy of abstraction and recorded accordingly.

A phenomenology of everyday action requires a consideration of what constitutes equipment in a particular context. As with possible ways to be, there are two routes to this; the first, observation, foregrounds the researcher's interpretations, the second, dialogue and interview, foregrounds the informants interpretations. A similar distinction between how people can be observed to enact an understanding and how they might explicitly express it applies here as it does to possible ways to be. This, again, is because becoming locked into people's own understandings of equipment constrains research to the present context, whereas focussing on how people can be understood to enact such understandings opens up the possible range of contexts to which those understanding can be applied.

Equipment may be identified as things which have involvements in order to achieve some goal. A phenomenology of the equipment involved in everyday action requires that what this consists in not be taken for granted, for example that a hammer, whenever it is visible, is always an item of equipment. Equipment is only revealed as such through its manipulation, so a hammer, although it might be identifiable as such to the researcher, does not exist in a particular context until the concern of an individual

or group is directed towards it. This conception can throw up some quite surprising understandings of what constitutes equipment; holes, for example are revealed as items of equipment, or an apparently 'natural' and undifferentiated piece of timber may be perceived to have a role in order to achieve something where others do not – it may, for example, effectively become a hammer – making it equipment.

It is important to understand how equipment is understood or revealed according to different contexts and self-interpretations. A hammer, for example, is used by a carpenter in-order-to cut a joint or secure a wedge, but for the researcher wishing to conduct a phenomenology of everyday action, a hammer is considered in-order-to understand how its specific manipulability in different contexts is manifest. The (apparently) self-same object is revealed in quite different ways in accordance with how the person to whom it is revealed understands themselves and their role in that engagement and its wider associations. The point of this is that it is wholly insufficient to simply label something as a hammer because doing so says nothing about the ways in which it may be understood and, in effect, nothing about what that thing *is*. However, such understandings are none the less genuine contextualised understandings that should be recorded in order to account for the influence of the researcher on data generation and the results of the project.

Equipment may also be revealed through the ways in which people talk about things. They may not have proper names assigned to them in the context of everyday action so terms like "this", "that" or "a bit of a dip in the ground" need to be considered in context as to whether they reveal equipment or not; often such terms may represent the normal ways in which things are understood. Interviews will tend to reveal equipment more explicitly in terms of proper names. These may be compared both to what is observable and what is talked about in context, as these will tend to be quite different. Explicit articulation in a setting away from everyday action, as represented by the interview setting, will tend to take a more distanced stance on what constitutes

equipment in those cases where questions are directed to reveal this. In a more open ended discussion, equipment may not be explicitly revealed at all; rather it will be implicated in discussions about how certain tasks were done. This latter revealing should be considered to be more akin to the ways in which equipment was revealed in the setting that is being discussed over any explicit articulation.

Recording equipment in accordance with these definitions can therefore be achieved in two ways. An item may be identified and given a proper name as it occurs to the researcher *e.g.* "hammer", also it may be recorded using the precise terminology employed in context by the individual who is concerned with it *e.g.* "the sledge". The recording method for equipment is not unlike that adopted for conventional archaeological single context recording, but in place of cuts, fills, layers, associations and absolute measurement details we have situation, task, involvement, human and equipmental references and, with video, segment and situation time-code identifier such as "video1/UC23/S12/02.33-04.36". This method gives a picture of what items of equipment have been identified and in what way, its links with other items, individuals, groups, tasks and situations all of which indicate the interpreted 'career' of an object through the course of a project.

In the context of situations, people are for the most part involved with the equipment through which they, in part, define and interpret their worlds. This is what equipment is *for* in the broadest sense; even taking a distanced stance towards equipment plays a part in this. Readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand are, therefore, the main ways in which people engage with materials, tools and other items of material culture. The phenomenon of readiness-to-hand can be observed in everyday action through what is taken up and used in a particular situation or in relation to a particular task. Some simple questions may help to clarify specific equipmental involvements, What items of equipment are being manipulated? What are they being manipulated in order to achieve, what task is the equipment involved in? What is it involved with?

What has it been taken up for? What is the goal of the task or role for which it has been taken up? And what role does it play in the ways in which an individual goes about creating and enacting a manifestation of their particular self-interpretation in that context?

Readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand occur at different levels, each of which is observable. Readiness-to-hand is the way in which people usually deal with things when there are no problems and a task is going smoothly. It can be observed when an individual or group is completely absorbed in the task at hand; where their concern is directed not at the tools themselves or the material that is being worked or manipulated, but 'straight through' these things towards the outcome of the task. In effect, the things that are being manipulated 'disappear from view' in favour of whatever end result is the goal of all this activity.

A series of different phenomenon can be observed when things are *not* going quite as smoothly and uninterruptedly. When normal skilled coping breaks down in any way equipment is revealed as variously conspicuous, obstinate or obtrusive. In such encounters equipment does not 'disappear from view' as it usually does during skilled activity but is rather called to people's attention in some way. Conspicuousness becomes observable when something is found by those manipulating it not to fit the role for which it was taken up as it is being used; it is defined by momentary disruption that is easily overcome in the normal course of the task at hand. Manifestations of conspicuousness tend to be fleeting because they are easily overcome and for the most part are hardly noticed, and are a normal part of most tasks. Obstinacy is more of a disruption than Conspicuousness. It is revealed when equipment 'stands in the way' of the task at hand. It can be observed where the equipment that an individual or group is attempting to employ for some task or another may require constant attention, for example, if it is not immediately right for the job. Obtrusiveness is observable where an individual or group's dealings with equipment break down completely, for example,

when a tool or something that is being worked on breaks and becomes unusable or is destroyed in the course of the task, or is missing or unavailable. These situations all result in overt attention being paid to all of the items of equipment with which the broken, destroyed or missing equipment would ordinarily be associated in terms of the task for which they were intended.

A question related to understanding how people encounter things as being involved with them is, How does an item of equipment as something for something change or remain the same in different situational contexts? For example one person's block of wood may be another's hammer. Changes in understandings such as this indicate that an item of equipment is not inherently any one kind of thing or another, what it *is* depends not on the rather abstract notion of context alone, but specifically on the different self-interpretations of those involved with that object in relation to each other, and with the other things with which that item of equipment becomes assigned in the course of it's appropriation from being understood to be in-order-to achieve one thing, to being understood to be in-order-to achieve something else.

As well as people being involved with equipment, that equipment also has involvements with other items of equipment so, in everyday action, nothing exists without a relationship to both people and other things. The relationship with other items of equipment is one in which one thing 'points toward' or refers to another. This can be though of as something like a 'route of discovery' by which things are revealed as equipment. This 'route' can be observed in situational or task contexts by asking the question, What thing causes what other thing(s) to come into focus for the individual or group that is interacting with them? For example, does the chisel bring the joint into focus or *vice versa*? Further, one might ask, What is the specific involvement that something has with an activity? *e.g.* a chisel in cutting a joint face. This will reveal the 'career' of a tool in terms of the various involvements that it has with other things,

tasks, materials and people. The consequence of this detail will be to dramatically expand the notion of what a tool, for example, is *for* and how this might come about.

Presence-at-hand is made more readily observable if it is considered as a 'standing back' from things because this describes what often happens when such a stance is adopted *i.e.* people literally step away from things to consider them explicitly. This signals a breakdown in people's involved activity and usually indicates a problem which requires explicit consideration. It is also indicated in dialogue where conversation shifts to the task at hand or to explicit consideration of tools or other objects. During the normal course of work *i.e.* when things are running smoothly, conversation will tend not to be about the work but about other, unrelated topics. In contrast to situated contexts, interviews will highlight explicit consideration over involved, enacted understandings, often being an Interpretation of the latter.

The Interpretative consequences of seeing things as items of equipment are quite profound for understandings of what constitutes material culture and for ideas about what things *are*. For the latter, a phenomenology of the equipment of everyday practice reveals that the terms that we use as archaeologists and, indeed, the terms or names that are used by people who engage with things, reveals little or nothing about what things are without considering their specific manipulability in-order-to achieve something. Also, little or nothing is revealed in naming about what things *actually* are *i.e.* the idea that things are 'really' one thing or another; we can, in fact, clearly see that things *are* only in the contexts of what they are manipulated in order to achieve for-the-sake-of some self-interpretation.

The above indicates that almost any physical object and some things that are not physical objects *e.g.* holes, have specific manipulabilities and the potential to be understood as having roles. This means that the restriction to classifiable objects and those that fall outside or in relation to those classificatory schemes gives a false

understanding of what constitutes 'material culture' and that the current conception of material culture is inadequate.

5.6. SUMMARY

Methodologising Heidegger's philosophical system as set out in chapter 4 raises a number of key questions, each of which has been addressed above and may be summarised as follows:

- How might the phenomena be identified?
    - Phenomena may be identified in an activity under study through the observation of action in context, analysis of the language/speech associated with that action and direct or indirect questioning of those involved.
    - Phenomena may be identified in relation to the involvement of the researcher though analysis of the decisions taken in source materials creation, undertaking a 'pre-conceptions study' to determine how the researcher views the object of study and analysis of the questions asked of those involved.
- How might they be recorded?
    - Phenomena can be recorded by noting their instances and associations. This is most effectively achieved using QDA computer software such as ATLAS.ti. This will be discussed fully in the context of a case study in the following chapter.
- What are the most appropriate sources and techniques?
    - The most appropriate sources for a phenomenology of everyday action are video, dialogue transcriptions and interviews.

- The most appropriate technique for generating these source materials is a semi-structured approach to both the shooting of video *i.e.* the decisions about to what to shoot, when, what to focus on, from where and for how long, and the conducting of interviews. This means that neither should be too strictly pre-planned but should be directed in response to either what is being observed or towards the concerns of the informant.

- What constitutes phenomenological data?

  - A distinction has been drawn between *source materials* and *data*. Phenomenological data is defined as the sum of observed and recorded phenomena.

- How is that data collected?

  - Phenomenological data is collected through the observation and recording of specific manifestations of phenomena in the form of codes and quotations.

- How might that data be managed?

  - The potential for the generation of large amounts of phenomenological data has been noted. It may be managed by considered decision making in the shooting of video, analysis of interviews for the main concerns expressed and the targeted selection of phenomena based on research priorities. At the analysis stage, specific situations, tasks or engagements may be 'sampled' to provide a picture of that situation, task or engagement, removing the need to record every instance of every phenomenon.

- What are the principle constraining factors for a Heideggerian phenomenological methodology?

- The constraining factors are time, the nature and combination of source materials, the number of phenomena studied and the level of detail at which they are studied and the resultant possibility of data overload.

To conclude, a methodologisation of Heidegger's philosophy in the context of the observation of human involvement in field-based experimental practice is not only possible but relatively straightforward to conduct. It does, however, have the potential to generate vast quantities of data, and one of the main tasks of any phenomenology conducted in this vein will be the appropriate management of that data.

There are two main routes to methodologising Heidegger, the first is to read and become immersed in his work and bring the insights gained from that immersion to a research project in an unstructured way, perhaps analysing them later for the influences they had on that project. The second would be to follow the route that has been laid out here. This should be seen only as one possible way of creating a methodology from Heidegger's philosophy and other researchers are encouraged to consider what is laid out here not as a 'cookbook', but rather as a 'shopping list' of ingredients to be mixed in different ways in accordance with the aims of a particular research project.

In the following chapter, the specific application of the general methodological concerns described here to a case study involving the reconstruction of the 'Chieftain's House' at Castell Henllys, Pembrokeshire, Wales will be expounded in detail.

~CHAPTER 6~
A METHODOLOGY FOR A REFLEXIVE, SITUATED PHENOMENOLOGY OF EVERYDAY ACTION

The general concerns raised by methodologising Heidegger's philosophy in the preceding chapter have established the basis for conducting a phenomenology of everyday action in relation to experimental archaeology. It has been argued that such a phenomenology should be situated *i.e. of* a context and *within* a context, and that it must be reflexive *i.e.* taking account of the position of the researcher in the generation of source materials and data. It has also argued that such a method should be rigorous and transparent, that the data generated is qualitative in character and that it is best conducted through three main, complimentary source materials *i.e.* video, dialogue transcription and interviews. Furthermore, it was argued that the qualitative data generated from these source materials has the potential to be extensive, requiring careful management.

6.1. OUTLINE OF A CASE STUDY

This chapter will focus on a detailed case study in the development of a Heideggerian phenomenological methodology through the example of a reconstruction project carried out in 1998 at Castell Henllys, Pembrokeshire, Wales. It will discuss the ways in which the phenomena discussed in chapter 4 were methodologised in relation to the data gathering and generation and analysis of the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction. It will also develop the broad concerns outlined in the preceding chapter in the specific context of the case study. As indicated above, this case study should seen as being formed of two parts, the first concerns the development of the methodology as a case study for the methodologisation of aspects of Heidegger's philosophy, the second concerns the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction project as a 'test-bed' for that methodology. The following precise application of the broad methodological concerns described above was developed specifically to account for the human involvement manifest in the reconstruction of the 'Chieftain's House' at

Castell Henllys, however, it is also felt to have broad applicability to other types of field-based experimental projects where its application will add a complimentary layer of detail about the human element of the making of things and/or the influence of the researcher on the planning, practice and results of such projects. It is also felt to be compatible, with some modification and development, to other areas of archaeological field practice – specifically excavation – where and understanding of the involvement of people in 'interpretation at the trowels edge' (Hodder 1999, 2000) is sought.

The main themes of a phenomenology of everyday action as outlined in the preceding chapter are the interpreting self, understandings of others, the interpretation of equipment and the role of the researcher. This chapter will discuss the precise route to generating and recording data on these main themes in this order. Prior to this there will be a discussion on the software requirements of the project and the acquisition and preparation of source materials. The bulk of the chapter will be concerned with observational strategies, interview technique, data recording techniques, data management techniques, an analytical methodology for qualitative phenomenological data and a methodology for reflexivity in relation to each major theme.

6.2. SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS

This project proved to be heavily reliant on computer software (Table 6.1.) and it is worth saying something at the outset about the affect that this had on the project as a whole. The main reason for this software reliance was the early decision to use ATLAS.ti to conduct the analysis of the source materials (Townend 2001, 2003). This decision was taken because of the variety of source materials that the project was anticipated to generate *i.e.* video, text and images. ATLAS.ti was chosen specifically because of its ability to handle all of these different source formats and because, after testing numerous other packages, it was felt to be more intuitive to use and sufficiently malleable to accommodate the philosophical position that was the basis of the project. The result of the decision to use ATLAS.ti was that all of the source materials had to

be transformed into digital formats. This was relatively unproblematic for interviews and dialogue because the use of word processing packages is now the norm and most researchers can be expected to have access to and knowledge of these packages. The only issue here was the precise format that the text documents should be saved as; this was again dictated by the decision to use ATLAS.ti which, for version 4.2 with which the project was started, was restricted to unformatted text (.txt) and rich text (.rtf) formats.

Software Package	Role
ATLAS.ti	Qualitative data generation, source and data management, methodology development, theory building
Adobe Premier	Video conversion and editing
Adobe Photoshop	Photograph management and editing
Microsoft Word	Master text document generation
Microsoft WordPad or similar	Primary document generation

Table 6.1. The software requirements of the project.

The digitisation of video sources is potentially more problematic because most researchers cannot be expected to be familiar either with the process or the software required. Digitisation can, none the less, be done relatively simply, in addition to which, commercial companies that specialise in analogue to digital conversion are widespread and with the increasing prevalence and quality of digital video cameras, this step may ultimately prove to be unnecessary in the near future. For this project Adobe Premier was used to create MPEG1 files from the raw footage, the process for which is described below. Premier was chosen partly because of its widespread use for digital film conversion and editing, partly because of its availability and partly because I, personally, am familiar with other Adobe products, all of which have a similar user interface, making Premier, for me, easier to learn and to use. Another Adobe package, Photoshop, was used to deal with the images. At the outset of the project, I had to make a decision about whether to take survey photographs using a standard 35mm SLR camera, or whether to use a digital camera. The former would potentially have meant scanning large numbers of photographs in order to have digital

files at my disposal, and the potential for loss of clarity in the resultant scans. The decision was, therefore, taken to use a digital camera from the outset. In either case industry standard image processing software was required and Photoshop is certainly the best choice in this regard.

The point of this brief discussion is to clarify the fact that the decision to use a computer software package such as ATLAS.ti for qualitative phenomenological research using a variety of source materials makes such a project completely reliant on a variety of software packages. This is both potentially expensive and time consuming where the operation of new software has to be learned. It also creates very large projects (in terms of megabytes of computer space), a restriction which must be considered in archive terms. The total of digital source materials and data used in this project, for example, amounted to approximately 4 gigabytes, which is a lot of storage space, especially for universities where server storage for any one individual is often quite limited. On the other hand, and on the basis of the experiences gained during this research, it is my considered opinion that such projects would not have been possible prior to the introduction of QDA software such as ATLAS.ti and the widespread availability of the software that supports the source materials that such packages are capable of handling. The possibility of developing a transparent phenomenological methodology is directly attributable to the use of ATLAS.ti in this project. I do not consider it either practicable or desirable to attempt such a project without the support offered by such packages.

6.3. THE ACQUISITION AND PREPARATION OF SOURCE MATERIALS

The source materials for the analysis of the Castell Henllys 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction project is composed of a video of approximately 175 minutes duration, a transcription of the dialogue from that video and transcriptions of six separate interviews (producing eight recordings) with four individuals involved in the project. Each of these sources were acquired by different means which will be discussed in

detail along with their methodological consequences below. All sources also had to prepared in order that they could be analysed using the ATLAS.ti QDA software package.

6.3.1. Video

The use of video, rather than real-time field observation, proved to be the key to the development of the methodology presented here. The reason for this is related primarily to the ability to go back over sections of interest and record a secondary level of data over them using QDA software. The video for the reconstruction of the 'Chieftain's House' was acquired from Phillip Bennett, the archaeologist and site manager of Castell Henllys Iron Age Fort, by whose kind permission it is used in this research and reproduced in the appendices. The bulk of the video was filmed between August and October 1998, with the final few scenes being filmed 6 months later during the April Easter period of 1999. It was shot by a University of Wales, Lampeter undergraduate and remains the property of Castell Henllys Iron Age Fort. The video contains visual and audio footage of the building's construction. It begins from a point where the postholes have already been dug and a selection of timbers has been brought to the reconstruction location (from here referred to as "the site") and partially prepared. The footage ends with the later stages of the thatching of the building.

The Castell Henllys video was not created with qualitative phenomenological research in mind. This provided an opportunity to consider the use of 'old data' in such research. This relates to two points in the conducting of the kind of phenomenological research discussed here. First is the question of whether it is possible to design an experiment that, from the outset, accounts for human involvement in the making of things and second, whether existing multi media records of conventional experiments (or possibly other areas of archaeological field practice), which were not designed with phenomenological research in mind, could also be used to account for human involvement. The use of 'old data' also highlighted the influences of the decisions

made during filming on both the content of the source and the data management issued that this raised.

The use of a pre-filmed source is a mixed blessing; on the one hand it allows the researcher to be sure that they have not influenced the creation of that source, but on the other hand it may not allow the analysis of the decisions taken prior to and during filming in order to asses their impact. This was the case for the 'Chieftain's House' video because, despite efforts to do so, it was not possible to locate the individual who shot the film – although some conclusions can be drawn about his influence (see chapter 7). As has been noted previously (Chapter 5.1.), an ideal situation with regard to the impact of filming decisions, would be to cover every individual, action and event with no breaks in continuity, that way one could be certain of no interference from pre-ordained, perhaps unrecognised research priorities. But – as has also been noted – it would be virtually impossible to analyse because of the overwhelming depth of detail without a careful management programme.

Digitisation

In order to manage and analyse the video through ATLAS.ti, it had first to be converted from the analogue VHS format in which it was provided into a digital format. Digitisation is a relatively simple but time consuming process whereby the raw footage is 'captured' and effectively re-recorded in digital form. This was done by the author in the Digital Media Unit of University College London, using Adobe Premier over five days in September 2002. High quality, uncompressed digitisation to the raw AVI format produces very large file sizes, which, in the case of the 175 minutes of the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction video was approximately 20 Gigabytes (20 000 000 000 bytes), far too large to either store, move to other computers or manage effectively.

It was decided to convert the raw AVI file to the MPEG I format because of the favourable quality to file size ratio of that format and because the codec required for its playback is widely available. The final file size of the MPEG video was determined by reproduction quality. A very high resolution video produces a very large file size. The final video had to be of a suitable quality that all of the people, things and actions that it contained were readily discernable. It also had to be small enough, in terms of file size, that it could be stored on both a fixed computer hard drive and one or more portable Compact Discs. Portability was important because it would have otherwise been impossible for the footage to be exported from the Digital Media Unit's labs to the author's personal computer for analysis and because it was intended from the outset to include the video in the appendices of this thesis.

The final file size of the MPEG I format digital video was 3360 Megabytes (3512 447 640 bytes). This was broken up into six segments of approximately 560 Megabytes (9586 407 940 bytes), each one copied to a single compact disc giving six 'clips' of approximately 30 minutes duration (Appendices Part III). These clips have not been subjected to any further editing and are the basic units of video data used in the analysis of the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction project. Other than digitisation the video was not altered in any way. No segments have been added to, removed or re-ordered.

Mention was made in Chapter 5.2. of "Units of Continuity" (UCs) which are defined by camera cuts. The process of identifying and defining these was part of the later analytical stage not the digitisation stage and will therefore be discussed below.

Dialogue

The dialogue from the 'Chieftain's House' video was acquired as a distinct research source by transcription from the original analogue recording. Some consideration was given to the use of speech recognition software in order to speed up

the process of transcription, but the poor quality of the audio source meant that this was not a viable option. Dialogue transcription is again not a technically difficult process but can be time consuming. For example, the transcription of the dialogue from the 175 minutes of video took approximately eight weeks, which was, in part, due to the poor sound quality of the video. It was not filmed with audible exchanges in mind and as a result the camera, which used only its built-in microphone to record ambient sound, was often positioned at a considerable distance from the activities that it was recording. In addition, the sound is often dominated by wind noise and occasionally by the noise of machinery. A further difficulty, compounded by the overall quality of the audio reproduction, was in understanding the local accents and dialects of many of the people featured in the recording. In addition there were many instances where several conversations were taking place at the same time, each of which needed to be untangled. The result of these complications was that each exchange had often to be reviewed many times before the dialogue could be clearly understood, adding to the time taken for transcription. There remain many exchanges where the dialogue is either inaudible or indiscernible; these instances were noted in the transcription. Transcription was done in Microsoft Word; this was felt to be far more efficient than writing by hand because of the need to constantly review each exchange and because of the eventual need to digitise the transcriptions for later analysis.

It is likely that the restrictions noted above will not prove to be unique to this project, and probably represent a common set of problems for the transcription of dialogue from video in the context of field-based experiments particularly where video is not shot with this kind of research in mind. It is possible that some, although not all, of these problems could have been eliminated had the video been shot with the recording of dialogue in mind. This would have required additional microphones to be positioned across the site to cover the whole activity area, however, it is worth noting that this would also have introduced its own problems *e.g.* many more co-occurring conversations would have been picked up as would more noise from the use of tools

and the manipulation of materials, which would have made the transcription more difficult, although certainly richer in detail.

The transcription contains approximately 13 000 words of dialogue. For analytical purposes the cuts in the video (where the camera cuts from one 'scene' to the next) were noted in the form of a heading for the section of dialogue that followed each cut. A number was given to each of the resultant dialogue sections in relation to sequence in which they appear in the video (Appendix 1.2.). The major concerns of each section was noted and a brief description of that concern given. Each section was also given a time code that reflected its duration and 'location' in the video. Time-coding the UCs was also a time consuming task because each cut in the continuity had to be identified precisely which required a number of 'passes' over the frames of video involved in the transfer from one UC to the next. These sections of dialogue are referred to, with their video counterparts, as "Units of Contiuity" (UCs). Each UC in the dialogue transcription is therefore defined in the following way: the video clip to which it is related and time code, UC number, major concern *e.g.* "[02a19:38 – 02a20: 38] UC11 – Measuring up the posts for the outer wall 2". All UCs were recorded in this way regardless of whether or not they contained dialogue.

After this 'Master Transcription' was created and saved as a Microsoft Word file (.doc), each UC containing dialogue was converted into a separate document and named according to the video 'clip' to which they related and the UC number *e.g.* "02a UC 5". These were than saved as unformatted plain text documents (.txt) in order that they could be imported into ATLAS.ti for later analysis. Both aspects of this were a data management decision taken to facilitate analysis by creating small, contextually discrete entities each of which related directly to their corresponding video UCs, rather than one large sprawling entity and because ATLAS.ti 4.2 required the conversion to an unformatted plain text document.

6.3.2. Interviews

My decision to conduct interviews arose from a combination of the philosophical and methodological concerns discussed in the preceding chapters. This gave two clear reasons for conducting interviews; the first was the need to account for an individuals own interpretation of their involvement in the reconstruction project, the second was the need to account for the influence of my own preconceptions on whatever data might result from my interactions with informants in pursuit of the first priority. It was decided that a semi-structured interview strategy would be the best method to employ in order to satisfy those research priorities (Bailey 1982; Denzin and Lincoln 1994; Seidman 1991; Werner and Schoepfle 1987). By not structuring too heavily the 'questions' put to the informants *i.e.* having a series of preset questions that were not deviated from on the one hand, and not allowing the interview to flow freely with prompts on my part in the direction of what I was interested in learning on the other, the interviews were constructed in such a way that they were fairly open and lead primarily by the informant's concerns prompted by my own. This decision introduced a potential for bias related to the researcher's affects on the study (Miles and Huberman 1994: 263). This 'bias' was accommodated as an integrated part of the research and the semi-structured interview methodology used was adopted in order to create that 'bias' in such a way that it could be accounted for both in terms of methodological development and later analysis.

Selecting the Interview Informants

The self-interpretation by each informant of their role(s) in the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction project was to be one of the structuring principles of the interview process. Accordingly each informant was selected for their having a clearly defined role in that project. Also of concern at the outset of the project was the distinction between ways of understanding the roles of the informants and the tasks in which they engaged in terms of 'practical' and 'theoretical' modes of engagement. As a result of these two key concerns four informants were chosen, each having a role

in the reconstruction project, and each fitting into one of two groups that reflected the initial concerns with practical and theoretic modes of engagement (Table 6.2.). I had no prior relationship with any of the informants, with the exception of PB.

INFORMANTS	MB	GH	CJ	PB
ROLE	Carpenter	Thatcher	Engineer	Archaeologist/Manager
ENGAGEMENT	Practical		Theoretical	

Table 6.2. Categorising informants.

Conducting the Interviews

The interviews were semi-structured and conversational in style. No set questions were formulated or put to any of the informants, neither was a set length of time allotted for each interview. The process of conducting each interview was as interactive as possible with a preference for the lead being taken by the informant rather than the interviewer. This strategy was adopted in an attempt to engage each informant on their perceptions of their part in the reconstruction project as much as possible on their own terms, while allowing researcher 'bias' to play a part by responding and interjecting during the interviews rather than having only the informant speak. The interview strategy dictated no particular order to the interviews and resulted in those that took place over more than one meeting not running consecutively. This situation favoured the needs of the informants and was taken to ensure, as far as possible, that each informant felt comfortable enough with the circumstances of the interview to speak candidly and at length. In addition, the interviews were informal in character and referred to as "chats" or "discussions" throughout the process. Despite these efforts to achieve as un-contrived a setting as possible, it is likely that the overt presence of the device used to record the interviews for later transcription influenced the tone of some of those interviews (this is particularly noticeable in PB's interview). However, I would not advocate secret recording of interviews as this would contravene the widely accepted ethical consideration of 'informed consent' (Miles and Huberman 1994: 290).

The result of the interviewing process were eight separate audio recordings; one each for two of the informants (CJ and GH), four for MB and two for PB. Both the questions and response elements of these recordings were transcribed, a process which took approximately three hours of transcription time to every one hour of audio interview. As with the dialogue transcriptions, this was done directly into Microsoft Word in order to reduce processing time and to ensure the creation of a digitised source from the outset.

When the transcriptions were completed, each interview was split into its component parts *i.e.* questions and responses. This created eight separate documents that were saved as text files (.txt) in order to facilitate their later analysis in ATLAS.ti (appendix 6.1 and 6.2).

6.4. IDENTIFYING, DEFINING AND RECORDING THE PHENOMENA OF EVERYDAY ACTION

A methodology for a Heideggerian phenomenology of everyday action is broadly divisible into three basic units or steps; the identification and definition of phenomena, the recording of phenomena and making connections between phenomena. The phenomena themselves are broadly divisible into three 'classes' of contextual phenomena, entity phenomena and relational phenomena.

6.4.1. Defining the Fundamentals of Analysis: Contextual Phenomena

A Heideggerian phenomenology of everyday action should begin with the definition of the contexts within and through which that action is observable. These are characterised here as contextual phenomena *i.e.* phenomena that define context. For this project, as one governed by that which is observable, this was done primarily in relation to the video clips. These contextual phenomena were classified as "Units of Continuity" (UCs), situations, tasks and stages. Having been identified, the specific occurrences of these contextual phenomena were demarcated as they manifest

themselves in the source materials. This meant creating 'quotations' – a segment from an analytical source that is considered by the researcher to be significant in some way – in ATLAS.ti that marked the beginning and the end of each instance of a particular phenomenon, this was done using ATLAS.ti's video quotation tool. Fig 6.1. (below) illustrates the creation of a quotation in ATLAS.ti for a video UC (other contextual phenomena in relation to the video were marked out in the same way). The start and end points are marked by the small triangles situated just above the slider bar, with the dark rectangle between and below these visually representing the duration of the quotation. Once categorised and demarcated, they were used in later analyses to target the occurrences of entity and relational phenomena at varying scales. This section will deal with the categorisation and delimitation of the main contextual phenomena of this project *i.e.* UCs, situations, tasks and stages.



Figure 6.1. Screenshot of ATLAS.ti's video quotation tool.

Units of Continuity

Units of continuity (UCs) have been covered in general terms in the previous chapter and above. They are defined by breaks in continuity in the video source, a structure that is reflected in the dialogue UCs. Because an existing video was used in the analysis of the 'Chieftain's House' project, UCs were imposed on the analysis rather than being an integrated part of the research design, however, as most videos are likely to contain breaks in continuity, particularly those recording long or complex projects, the existence of UCs should be factored into the majority of video based analyses, the exception being short projects where it may be possible to maintain continuity. As noted above, the 'Chieftain's House' video was split into two distinct sources for analysis; video and dialogue. As a result, the UCs have two distinct manifestations relating to each of these sources.

Video UCs

Demarcating video UCs involved identifying where breaks in continuity or 'cuts' occur in the footage. These cuts (which are essentially created by the camera being stopped and restarted or turned off and then back on again) were used to define the beginning and the end of each UC. Video UCs were recorded as blocks of time and thus delineated by their start time and their end points. These were marked by camera cuts or 'transitions' as noted above. Recording was done using ATLAS.ti's video/audio quotation tool (Fig 6.1.), this meant that each UC was recorded as a 'quotation' which meant that the video did not have to be physically chopped up using video editing software.

Dialogue UCs

Dialogue UCs were defined in direct relation to the dialogue contents of each UC as demarcated by the boundaries of the video segment with which it is associated. This was done after the video UCs were identified because their boundaries needed to delineated before their corresponding dialogue sections could be separated. Rather than being created as quotations, sections of the overall dialogue transcription were recorded as separate textual documents which were then assigned to ATLAS.ti as discrete primary documents, each of which were given a comment that briefly described its content. In order that the links between the textual dialogue primary documents and the video quotations were not lost they were both named in the same way.

Situations

Situations are the main settings for everyday action (for a detailed definition and discussion of 'situation' see appendix 3.3.1); as such each instance was identified and recorded. There are two routes to this, the first is total; to identify and record all instances of situatedness, the second is targeted; to sample in relation to tasks, stages of a project or other kinds of engagements. In both cases the method for identifying and defining them is the same. The project was begun with the aim of total recording

which, in addition to facilitating the main aim of the project *i.e.* the development of a Heideggerian phenomenological methodology, was felt to provide the greatest amount of relatively unbiased information for later analyses. However, total recording proved to be extremely time consuming over and above a level of analytical benefit beyond methodological development in terms of the potential usability of the method by others. As a result a targeted approach was also taken as part of the programme of methodological development.

Targeting is effectively a sampling strategy that can be approached either randomly *e.g.* by selecting an arbitrary number of UCs from across the length of the video, by task or stage *i.e.* by selecting all the UCs associated with a particular task or stage, by individual *i.e.* by following the 'career' of a particular individual through the whole of the video or through a particular task or stage. This latter approach can also be directed towards particular items of equipment. Another approach, which is more in keeping with the character and purpose of qualitative research, is to target those sections of the video that 'stand out' to the researcher. This approach requires a level of preliminary analysis and coding to establish which parts of the video the researcher finds interesting and the initial reasons for that interest.

Targeted recording in these ways is both more manageable in terms of data generation and has the advantage of enabling deeper analyses of particular contexts given the premise that research time and resources are usually limited. Targeted recording also introduces biases as a result of the section of particular instances either as 'interesting', in which case the decision associated with selection should be noted, or random, which risks missing crucial engagements for a full understanding of the project under study. Also a targeted strategy that targets individuals or items of equipment will only give a picture of the phenomena associated with those particular entities and not the project as a whole. In each case these biases need to be accounted for and made explicit in relation to particular research goals. Despite these caveats,

such biases should be considered as a normal part of the QDA process given that choices of some kind have to be made at all stages and levels of source materials acquisition, data generation and analysis.

Situations were recoded as both quotations and codes. All video situations were recorded first as quotations using ATLAS.ti's video/audio quotation tool. They were each named numerically and to reflect their source *e.g.* "Situation 28: Video" in the manner described above. In cases where situations were considered either to have been re-adopted or to have remained the same across UCs, these were noted using 'a', 'b' *etc.* after the numerical indicator *e.g.* "Situation 167b: Video". In addition to the assigned name, ATLAS.ti automatically provided information about the primary document that the quotation is associated with, the quotation number in creation order as it relates to the primary document and, in parentheses, the start and end times of the quotation (given in 100ths of a second), as well as information on whether the quotation has a comment associated with it and whether it has been hyperlinked to another quotation. The full name of a quotation may therefore appear as *e.g.* "~<>Situation 286c: Video (45570 46000)". The numerical order in the assigned portion of the full name does not reflect a real-time sequence but rather represents the order in which each situation was recorded. Once the quotation had been created each situation was coded to match the situation number reflected in the quotation's assigned name *e.g.* "Situation 286" (Appendix.2.3, p. 166-167). Quotations with 'a', 'b', sequences were coded in the same way which served to bring together all of the instances of a multi-part situation. So situations such as Situation 286, which has 6 different specific instances (marked in the quotation as a, b, c, d, e and f) were brought together under one code. These codes also served to connect video with dialogue situations under one heading as one conceptual entity. To achieve this connectivity, a quotation was created of any transcribed dialogue that was audible in a video situation, this was then coded with the same code as that applied to the particular situation to which it was related. This procedure gives both a guide to understanding the data

reports (Appendices 2, 3 and 7) and details the following methodological sequence: 1. define video situation, 2. create quotation to record video situation, 3. assign name, 4. create code, 5. define dialogue situation where appropriate, 6. create quotation, 7. assign code and 8. hyper-link video and dialogue quotations. Point 8 will be discussed further below. The final step was to link together all the situations observable in one UC (Fig. 6.2.). This was a data management step that allowed at-a-glance assessment of the quotational composition of any given UC.



Figure 6.2. Example of the situation composition of a UC (70).

Situations can be observed to occur in relation to either individuals or groups, in each case they can be seen to be either adopted or re-adopted. This latter point of the temporality of situatedness will be developed below.

Individual Situatedness

Individual situatedness is related to the concept of current Daseining as outlined in Chapter 4.4.1. and which Dreyfus describes as a "way of being in a situation-dealing with something specific in a context of things and people, directed towards some specific end, doing what it does for the sake of being Dasein in some specific way" (Dreyfus 1991: 163). It defines a kind of situatedness through which an individual can

be observed to enact their own embodied, ontological interpretation of their role within the broader project at a specific juncture.

When identifying individual situatedness it should be noted that it is not the case that there is an absence of either group or project with which the individual is associated, rather that these are 'in the background' in terms of the individual's tacit understanding/interpretation of their particular role in a specific time and place. Any individual situatedness that may be observed is predicated on the existence of a situatedness within a project, which in turn takes it's particular form from the totality of instances of situatedness that occur within it. Methodologically this means that individual situatedness is relatively simple to identify when there is only one individual observable (Fig. 6.3.); this, however, is not usually the case.

Figure 6.3. NS readily observable as Being in a situation on his own (frame extracted from the 'Chieftain's House' video).

In the majority of instances, the situatedness of an individual must be considered in relation to the other individuals observable; is the individual 'in a world of their own' or are their concerns shared? Figure 6.4. below shows one individual

(LL – highlighted) who, although clearly part of the task and the project, is none the less equally clearly 'in a world of his own' he is not lost into the concerns of the others.

Figure 6.4. LL observable as Being in a situation on his own despite apparently being involved with others (frame extracted from the 'Chieftain's House' video).

In fact, further analysis of the UC from which the above still was lifted (03b0: 59-03b02:04 UC 80) reveals that the individuals in this group were not as 'together' as they may appear *i.e.* although they were all taking part in the same task, the specific directedness towards the tools and materials involved and their solicitude towards each other was not shared. This is difficult to demonstrate or represent in a still image, but can at least be represented in the form of a network diagram (Fig. 6.5.) which clearly shows that each individual engaged in this task is doing so in their own terms with little of their specific concerns shared. Both of these examples represent extremes and many tasks and most UCs will display individual and group situatedness to varying degrees.



Figure 6.5. Network view on individual situatedness in UC 80.

In terms of expectations *i.e.* what one might anticipate to observe from a researcher's perspective, individual situatedness might be expected to dominate those tasks that involve only one individual. In this project, some of the few tasks observable in the source materials that involved only one individual were thatching, daubing, the packing of postholes and some of the carpentry (Fig. 6.6. a, b, c and d respectively).

Figure 6.6. Some of the few tasks observable that involved only one individual (frames extracted from the 'Chieftain's House' video).

This indicates that one cannot presuppose that certain tasks or stages will involve only one or any other given number of individuals, neither can one expect only one individual to be involved in high skill tasks (thatching, for example, is a high skill task whereas daubing is not), thus reinforcing the groundedness of this approach in the observable. Individual situatedness might also be expected to be more prevalent in relation to those tasks that involve pairs of individuals, examples from this project are the cutting and fitting of timbers during the construction of the roof superstructure and de-barking (Fig. 6.7. a and b respectively).

Figure 6.7. Examples of those tasks that involved pairs during the reconstruction of the 'Chieftain's House' (frames extracted from the 'Chieftain's House' video).

One may not expect to observe a dominance of individual situatedness, in relation to the other kinds of situatedness likely to be observable, in those tasks that are conducted as either small or large group activities such as wattling which can be analysed at either scale (Fig. 6.8.) or, indeed, as demonstrated above (Fig 6.7.).

Figure 6.8. Examples of small groups (a) and large groups (b) engaged in the task of wattling (frames extracted from the 'Chieftain's House' video).

Group Situatedness

Group situatedness defines a kind of situatedness through which a group can be observed to enact a shared, embodied, ontological interpretation of a particular role within the broader project at a specific juncture. Group situatedness covers over the specific self interpretation of individual situatedness, bringing a shared way of Being into primary focus. Individual situatedness is given over to that of the group, a condition that is related to the idea discussed in Chapter 4.4.1. that Dasein is given to losing itself into 'the One'. This does not negate the condition of being situated within the project, quite the opposite; any particular group situatedness that may be

observed is predicated on the existence of a situatedness within a project, which in turn takes it's particular form from the totality of situatedness' that occur within it. As with individual situatedness, it is not the case that there is an absence of either individuals or project with which the group is associated, rather that these are 'in the background' in terms of the group's tacit understanding/interpretation of its particular role in a specific time and place. Methodologically, therefore one is looking to identify groups within groups. As with individual situatedness, group situatedness may be readily identified where only one group is observable (Fig. 6.9.); this, again, is not always the case.

Figure 6.9. Readily observable example of group situatedness in the fitting of an entrance post (frame extracted from the 'Chieftain's House' video).

Often, several groups will be observable concurrently and at different scales. From this research, wattling provides an excellent example of this (Appendix 7: steve02a25:32 – 03a28:17). Wattling represents a stage in the construction of the 'Chieftain's House' which is enacted by a 'stage group' comprised of the large number of individuals that are involved in this stage of construction. Nested within this 'meta' group are numerous 'task groups' which are involved in specific instances of wattling. There are also 'small groups' who are recognisable not for what they are doing, but

who they are with, and in addition, there are 'pairings' of two individuals (Fig. 6.10.). These groups are dynamic in terms of the numbers of such groups observable at any one time and the membership of these groups.

Figure 6.10. Types of Groups situatedness observable in the task of wattling: 1. 'stage group', 2. 'task group', 3. 'small group' and 4. 'pairing' (frames extracted from the 'Chieftain's House' video).

As has been demonstrated above in relation to individual situatedness, one might come to the analysis of groups with certain expectations *i.e.* that group situatedness will be dominant in relation to those tasks that involve more than one individual such as wattling. This proved not to be the case for the wattling of the 'Chieftain's House' as 105 instances of individual situatedness were identified over 99 instances of group situatedness. One might also anticipate that the project as a whole, given the assumption that it is at least unlikely that a large roundhouse can be built by one individual alone, is likely to be dominated by group situatedness. But, as the example of the wattling indicates, this will always need to be demonstrated by careful analysis of the particular manifestation of situatedness in relation to specific tasks and considered in relation to the sampling strategy adopted for the project.

For example, table 6.3. below shows the breakdown of the instances of the types of situatedness identified in the 81 UCs sampled for the development of his methodology. It shows that individual situatedness dominates that part of the project that has been analysed but does not relate to the project as a whole.

Types of Situatedness	Instances
Group Situatedness	110
Individual Situatedness	176
Pairing	86
Triumvirate	47

Table 6.3. Instances of the types of situatedness identified in the 81 of the projects UCs.

As has already been indicated, four types of group situatedness were observable in the 'Chieftain's House' sources which have a broader currency in terms of other experimental practices in archaeology:

Pairings: a small group comprised of two individuals. Pairings are relatively straightforward to define and were frequently evident in the 'Chieftain's House' sources. Of the 81 UCs sampled during the development of this methodology, 86 instances of pairing were observed. Pairing in this sense does not necessarily mean that individuals were working together, rather that the concerns of two individuals were shared.

Small Groups: Groups comprised of three or more individuals, the constitution of which is not dependent on being involved in a particular task but rather on the relationships between the individuals.

Task Groups: a group of three or more individuals that is defined by involvement with a specific task such as wattling, fitting posts or raising a lintel.

Stage Groups: a group of three or more individuals that is defined by involvement in a stage of the project. A stage is defined as a broader level in the execution of a project which is constituted by more than one specific task.

Within these conceptual divisions it may also be possible to observe further numerical divisions. For example, groups of three individuals were observed to form regularly (47 instances, see Table 6.3.) throughout the 81 UCs sampled during the development of this methodology. The main types of group situatedness are more than simply ways of organising labour, they are ways of being involved in something that make the observable engagements and tasks possible at all. The numerical divisions, where they might be identified on the other hand, are related more closely to the number of people available on the project and are a consequence of involvement, not a cause of it.

Modes of Situatedness

Situations can be observed to operate in two basic temporal 'modes' which cross-cut both particular instances of situatedness and the 'kinds' of situatedness (individual and group) outlined above. Instances of situatedness are discrete entities that have a temporal span, whereas kinds of situatedness are defined by their relational character. Both instances and kinds of situatedness may be adopted and re-adopted during the course of a reconstruction project, therefore, the two modes of situatedness may be defined as 'adoption' and 're-adoption'.

Adoption

Although, theoretically, Dasein is always in some situation or another, specific instances of situatedness need to be 'adopted'; they do not simply 'happen'. The adoption of a specific instance of situatedness is marked by a shift in concern, solicitude or both on the part of an individual or group. The adoption of situatedness is a mode of being involved in something that is 'chosen' by an individual or group. This does not mean that it is a conscious choice as people are not, for the most part, aware of their Being-Situated, but it is none the less deliberate *i.e.* it is not accidental. As such, the adoption of situatedness is related to the contextual self interpretation of those

re-adoption of situatedness in situations 273a and 273b (Appendix 2.3: p.164, Appendix 1: p.53 and Appendix 10: 03a27:28-03a28:17 UC 74).



Figure 6.12. Network diagram illustrating the re-adoption of situatedness in situations 273a and 273b.

The Temporality of Situatedness

Each situation does not in all cases occur in a temporally linear sequence, although each instance necessarily has a temporal character. Individuals or groups may be observed to adopt a one particular situatedness followed by another in sequence. In these cases, a linear span is observable for each situation as well as a linear sequence of individual instances. Non-linear sequences have two distinct manifestations. In the first, a task may be begun and completed within one situation. In these cases where there is no change in situatedness there can be said to be no sequence or change. The second manifestation of a non-linear sequence is more common and is observable as a sequence of adoption and re-adoption where and individual or group may be observed to 'see-saw' back and forth between these two modes. These temporalities are also often combined whereby non-linear situatedness is broken by one that has a linear character. Combinations such as this are quite common in the 'Chieftain's House' source, and mark shifts in concern, solicitude or both.

Tasks and Stages

Tasks were identified as discrete units of activity associated with a limited range of involvements and situations with a limited outcome. Stages are larger units of activity which encompass a larger number of involvements, different tasks and situations and have a more significant outcome in terms of the physical object being created by the project as a whole. Examples of the relationship of tasks to stages are: weaving hazel rods; part of the wattling stage, cutting birds-mouth joints; part of the roof superstructure stage.

The contextual phenomena defined above provide a structure to the source materials and data at three levels of resolution. The situation is the most finely grained unit within which to conduct analysis of other contextual phenomena, tasks provide access at a further level of abstraction but still with a closely defined contextuality, stages are the largest units of analysis below the project itself and represent the greatest level of abstraction away from the specific situatedness of individuals or groups. Units of Continuity should be considered as windows on the contextual units of situation, task and stage and not usually as an analytical units in their own right.

6.4.2. Entity Phenomena

Entity phenomena are those observable entities embedded within the contextual phenomena discussed above. They are not merely 'things' but are that which has a concrete existence, such as items of equipment *e.g.* hammers, chisels, rafters, lintels and postholes as well as specific individuals and group themselves. The reason that these entities are referred to here as entity *phenomena* rather than simply entities is because it is not the thing in itself as an abstracted, rarefied essence that is of interest, as is implied by the use of that term alone, but rather the phenomena of its understanding and appropriation in relation to Dasein doing what it does for the sake of being Dasein in some particular way. In the case of this research that means both the contextual interpretations and appropriations of those involved in the project and

the Interpretations of the researcher. Methodologically, therefore, these contextual understandings were retained in the coding system employed in noting the occurrence of particular entities by using a combination of *in vivo* and *open* coding. *In vivo* codes use words and sentences directly lifted from the dialogue; this retains their contextuality and displays the phenomena of their interpretations. For example, in the short exchange below, the use and availability of a particular tool is being discussed. The use of *in vivo* codes here (highlighted) shows that the individuals involved have different interpretations of what is being discussed.

> MB:
> If you... when you get down the office, if you could ring Neil, I've asked him to drop a one or two felling axes at my place, just to... just to trim these off. The Boys reckon a felling axe would be better, if he's got a couple to spare.
>
> PB:
> Right
>
> MB:
> Just for trimming the bark off.
>
> PB:
> I've got an axe with a wooden handle in there, don't know whether that's any good to you?
>
> MB:
> A felling axe? Er, a big one?
>
> LL:
> A big handle thing.
>
> PB:
> No.
>
> (Appendix 1.2: 02a20:38-02a26:41 - UC 12, p.19)

Open codes, on the other hand, are created by the researcher and express the researcher's understandings of the entities recorded. For example, the network

diagram below (Fig 6.13.) shows my understanding (Part of timber {11-3}~) of what is being referred to in particular quotations from dialogue which spans different discussions at different times and places in the project (nodes marked with).



Figure 6.13. Network diagram expressing the researcher's understandings of phenomena.

6.4.3. Relational Phenomena

Rather than codes, which are used to define both contextual and entity phenomena, the identification of relational phenomena is achieved through the use of hyper-links and code-code relations. Once identified, the connections between contextual phenomena across different source materials were formalised by 'hyper-linking' them in ATLAS.ti by the use of hyperlink relations which were defined using ATLAS.ti's "relations editor" (Fig 6.14. and Table 6.4. respectively). This connectivity technique involved bringing the quotations of those contextual phenomena that had both dialogue and video manifestations together with a 'hyperlink' which operates in the same way as that familiar from the Internet. Relationships between phenomena can then be seen at a glance. An example of this it the relation "is dialogue for", which facilitates analysis by making it possible to 'jump' directly to the video segment that contained a particular piece of dialogue.



Figure 6.14. Screenshot of ATLAS.ti's "relations editor".

Relation ID	Icon	2nd Label	Menu Item	Property
CONC	><	concur	is concurrent with	Symmetric
CONTINUE	>>>>	cont	is continued by	Asymmetric
DISC	:>	disc	discusses	Transitive
EQUAL	=	EQ	is dialogue for	Asymmetric
FEAT	(:)	featin	features in	Asymmetric
LEADS	--->	LT	leads to	Asymmetric
PT	()	pt	is part of	Asymmetric
RE-AD	>()	re-ad	is re-adopted in	Asymmetric

Table 6.4. Hyperlink relations defined using ATLAS.ti's relation editor specifically for this research.

Temporalities were also defined and recorded as hyper-linked relational phenomena between instances of situatedness in terms of "leads to" and "is re-adopted in" relations. Linear temporalities can be represented and connections drawn between entities by the use of network diagrams (Fig. 6.15.).



Figure 6.15. An example of linear temporality.

For example figure 6.15. above represents a linear pattern of situatedness which begins with two instances of individual situatedness (involving CJ and GJ) these are linked with a "leads to" relation to a single instance of paired situatedness bringing the two individuals together into a shared situatedness.

Non-linear temporalities whereby one situation is repeatedly re-adopted were also noted and defined by the "is re-adopted in" relation. Linear and non-linear temporalities may also combined. Figure 6.16. represents a combination of temporalities of situatedness whereby non-linear situatedness is broken by one that has a linear character.



Figure 6.16. An example of combined temporalities.

For the coded entity phenomena a series of relations were defined that expressed the relationship of one entity to another in the form of code-code relations. ATLAS.ti is shipped with a series of pre-defined code-code relations based around the concepts of grounded theory (see *e.g.* Strauss and Corbin 1990). As with the hyperlink relations, these can modified and/or added to using the program's 'relations editor'. A significant component of this research has been the definition of an explicitly Heideggerian set of code-code relations, an example of which is given in the table below. This involved distinguishing between foundational phenomena *i.e.* situations, tasks and stages; entity phenomena *i.e.* individual and group ways of Being, Others and equipments; and relational phenomena (Table 6.5.).

Relation ID	Icon	2nd Label	Menu Item	Property
ABSORB	(:)	ABS	is absorbed into	Transitive
BAMID	(+)	B-A	is amidst	Transitive
BEIN	(.)	B-I	is in	Transitive
BTHERE	.	B-T	is there	Transitive
BTOW	-->	B-TOW	is Being-towards	Transitive
BTOO	-	BTT	is there too with	Asymmetric
BWITH	<->	B-W	is with	Symmetric
CLOSEN	~	CL	is close to	Asymmetric
CONSP	*	CO	is conspicuous to	Asymmetric
DASWI	<.>	D-W	is Dasein-with	Asymmetric
DESEV	<	DS	de-severs	Asymmetric
DIREC	>>	DI	is directed towards	Asymmetric
DISPER	(*)	DIS	is dispersed into	Transitive
FORWHI	#	F-W	is the for-which of	Transitive
INORDE	>->	IOT	in-order-to	Asymmetric
INWHI	[]	I-W	is the in-which of	Transitive
OBS	!	OB	is obstinate to	Asymmetric
OBTRU	!!	OBT	is obtrusive to	Asymmetric
PLACE	()	PL	is place for	Transitive
PPRES	/	PPAH	is purely-present-at-hand to	Asymmetric
PRES	|-|	PAH	is present-at-hand to	Asymmetric
PROJEC	^	PROJ	is projecting towards	Asymmetric
READY	@	RTH	is ready-to-hand to	Asymmetric
REGIO	""	RE	is region for	Transitive
THROWN	_	THR	is thrown into	Transitive
TOWWHI		T-W	is the towards which of	Asymmetric
WITHW	+	W-W	is the with-which of	Asymmetric

Table 6.5. Example of Heideggerian code-code relations defined for ATLAS.ti during the development of this methodology.

For the relational phenomena Heidegger's technical language was adhered to (Table 6.5.) because it proved a conceptually dense and convenient shorthand. The result of this approach is that contextual, entity and relational phenomena can be visualised and displayed by the use of network diagrams (*e.g.* Fig 6.17., which shows the relations evident in the discussion about the 'felling axe' as used in the dialogue example above).



Figure 6.17. The relations evident in the discussion about the 'felling axe'.

Making connections in the ways discussed above allows each individual, group or item of equipment to be 'followed' through the tasks, stages and temporalities of the reconstruction project as well as the ability to look closely at specific relationships and instances of situatedness.

6.6. THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCHER: A METHODOLOGY FOR REFLEXIVITY

As well and looking at the source materials and the data itself, I felt it necessary to analyse myself and my role in construction of that data and my influence on my sources. It has been suggested in the preceding chapter that one possible route to an explicitly reflexive methodology is for the researcher to explicitly define their own way of Being in relation to the task of the research project (as discussed in Chapter

5.2). This means asking the question, How do I understand the object of my study? In order to answer this question two further questions must be asked, How do I record these understandings? and, How do I analyse them? The results of these questions may be surprising; they may contradict the ways in which one thought that one understood an object of study and the study itself. These questions are what makes this part of the study phenomenological in that phenomena being studied is my understandings of the reconstructed roundhouse not the roundhouse itself, although the data generated concerns both that understanding and the object itself.

In the case of this specific project my preconceptions took two distinct forms, first I thought that I was interested in experimental archaeology and it's manifestation in the reconstruction of later prehistoric roundhouses. Second, I thought that I was interested in how those involved understood their roles in a reconstruction project and how they interpreteed tasks, materials, technologies and tools. This led, on the one had, to a survey project involving a number of reconstructed roundhouses in England, Scotland and Wales, and on the other to part of the reasoning and structure behind the conducting of interviews.

The structure of the following section may, at first, seem odd to the reader as a survey of a number of reconstructed roundhouses across England, Scotland and Wales is the first topic for discussion whereas the interviews for the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction are discussed second. It may seem more logical to discuss the interview process first as this related more immediately to discussion above. However, the aim of this section is, in part, to outline my own involvements in this research project a whole, so in order to retain a sense of this the survey and interview elements of the project are discussed in sequence in which they occurred.

6.6.1. Survey of Reconstructed Roundhouses

Reconstructed roundhouses were the first of my objects of study. What I needed to know was how I understood them. I needed to know this because I wanted to know how my understandings of reconstructed roundhouses, as an archaeologist and research student, differed from the understandings held by the people that built them. This 'need' was given impetus by the following statement by Heidegger in *Being and Time*:

> The botanist's plants are not the flowers of the hedgerow; the 'source' which the geographer establishes for the river is not the 'springhead in the dale'.
>
> (Heidegger 1962: 100)

The distinctions between the viewpoints expressed above might be characterised as *distance* and *involvement* and each is a very different way of engaging with things which generates very different understandings of the (apparently) selfsame object. Given this distinction, is there a difference between my stance, and that of those involved in building; in other words was the roundhouse equivalent to the "botanist's plants" or "the flowers in the hedgerow" and for whom? Coupled with an expectation that I would be able to observe situated manifestations of distance and involvement in the building of a roundhouse, I felt that I needed a basis for comparison.

Survey Method

In order to understand how I understood reconstructed roundhouses I conducted a comprehensive survey of 24 reconstructed roundhouses still standing in England, Scotland and Wales (Table 6.6.) of a total of 27 known to exist at that time (2001). Those reconstructions were surveyed in a way that seemed 'natural' or 'obvious' to me in terms of my self-interpreted identity. This resulted in the following survey technique, which although conducted primarily with a view to illuminate my own understanding of the 'objects' of my research, also served to generate a data-set which is useful for

other forms of research into the current corpus or roundhouse reconstructions; this, of course, also illuminates my own particular engagement with these entities:

- Taking a series of analytical photographs of each building
- Creating a coding system for those images
- Taking a standardised set of measurements
- Creating standardised, schematic sketches of the building and its elements

Roundhouses Surveyed
Belmuir House
Butser Glastonbury House 1
Butser Glastonbury House 2
Butser Moel y Gerddi House
Bodrifty House
Castell Henllys House 1
Castell Henllys House 2
Castell Henllys House 3
Castell Henllys House 4
Conderton House
Flag Fen Bronze Age House 1
Flag Fen Bronze Age House 2
Flag Fen Iron Age House
Gallica Teaching Frame
Longbridge Deverill Cow Down House
Glastonbury Mound 13 House
Glastonbury Mound 74 House
Monymusk House
Moel y Gaer House
MOWL Moel y Gerddi House
Trewortha House 1
Trewortha House 2
Trewortha House 3
Woolaw House

Table 6.6. Roundhouses Surveyed in England, Scotland and Wales.

Photographs

A set of photographs were taken of each of the technological features of each roundhouse. These images record all of the available/visible technological information about each structure. A two-metre ranging pole, a 0.5m ranging pole or a combination of both were used to represent scale in each photograph.

Photograph Identifiers

A set of 'identifiers' were created to define the features recorded in the photographs. These features were identified and selected because they represent the processes and position that

renders the roundhouse into a consistent data set. The codes contain three classes of information in the following order:

- *Location (where) i.e.* where the photograph was taken.
- *Object (what) i.e.* what the photograph was taken of.
- *Number i.e.* sequential order of photographs that carry the same code and the number of such photographs *e.g.* 2.3.

The first two parts of the identifier contain further shorthand information about the specifics of *location* and *object*. These are organised hierarchically according to the information that the photograph contains.

- Location.
- Building name *e.g.* BOD (Bodrifty)
- Orientation *e.g.* N (North) or W (West)
- Relative location *i.e.* I (Internal) or EX (External)
- Specific location *e.g.* OR (Outer Ring); IR (Inner Ring); TOW (Top Of Wall) etc.
- Object.
- Primary object *e.g.* TR (Tension Ring)
- Secondary object *e.g.* R (Rafter)
- Tertiary object *e.g.* JB (Jointing/Binding)

The objects are organised hierarchically in the order in which they must be employed as the structure is built, a form of stratigraphic relationship.

The various coded elements are presented sequentially with each one separated by a hyphen. This gives an information narrative on what the photograph records in shorthand *e.g.* BOD-I-OR-TOW-TR-R-JB-2.3 indicates a photograph that was taken of the Bodrifty house (BOD) on the inside (I). The general subject of photograph is the outer ring (OR), which is positioned at the top of the wall (TOW). The specific subject is the tension ring (TR) and rafter (R) and the manner in which they are jointed/bound together (JB). The numbers (2.3) indicate that it is the second of three such photographs.

Below is the photograph identified in the manner described by the example above:



Figure 6.18. Illustration of photograph identifier referents.

The terminology from which in the identifiers are derived *e.g.* tension ring, wall plate, rafter, inner ring, outer ring *etc.* is an existing one in common use within the community of people who construct such buildings. Most of this terminology

is taken from the existing corpus of carpentry terms but there are exceptions, for example 'ring beam' is a term that was coined by Reynolds after his experimental work on reconstructing roundhouses and relates only to roundhouses. The majority of roundhouses that have been reconstructed since Reynolds pioneering work employ this structure in the roof construction so the term has entered into common usage.

Measurements

The measurements employed in the recording of the reconstructed roundhouses are quantitative in character. They were taken as part of the exercise in defining my understanding of the roundhouse as an object of research. Dimensions were measured using three metre or 30m tapes depending on circumstances. In keeping with the received view that "by definition a roundhouse is a cylinder surmounted by a cone" (Reynolds 1993: 93), each roundhouse was broadly divided into these two main parts. Measurements were taken to determine the height, internal and external diameter of the cylinder and height and basal diameter of the cone.

Each element of these two basic divisions was additionally classified and measured in terms of length, width and depth. Circular/cylindrical elements were measured in terms of length and diameter. The diameter of un-worked roundwood such as commonly features in the rafters and purlins was determined from the butt-end (*i.e.* where the tree/sucker was cut off at the stump/stool). In keeping with forestry practice, this is known as *end-diameter*. In addition, where there was an entrance structure such as a porch (as on the Pimperne house for example) this was considered a distinct structure on a par with cylinder and cone and recorded accordingly.

The effective measurement of the overall height of the roundhouse is a problem where it may not be possible to acquire an inclinometer for cost reasons. This may be resolved by improvising an inclinometer using a method common in forestry which relies on a simple enlargement of a right angle. This method employs a doweling rod

of arms length held at 90° to the fully outstretched arm, directly in ones line of sight. Standing in front of the thing to measured, one steps back until a position is reached whereby the rod appears to be the same height as an imaginary line from the base of the thing to be measured and its highest point. This position is then marked and a tape is run from the centre of the base of the thing to be measured to this position. This distance is equivalent to the height of the object. This method, when compared with an inclinometer reading of two test objects (the Longbridge Deverill Cow Down house and the Moel-y-Gerddi houses at Butser Ancient Farm), shows that it is possible to measure to within approximately 0.3m. This technique was used throughout the survey. It was employed to establish an independent check on the height calculation generated from the diameter of the base of the cone and the angle of pitch, as the angle of pitch could not often be verified.

Orientation was also measured both to determine the orientation of the entranceway and to define the cardinal points outside the building. The orientation of the entrance(s) was measured from the centre of the threshold with a hand-held compass. The cardinal points of the roundhouse were determined for the exterior again using a hand-held compass lined up on the apex of the cone.

Internal orientation was achieved with an 'O'clock' scale with the entrance representing 12 O'clock relative to the position of the surveyor who stands in the centre of the building (this is usually possible except where a central lit fireplace forms an obstruction).

Sketches

A series of sketches were taken of each roundhouse and each of the structural units that were recorded. The sketches served a number of purposes: to provide visual and numerical record of the units of each building, to order the sequence in which units would be recorded, to provide a quick reference of the relationship between

measurement data and the units they record, to record structural details invisible to photography and to provide a record of my changing understandings of how to record roundhouses. The sketches meant that a second type of classification to compliment the cylinder/cone categories was created, that of discrete structural units rather than individual elements *e.g.* entrances, doors, wall structure, bracing *etc.* These sketches can be used in the same ways as the photographs.



Figure 6.19. Example of sketches – Bodrifty entrance and wall structure pages. (re-drawn from sketch book because of poor quality reproduction on scanning).

6.6.2. Interviews

How the people involved in the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction understood their roles in a reconstruction project and how they understood tasks, materials, technologies and tools was the second of my objects of study. In order to examine this I conducted a series of interviews with four key individuals who featured prominently in the video of the reconstruction. I wanted not only to know how they understood their roles *etc.* but also how I understood these phenomena. The following methodological description concerns the way in which the interview questions were analysed to discern which phenomena that I was concerned to draw from the informants overall and what

the relative frequencies of these phenomena were in each interview. This data could then be compared to the interview responses which were to be analysed in a similar manner. The following is intended to be an example of a reflexive methodology that accounts for the role of the interviewer in the collection of qualitative data from interviews.

The Interview Questions

Because the analysis of the questions was to be conducted using the QDA software ATLAS.ti, the 'questions' documents created from the original interview transcriptions were first stripped of the formatting that they acquired as a result of being transcribed into Microsoft Word and converted to ANSI (American National Standards Institute) encoding with hard returns. This step was necessary to allow ATLAS.ti to recognise the document (it should be noted that with the new version of ATLAS.ti – version 5 – this time consuming step will no longer be necessary (Townend 2003)). Each question was then assigned a number, and the questions were edited for minor corrections. The resultant rich text documents were then each assigned a unique name corresponding to their content and the informant with whom they were associated *e.g.* "Interview Questions – CJ"; they were then imported into ATLAS.ti. These text documents are referred to as Primary Documents (PDocs).

Analysis Method

Step 1: Once imported into ATLAS.ti each set of questions were read through, identified and coded as one of four types of question: 1. question, 2. prompt, 3. comment and 4. response. This gave a broad structure for each interview (Fig. 6.20.) which could then be used to further refine the analysis.

Step 2: For the second stage of coding it was felt necessary to discard all 'responses' and 'comments' (Fig. 6.20.) from further analysis because they were felt not to contribute meaningfully to the outcome of the interviews or to the specific



Figure 6.20. Structure of interviews.

purpose of this stage of the analysis which was to understand those phenomena which were foremost in the mind of the interviewer during the interviews. The remaining 355 questions and prompts were then read through for the phenomena that each addressed. Neither the number nor content of these phenomena was defined prior to the analysis, although they were grounded in the philosophical position taken for this research. It was felt that drawing them out from the interview questions after the interviews had taken place would bring later analysis closer to the data itself rather than relying on pre-set notions that may or may not be identifiable in the data. The 20 themes identified and coded for in the data are given below (Table 6.7.) in alphabetical order.

Phenomena Revealed in Interview Analysis
Attention to Task
Interpretation of Past Practice
Interpretation of Self
Outstanding Event
Planning/Practice and Vice Versa
Role of Experience
Understanding of Appearance
Understanding of Constraints
Understanding of Environment
Understanding of Involvement
Understanding of Materials
Understanding of Others
Understanding of Resources
Understanding of Risk
Understanding of Role of Others
Understanding of Space/Place
Understanding of Tasks
Understanding of Technologies
Understanding of Time
Understanding of Tools

Table 6.7. Phenomena extracted from interview question data.

The themes identified here are closely linked to the theoretical position taken in this research. Thus, "understanding of tools" reflects Heidegger's concern with how an individual may come to different understandings of a tool through the course of its use in a particular context. A researcher

with different theoretical concerns would code the data differently to reflect those concerns, for instance, were I interested simply in the use of tools, I might code those speech turns in the data that ask when or how a tool is being used with a code such as "use of tool". For my own concerns, I might code those same speech turns with "understanding of tools" here an attempt to draw the informant on their *understanding* of tools, rather than simply instances of their use, is identifiable in the interview and reflected in the coding. This results in the creation of a data set of codes that is directly grounded in the philosophical concerns of the project and a data set of quotations that is specific to those codes.

Step 3: Once identified, the coded phenomena were analysed for the absolute number of times that they occur, both overall and in each interview thus indicating their 'groundedness' (an absolute numerical value for how often they occur in the data) and their perceived importance to the interviewer both overall and in context.

Step 4: Absolute numbers of instances of each phenomenon do not account for the widely varying times taken to conduct each interview. As a result the absolute figures were converted to percentages to give relative values for both the frequency with which a given theme was addressed overall and the frequency with which it was addressed to individual informants. This data can then be compared to the phenomena identifiable in the responses.

The Interview Responses

On completion of the preliminary analysis of the questions from the interviews of the 'Chieftain's House' project informants, a similar analysis was conducted on the responses. The purpose of this analysis was to create database of codes and coded speech turns that could be assessed for the phenomena addressed by the informants. This data could then be compared with the codes and coded speech turns of the questions for the relationships between the concerns of the interviewer and the

concerns of the informants. These two steps were taken first to give an insight into informant's understanding of their role in the reconstruction project and second, to consider whether and in what ways the concerns of the interviewer interacted with the concerns of the informant in the creation of a qualitative database on detachment and involvement and its interpretation in a closely defined setting.

As with the questions, the interview responses were to be analysed using ATLAS.ti. Also in common with the questions documents, the responses documents were stripped of the formatting that they acquired as a result of being transcribed into Microsoft Word and converted to ANSI (American National Standards Institute) encoding with hard returns. Each responses document was then edited for minor corrections. The resultant unformatted plain text documents were then each assigned a unique name corresponding to their content and the informant with whom they were associated *e.g.* "GH Interview Responses"; they were then imported into ATLAS.ti.

Analysis method

Step 1: Once imported into ATLAS.ti, the responses were first read through for the 20 phenomena identified during the analysis of the questions (Table 6.5.). Instances of these phenomena were then coded appropriately.

Step 2: The second step in the analysis involved re-reading the responses to draw out any other phenomena that might be addressed by the informants beyond those corresponding with the questions phenomena (Table 6.8.). This additional data was collected in order to augment later analysis by identifying any potentially significant phenomena not prompted by the questioning to the database of pre-identified phenomena. All responses were approached in this way regardless of whether any individual response related to a question, prompt, response or comment in the questions data; each response was considered individually for its content alone.

CODES	PRIMARY DOCS				TOTALS
	1	2	3	4	
Reference to...	6	0	7	12	25
Theoretical Perspective	0	1	0	5	6
Understanding of Benefit	8	0	4	2	14
Understanding of Difficulty	18	5	24	2	49
Understanding of Loss	2	0	2	1	5
Understanding of Weight	0	0	1	1	2
Totals	34	6	38	23	101

Table 6.8. Additional phenomena.

Step 3: Any speech turn within the responses documents that was not felt to contribute any identifiable phenomena to the overall phenomenological data set were coded with a family of 'uncertainty codes' *i.e.* "?", "unsure" and "not helpful" (Table 6.9.).

CODES	PRIMARY DOCUMENTS				TOTALS
	CJ	GH	MB	PB	
?	1	0	0	0	1
Unsure	2	4	24	47	47
Not Helpful	4	5	11	23	23
Totals	7	9	35	20	71

Table 6.9. 'Uncertainty Codes' and their absolute frequencies.

Step 4: In common with the analysis of the questions documents, the coded phenomena, once identified in the speech turns of the responses, were analysed for the absolute number of times that they occur, both overall and in each interview. This would again indicate both their groundedness and their perceived importance to the informants both overall and in context.

Step 5: The problem of the variable times of the interviews was as significant for analysis of the responses as it was for the questions, therefore the absolute figures were again converted to percentages to give relative values for both the frequency with which a given theme was addressed overall and the frequency with which it was addressed by individual informants. The resultant data can then be compared to the phenomena identifiable in the questions.

6.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON DEVELOPING A HEIDEGGERIAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY

One of the stated aims of this project has been to examine a theoretical position against an observable set of real world activities. The principle 'result' of which has been the development of the phenomenological methodology presented here. As has been mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the focus on the development of the Heideggerian methodology for experimental practice that this research takes came about as an accident. It had never been my intention to develop such a methodology; indeed, in the early stages of research I was expressedly anti-method. The methodology was developed because I wanted to conduct a Heideggerian analytic of experimental practice, and when I came to do so I was confronted with the realisation that although I was familiar with the philosophy, I did not know how to action that familiarity. As a result this methodology was developed during the course of trying to accomplish a Heideggerian analytic and involved a great deal of trial and error.

A large component of the methodological research concerned becoming familiar with and integrating the software that was used both in the development of the method and in its use *e.g.* defining explicitly Heideggerian sets of relations and a coding technique that reflected Heidegger's major themes of practical action, theoretical appropriation, situatedness, self-interpretation, worldhood and equipmentality. As such, this methodology should be considered as a starting point and in no way complete and comprehensive. It needs, for example, to be used in other experimental projects in order to determine whether there are a common set of phenomena that regularly manifest themselves in relation to different technologies. Also, it would be beneficial to have other researchers repeat this project to see whether they identify phenomena in the same ways and to consider whether if they do not, why they do not. More reconstruction projects need to be assessed with this approach to see whether there is a pattern to situational involvement that cannot be drawn from a single case study. In short, there is much yet to do. One of the reasons for this is that the bulk of

this research project was concerned with creating a methodology. This is the reverse of what I had anticipated at the projects inception, I had felt that it was possible simply to *do* a Heideggerian analytic; well it is, but only once at least one possible way of doing it has been developed. This raises the point that the methodology discussed here is not put forward as the definitive way to carry out a Heideggerian analytic of experimental (or any other) archaeological practice; it is offered as *a* way in which such an analytic may be achieved. As a method, it applies more broadly in so much as it represents a phenomenological methodology and is applicable to a broad range of archaeological phenomena as all archaeological research concerns contextual, entity and relational phenomena in some way. Again, it is put forward as *a* phenomenological methodology, not *the* phenomenological methodology. Despite this, I believe this to be the most comprehensive such methodology currently in existence.

Finally, something should be said about the workload generated by the methodological approach discussed herein. Because this and the preceding chapter have focussed on the development of the methodology, it may appear that so much work is required to put it into practice that it is not practicable or reasonable to do so in relation to most research projects. This is not the case. Once the fundamentals are in place, the processes of defining and linking contextual, entity and relational phenomena is very straightforward and may be achieved quickly, particularly where a targeted strategy is developed. It is true to say that trying to note and connect every occurrence of everything is an impossible task, but this is no more of a limitation on this method of research than any other that also faces the problem of the insurmountable task of accounting for reality at every level.

PART IV: DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION

~CHAPTER 7~
UNDERSTANDING THE PRACTICE OF EXPERIMENTAL RECONSTRUCTION

The preceding two chapters discussed the development of an explicitly Heideggerian phenomenological methodology and included examples of the ways in which that methodology structured and was structured by both a philosophical position and a diverse multi media data set. It began by stating that phenomenology is primarily a *way* rather than a *what* but went on to argue that the proper study of phenomenology is the phenomena of engagements and understandings rather than practices and entities as objects that exist apart from understanding. I have argued that it is possible to 'do' phenomenology rigorously and demonstrated a means by which this may be achieved. Through laying out a phenomenological methodology in detail I have also suggested that phenomenology is not a 'soft option' that does not generate data, does not involve complex, systematic analysis and is a path taken by those work-shy individuals who do not want to do 'real archaeology'.

This chapter develops the application of that methodology in relation to the practices of experimental reconstruction. It will deal with both the phenomena outlined in chapter 4 and analysed through the case study of the Castell Henllys 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction project and the Interpretation and consequences of the analysis of my own engagement with the roundhouse as an object of research. The results of this methodology when applied to the case study have three main components which will be discussed herein. 1. to assess the observability of a set of philosophical/theoretical constructs with a view to answering the question of whether these constructs are in any sense 'real', 2. the specific consequences for the practice of experimental reconstruction of contextual manifestations of those phenomena and 3. the consequences for the practice of experimental reconstruction of adopting a reflexive

approach to that practice and its analysis. These aims have been realised through the methodology presented in chapters five and six and are seen to have Interpretative consequences for understanding both the practice of experimental reconstruction in the field and roundhouse building in the Iron Age (Chapter 8).

7.1. EXAMINING THE PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION

It has been noted that a distinct, albeit disparate, school of Heideggerian archaeologies has developed within the broader discipline, mostly, although not exclusively, in relation to European prehistory. What all of these approaches lack is a clear expression of a way of taking a Heideggerian approach to an archaeological problem or phenomena (by which I mean site, artefact, activity, sub-discipline Interpretation *etc.*). This is not intended as a criticism, as a careful reading of these texts coupled with an understanding of Heidegger's philosophy will readily reveal the influence that it has had on the work presented. I mention this only to suggest that there is a hole in this way of understanding archaeology, and that many, who are not so familiar with Heidegger's philosophy, will say that this is all very interesting, but how do you do it? This latter point reflects my personal experience in proposing and conducting the research presented herein.

The question of how one *does* a 'Heideggerian archaeology' arises from the deeper question of how one might 'see' the ideas that he discusses. This sets up the notion that in order to do a Heideggerian archaeology one must be able to 'see' ideas; an understandable basis for criticism. The first step to dispelling this problem is to note that the ideas represent theoretical propositions regarding the existence of certain phenomena. Considered in this way, one can then ask whether these phenomena may be observed in any particular setting; are they, in other words, real?

The methodology presented here indicates that the phenomena that Heidegger discusses in *Being and Time* are indeed real; or at least, those that have been examined

in the course of this research. The method by which they may be observed and recorded is, I believe, repeatable and I would encourage other researchers to do just that. I fully expect the particular manifestations of these phenomena to be different in different settings but the core contextual, entity and relational phenomena, from situatedness to equipment to readiness-to-hand, will always be present. This brings us to a discussion of some particular manifestations of the phenomena that have been observed and recorded in this project.

7.2. THE INTERPRETATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF EVERYDAY ACTION

A number of key results which relate to the 37 distinct but interrelated phenomena (Table 5.1.) discussed in abstract in chapter 4 will be discussed in greater detail here as they relate both to the research conducted on the Castell Henllys 'Chieftain's House' and reconstruction practice in general. This discussion will develop the points made above in order to consider the specific consequences of the reality of each of these phenomena in turn for understanding the practice of experimental reconstruction.

7.2.1. Dasein and Existence

Reconstruction relies on human absorption as much as it does the involvement of materials, tools and technologies. Any reconstruction is therefore a material record of the particular manifestations of that absorption. Reconstruction cannot, therefore, be considered in the absence of human absorption either at the building or write-up stages. Noting the numbers of people taking part in something and the time they take to do it, the calories they burn off or the distances they travel (the traditional concerns of experimental archaeology) reveals little about the involvements through which they interpret their absorption in something.

A reconstruction, because it always involves people doing things, is always an interpretation that takes its specific form as a consequence of human absorption

in activities. The process of reconstruction also interprets the mechanisms by which people understand those engagements *i.e.* as well as Interpreting the material elements of building, reconstruction interprets its 'human element'. Reconstruction is therefore never neutral and scientific, although it may be (and usually is) written about in such a way as to appear so.

Reconstruction tends to privilege the theoretical elements of building such as technological choices and particularly problem solving. This is generally true of most experimental projects that are concerned with the making of things and is a problem that is not resolved by the *Chaîne Opératoir* approach developed by Lemonnier and popular in the analysis of lithic and ceramic technologies in archaeology (*e.g.* Lemonnier 1986, 1992, 1993). This represents only a small part of what building usually consist in which is given undue prominence in explanations of roundhouse construction. It is rather the 'getting on with things' that characterises most of the human engagements with things that make up the reconstruction exercise. Seeing reconstruction in terms of Dasein brings this into focus and considers the theoretical element in the broader context of possible modes of engagement. Those absorbed in reconstruction do not, for the most part, consider how they influence the final product and the interpretation that it represents beyond statements of materials and technological choices. They do not account for their own roles as absorbed, contextualised, self-interpreting individuals. Considering reconstruction in terms of Dasein addresses this important foundational element of the reconstruction exercise.

In relation to the Castell Henllys project, the people who took part were not analysed as quantifiable objects but as absorbed, interpreting individuals. This lead to the overall conclusion that the people involved, considered in terms of Dasein, were a fundamentally constitutive part of the final form and character of the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction *i.e.* that the specific process and form of the reconstruction project was determined, not primarily by materials and technologies, but by the

absorption of the people who took part and how they tacitly interpreted and enacted that absorption in relation to their own self-understandings.

The following discussion will examine this in more detail through the ontological phenomena that structure Dasein's existence. This discussion will follow the structure laid out in chapter 4 in order to facilitate cross-referencing between the phenomena in abstract as laid out in therein and the consequences for experimental reconstruction of their recognition.

7.2.2. Being-in and World

This notion is crucial for understanding how the practice of experimental reconstruction is enacted. People go about both doing things and dealing with things and others through adopted sequences of situatedness, each of which are smaller, context specific parts of a broader situation in which each individual finds themselves. Situations are the primary structuring elements of reconstruction practice and are directly related to people's tacit understandings of their roles in such a project; they are, in effect, the 'building blocks' of people's understandings of the project. The usual understanding of reconstruction projects is that they are conducted in series of discrete stages. Analysis of the 'Chieftain's House' data suggests that this is an Interpretative fiction that arises from the perceived need to quantify the process of building in order to make the account of it suitably 'scientific'. Building in fact occurs through the flux of adoption and re-adoption of different modes of situatedness the result of which is a physical entity that is intimately tied to the self-interpretations of those involved (Fig. 7.1.).

This creates a new and unique 'world' from the bringing together of the other interpreted worlds of those involved and is shaped by the flow of situations that those involved find themselves in throughout the course of the project. The creation of worlds is a fundamental outcome of people's engagements with things and Others.

This is the sense of worldhood that is available to examination through experimental reconstruction rather than the worldhood of the world itself (see Chapter 4.3.1). We can therefore Interpret the existence of the world of a roundhouse builder which is an interpreted and context specific manifestation of Being-in-the-world in a broader sense.



Figure 7.1. Network diagram illustrating CJs shifting situatedness back and forth between standing back and active involvement in the context of the fitting of the tension ring elements.

7.2.3. Being-with

This phenomenon, perhaps more than any other, makes a nonsense of the notion of the isolable, repeatable, neutral experiment. This is because reconstruction projects are unavoidably conducted by people and people always act in some way in relation to others. In relation to the project there are, on the one hand, the Others that are absorbed in the day to day acting out of that project; the building, the collecting and moving of materials, the planning, the sourcing of money and perhaps visitors to the site. On the other hand, there is one particular Other who is always referenced in some way in any roundhouse reconstruction project; the late Peter Reynolds. It is not possible to build a roundhouse in Britain without Reynolds being implicated

in some way in method, process, choice of materials, technologies, form; almost any aspect of roundhouse reconstruction including the choice to build one in the first place. No roundhouse reconstruction can therefore ever be a pure test of materials and technologies in the absence of human absorption.

Another manifestation of this phenomenon that is unique to experimental reconstruction is that it also references the Others of the past. This is particularly clear from the interviews with the people who took part in the Castell Henllys projects who throughout reference continually the 'they' of the past. This is usually in terms of understandings of what 'they' would have done which are heavily influenced by the self-interpretations of the respondents, so the understandings of CJ, the project engineer and MB, the project's carpenter, for example, of what the people in 'the past' would have done are quite different.

There is however, another level at which the Others of the past are being referenced and interpreted and that is the ontological. Experimental reconstruction tacitly interprets the ontological structures that underpin everyday practice in the specific context of the building of a roundhouse. Note here that I do not argue that it 'explains' these phenomena, their specific manifestation in past and present are not the same, indeed they would not be the same from one contemporary building in the past to another, but that the structures, as they have been outlined philosophically in chapter 4 and observed and analysed through the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction project are none the less interpreted by the actions of those absorbed in such a project.

7.2.4. Being-alongside

People construct their worlds through their relationships with things as well as with others. The main consequence of this for understanding the practice of experimental reconstruction is that the things that are used in such projects, such as tools and materials are more than material things that are used to build a roundhouse,

they are also interpreted entities upon which people draw to construct and understand their worlds. A roundhouse reconstruction is therefore a physical manifestation of the interpreted words of a particular group of people. It is these interpreted worlds that explain the differences between different reconstruction projects, rather than, as is commonly belied, the specific tools and materials themselves. For example, the Pimperne House at BAF is different from the Castell Henllys 'Chieftain's House' because the worlds of the people involved *e.g.* Peter Reynolds as a scientist and academic on the one hand and MB as a carpenter and wheelwright on the other, as they are mediated through engagements with things, are also quite different. Being-alongside things, primarily builds worlds and only secondarily allows the creation of other things, like roundhouses.

7.2.5. Thrownness

The possibilities to be that are embodied in a reconstructed roundhouse, such as being a scientist or being a carpenter and wheelwright are only possible because of peoples' thrownness into the word. For the practice of reconstruction this means that all of the Interpretations about what 'they' might have done in the past that are an integral part of the justification and purpose of such a project are also constrained by that thrownness. This means that they can never be demonstrated to be true of the past because that would be to suggest that past builders were thrown into exactly the same world. For example, Reynolds, as a scientist, created his Interpretation of roundhouse structure by looking for the simplest and most efficient use of materials and technologies, while MB, as a carpenter and wheelwright created his interpretation of a roundhouse structure as a result of his particular way of Being. Neither of these Interpretations are true nor can they be demonstrated to be true, but both are the result of particular self-interpretations that are possible only by the particular thrownness of those individuals. Reconstructions, therefore, never represent the truth about building in the past but instead indicate that building is the result of interpreted possible ways of Being on the part of those who build.

7.2.6. Projecting

In the notion of projecting is the suggestion that people have a tendency to 'look ahead' towards something, however tacitly, in their engagements with things. For reconstruction this means that materials and technologies are pre-understood in relation to what they have been selected for regardless of whether or not they actually fulfil that role in practice. The implication of this is that the roles of all materials and technologies employed in a reconstruction project are negotiated in relation to a set of pre-understandings concerning what these materials and technologies are understood to be not what they are *for*. This means that at no point is the experimental reconstruction free of prior understandings or bias, and that no true 'tests' are carried out in a context of neutrality.

An example of such a pre-interpreted entity from the Castell Henllys project is the timber that formed the lintel over the entrance. In the following exchange from early on in the project before any such timber was located, the group's pre-understandings of that timber are laid out:

> MB:
> A nice squidgy thing like that for the top of the door
>
> PB:
> You know about that? That would be really good actually if we could get a nice arch thing going on.
>
> NS:
> Do you want... yeah you want it banana shaped? You don't want it 'S' shaped, yeah? 'Cause you want an arch shape
>
> MB:
> To have a curve, if it comes in and just does a rise in the middle of some description
>
> NS:
> Yeah, fine, something like that
>
> MB:

MB:
Looks right there, get the other end right [undecipherable]

MB:
Oooh, hoo, hoo, hoo [self satisfied laughter] eh, that's amazing!

LL:
Yeah, great, that's it

(Appendix 1.2: 03b10:57-03b13:22 – UC 95)

MB discusses this later in his interview:

> That's a nice shaped piece of wood wasn't it, look it's symmetrical near enough. It was made for the job. We went up and cut about four different ones, no, we brought four down to the bottom car park, I think it was about four, and that was the best shaped one of the lot. It just looked as though it was meant to go there.

(Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, lines 1953-1959)

Or from CJ's perspective:

> I know we were looking for one, and it was came out of a long piece and there was that piece and it did exactly that... We didn't go out in the woods and look for it I don't think, it was something... It was one of the ones up there, you know. There was a particularly bandy rafter that just happened to have that piece in it that suited for that. What is Mo's overriding feelings about this, he must be very proud.

(Appendix 6.2.1: Interview Responses - CJ, lines 1095-1107)

In terms of the people absorbed in reconstruction, this tendency to project forward into possible ways of Being means that those people enact their tasks and roles in reconstruction for the sake of defining themselves in some particular way. This means that reconstructions are part of people's self-interpretation and therefore never value free.

> My attitude was to sort of go for it, being a chippy and working in wood all my life, I'd go at it the way I thought it should go but Phil then... I'd done a little bit of research prior, but Phil is the main man who's... wants it building his way really. It's like burning all the pieces of wood, It was Phil who came up with that we ought to try it you know, and do so many with the wood. What I've done, I've laid all the timber out on site. All the wood is this side of the site, we've got everything all laid out so we can get at it.

(Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, lines 1138-1147)

7.2.7. Absorbed

People have a tendency to be absorbed into the things which they are 'alongside' in their worlds as enacted through everyday task situations rather than taking a distanced analytical view of things. From reports on experimental reconstruction projects (*e.g.* Harding, *et al.* 1993) or from discussions with those who conduct them, an impression is given that this tendency is reversed and that theoretical distancing rather than absorption characterises the way things are dealt with in such projects. Analysis of the Castell Henllys project and observation of other projects indicates, however, that a true reversal would only be in place in a reconstruction that involves people with no familiarity of the use of tools and the properties of materials; a situation that rarely occurs other than in teaching environments. Absorption is particularly characteristic of the use of tools by skilled individuals who do not direct their attention to the tools themselves but rather to the task at hand.

An example of this distinction can be seen in the wattling of the 'Chieftain's House', which in its early stages was not characterised by absorption but rather by deliberation, whereas this was reversed in the later stages (Fig 7.3.).

Figure 7.3. Deliberation and absorption in the wattling of the 'Cheiftain's House' (frames extracted from the 'Chieftain's House video).

> I don't know whether you saw me running around like an idiot at times because their ideas of wattling were that you just wattle, but it's really quite difficult to get it to go right because you can end up with the tail ends of the hazel rods all in one section so you get a weak part of the wall, so it really needs a bit of thought behind it, which they did eventually. It took about half an hour I think before it clicked and then they went on pretty well.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, lines 409-416)

The phenomenon of absorption has been overlooked in accounts of experimental reconstruction projects in favour of the consequences of a distanced analytical stance because absorption constitutes 'business as usual' rather than overt problem solving, which tends to be the focus of experimental projects and, unlike problem solving, is not carried out predominantly through the medium of language. This means that the reports, and in effect the results of reconstruction projects are skewed towards a phenomena that constitutes only a small part of the reconstruction exercise and so do not account for what is occurring the majority of the time.

7.2.8. Disclosed

The consequences for reconstruction of the recognition of disclosedness are linked to that of absorption. People do not, for the most part, come to 'know' the things that they use in an everyday setting by taking a distanced analytical view of them but rather through their particular manipulations in a specific context – look again at figure 7.3 above with the question "to which group are the tools and materials 'known' or disclosed most authentically"? in mind. This means that the current focus of experimental reconstruction on explicit knowledge and problem solving excludes any possibility of Interpreting how people understand tools and technologies in the context of absorbed everyday action.

7.2.9. Falling

Reconstruction does not take place in a vacuum, it is entirely dependent on the specific enacting of absorption and disclosedness in any given setting in relation to the project. This results in the phenomenon of fallenness which is manifest in a failure, on the part of those taking part in a reconstruction project, to recognise the extent to which they are 'lost' in their roles and subsequently how those roles effect the project, it's outcomes and how these are understood. This is often true of those who appear to understand their cultural (and more often with archaeological projects) temporal situatedness. MB for example says:

> The trouble with all these things is there's a twentieth century brain. You can't, no matter what you do - unless somebody hits you over the head with a length of timber and takes you back to square one - you just can't... you know, your brain automatically, no matter all these programs they do about these things, you've got a twentieth century brain at the back of it.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, lines 1019-1025)

But still quite uncritically makes assertions that are dependent on his Being who he understands himself to be in the now (Fig. 7.4. illustrates what MB is referring to):

> Because they were at the woodland centre for so long. This block of wood here actually formed the 'birds-mouth' I think. You know when I said it was just notched over the top of that? That was in there, I'm sure it was. I'll have to see later when we round the other side to see what's...
>
> Yeah, to stop it slipping altogether.
>
> Yeah. I think that's one of the things the architects came up with. I don't think... they wouldn't have done that. It's very fussy isn't it?
>
> Yeah, I think they'd have notched... like a saddle joint over the top, they would. I think I took a couple out, there's a gap around this left hand side. I'm sure I took a couple out and replaced them; I didn't like them.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, lines 1551-1569)

Figure 7.4. Illustration of the section of the substructure referred to in the above interview extract (frame extracted from the 'Chieftain's House' video).

Those who carry out reconstruction projects, therefore, need to recognise the extent to which their fallenness influences the work that they do and the 'knowledge' that they produce. This recognition is a major part of what the methodology presented in this thesis was designed to reveal.

7.2.10. Interpreting

There are two ways in which this phenomenon is manifest in the practice of experimental reconstruction. The first is a tacit 'interpreting' that takes place during the normal course of carrying out a reconstruction project, the second is a more deliberate 'Interpreting' of both what is taking place in present practice and what may have taken place in the past. Both of these manifestations of interpretation are centred on those that take part and take place in the context of action. They are distinct from the 'explanations' offered in the form of results from a reconstruction project.

Tacit 'interpreting' is one of the most challenging aspects of experimental reconstruction to understand and has two aspect; the first is the interpretation of skills and understandings in the context of everyday action, the second is the interpretation of the ontological structures of everyday action. Through their concernful dealings with equipment as tools, materials and structural elements, those absorbed in a reconstruction project tacitly interpret both the existence and specific manifestation of those dealings in the construction of a particular house in the past. They also interpret the phenomena that structure everyday action (which underpin specific expressions of skill) in a way that, if left unexamined, tacitly asserts that those ontological structures were negotiated in the same ways in the past as they were during reconstruction. In addition they interpret, in a new context, the skills tradition to which they belong, resulting, for example, in MB's construction of the wheel-beam structure in the 'Chieftain's House', perfectly articulated by MB himself:

> ...and of course with me being a wheelwright as well, that helped a bit, I can see where that did help I must admit.

in the strict scientific sense, are primarily interpretative and that any explanation that may be derived from them about buildings in the past is dependent on and derived from, this interpretative character.

Another crucially important aspect of peoples' tendency towards being interpreting (*sic.*) is that above all else people interpret, or more often mis-interpret, themselves. Self-interpretation is a recurrent theme in this research as it has become clear that every aspect of the reconstruction exercise is related to how people construct interpretations of themselves in specific contexts and in relation to their situatedness and the things and others that contribute to that situatedness. The fact that people come to understand themselves through their material associations means that reconstructions, as well as being about understanding the past, are also about constructing and consolidating the particular self-interpretations of those absorbed into them.

7.2.11. Care, Concern and Closeness

Everything that has been discussed so far is brought together under the notion of care. Another way to express this is that 'things matter' to people. That things mater is ably expressed by CJ in the following excerpt from his interview where he is talking about the curved lintel timber:

> We didn't go out in the woods and look for it I don't think, it was something... It was one of the ones up there, you know. There was a particularly bandy rafter that just happened to have that piece in it that suited for that. What is Mo's overriding feelings about this, he must be very proud.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.1: Interview Responses - CJ, lines 1103-1108)

The ways in which they matter is related to specific manifestations of the all of the phenomena discussed above. The notion that things matter means that reconstruction can never be a neutral exercise it is always part of the construction of the self-interpreted worlds of those who take part, for this reason I would argue that

future reconstruction projects should, at the very least, incorporate the qualitative analysis of those who take part as this is a fundamental structuring element in any reconstruction project that should not simply be written out at the report stage as has tended to be the case to date.

Care and concern bring things 'close' to those who are absorbed in their concernful dealings with them. The closer things are in this sense, the less they are noticed and the more 'natural' or 'real' such engagements seem. This phenomenon helps to explain why everyday coping has been overlooked in reconstruction in favour of explicit problem solving. It also helps to explain why reconstruction is often felt to be more intuitively 'correct' by those that engage in it.

7.2.12. Equipment and the in-order-to

The major consequence for reconstruction of viewing tools and materials as equipment is that the focus for understanding these types of entities shifts from the things themselves *i.e.* studying them in their own right in isolation from human engagement, to how they are understood and manipulated by those who deal with them. Under this view, tools and materials cease to be simply 'raw materials' or practical objects but meaningful entities the appropriateness and use of which is interpreted by those that use them. This perspective also redraws Interpretations not only of what they *are*, but also of what they are *for*. As noted previously, an item of equipment is not inherently *for* anything in the functional sense, but what equipment is always for, in the sense of what it is employed for-the-sake-of, is defining and consolidating people's self-interpretation. MB, for example, always uses the flat of a hammer when using a chisel (Fig. 7.5.). This is clearly not how a hammer is 'supposed' to be used but MB does it because it is part of what makes him the particular craftsperson that he is in terms of the way in which he interprets himself.

Figure 7.5. "Hammer on the flat? Yeah, always have done." (Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, line 1789. Frame extracted from the 'Chieftain's House' video).

In a reconstruction project there are a potentially enormous number of items of equipment. The equipmental character of some of these items is relatively straightforward, an axe or a hammer for example is clearly an item of equipment, but there are other 'things' that constitute equipment that are not so obvious. Because of the contextual character of equipment in relation to action, individual parts of what at first may appear to be a single entity are often understood as items of equipment in their own right. A post, for example, is actually an equipmental totality comprised of at least two items of equipment; its base and its top. This is clearer if considered in terms of the in-order-to or role of each of these entities. The base of the post has a different role – in-order-to support the post in the ground – to that of the top which is in-order-to carry the wall plate. Similarly the grain of a piece of timber may be seen as equipment in the context of preparation as it is conceived of as something in-order-to achieve something.

Other less obvious items of equipment are those things that are apparently undifferentiated pieces of scrap material but which, in certain contexts become items of equipment, sometimes different items of equipment to different people within the same macro-context, as indicated by figure 7.6. and the excerpt from MB's interview that follows (conducted with the video playing as a prompt):

Figure 7.6. Just a bit of wood or a hammer? Contextual interpretations of items of equipment (frames extracted from the 'Chieftain's House' video).

> "Ceri, don't use my bit of wood as a hammer it's most probably got to fit somewhere else!" Did you see me take it off him!
>
> (Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, lines 1921-1923)

For MB this "bit of wood" already has a pre-defined role in-order-to construct the ring-beam but for CJ it is in-order-to hammer something in place, so in that context effectively a hammer. So apparently 'neutral' 'things' such as a "piece of oak", "the long timbers" and even "the ground" are usually understood as items of equipment; *as* something in-order-to achieve something (Fig. 7.7.).

In a context of activity, items of equipment are not usually understood in relation to their proper names, but rather by context specific terminology or indicative actions that rely on pre-understandings about the in-order-to of such items already being in place. Examples of this are "a nice squidgy thing" (Appendix 1: 02a UC 04.txt), which in fact refers to curved lintel timber intended for the entrance but does not yet exist, or "a big handle thing" (Appendix 1: 02a UC12.txt), which is how LL understands a felling axe (see also example in Chapter 6, p.128). The 'Chieftain's House' video is



Figure. 7.7. Network diagram illustrating just some of the items of equipment involved in the 'Chieftain's House' project.

full of such contextual references, which may be contrasted with the interviews where the proper names for such items of equipment tend to be used.

One final 'class' of item of equipment is the one that is not there. The best example of this is the hole, such as the mortise-holes in the ends of the wall plate timbers, which comes up time and again as an item of equipment with a distinct in-order-to from the material that it is 'in'.

> PB:
> You've got your dowel hole then, that's the problem isn't it
>
> (Appendix 1.2: 02a00:38-02a13:26 – UC 4, p.4)
>
> MB:
> We'll have to have the hole bigger there isn't it... so that's a piece of two by two across there
>
> (Appendix 1.2: 02a00:38-02a13:26 – UC 4, p.6)
>
> MB:
> Are the holes anywhere near, Aled?
>
> (Appendix 1.2: 02b20:51-02b21 – UC 32 16, p.29)

These refinements to what may considered as items of equipment in a reconstruction were revealed though analysis of the dialogue from the 'Chieftain's House' video because it reveals context specific sets of understanding which are not accessible through interview after the fact or by the naming of things by the researcher.

7.2.13. Readiness-to-hand

Despite the fact that the Castell Henllys 'Chieftain's House' was the first roundhouse to have been built by those that took part in the project, the processes of building appeared to be dominated by the phenomenon of Readiness-to-hand. This was not wholly expected, particularly in light of the interviews, where the focus of discussion was on the planning and problem solving elements of the process, thereby giving the impression that it was these that were dominant in the building process.

Readiness-to-hand was seen to be revealed when those involved in the projects were skilfully coping (dealing) with the tasks at hand and everything was going smoothly (Fig. 7.8.).

Figure 7.8. MB cutting 'birds mouth' joints at the base of a rafter (frame extracted from the 'Chieftain's House' video).

The broader consequence for reconstruction projects, which take problem solving as the main element of their research foci, are overlooking the majority of the kinds of activities and engagements that make up any such project. This means that Interpretations or explanations so constructed are creating a false impression of the building of a roundhouse, not only as it applies to reconstruction, which is not principally about problem solving, but also as it applies to understanding the processes in the Iron Age. This is because of a tacit assumption that the problem solving experienced by the reconstructors, as the main element of the building process, is equivalent to that having been the case in the past. Analysis of the 'Chieftain's House' project, which was conducted by skilled craftspeople, suggests that skilled coping, manifest through the phenomenon of readiness-to-hand, is the main part of the building of a roundhouse

and should, therefore, receive more research attention than the problem solving that has hitherto dominated the analysis of reconstruction projects.

7.2.14. Un-readiness-to-hand

A different phenomenon was observed to be at work when things were *not* going very smoothly and uninterruptedly during the course of the Castell Henllys project. This phenomena and it's sub-phenomena still represents part of the normal carrying out of tasks as distinct from the phenomenon that underpins explicit problem solving. It is identifiable from three stages of breakdown in the level of skilled coping represented by readiness-to-hand tasks and results in any equipment implicated in a task being revealed to those using/encountering it as *un-ready-to-hand.* This phenomenon is more involved than *readiness-to-hand* and has three states, which were defined in chapter 4 as *conspicuousness*, *obstinacy* and *obtrusiveness*. All of these modes of encountering are deficient when compared to readiness-to-hand. The consequence for those encountering that equipment is that it does not 'disappear from view' as we have seen with readiness-to-hand but is rather called to their attention in some way. Like readiness-to-hand, these phenomena have been overlooked in reconstruction in favour of explicit problem solving which comes about only as an occasional consequence of the complete breakdown of normal coping characterised by these phenomena.

Conspicuousness

Equipment was revealed as conspicuous when it was found not to fit the role for which it was taken up during the course of its use. Conspicuousness is defined by momentary disruption that is easily overcome, and usually not recognised as disruption, in the normal course of the task at hand. Wattling provides a good example of how equipment (which in this case are the rods and sails of the outer wall) were be encountered as conspicuous. In figure 7.9. two pairs of people are featured constructing a wattle outer wall of a roundhouse, during this activity there will be times when they find that the rod (long horizontal element) that they are weaving between

the sails (short vertical elements) either will not fit because it is too thick or too stiff, or they will find that they have miss-woven it so that it does not fit into the pattern of the wattle. In each case either getting another rod or re-weaving easily overcomes the state of conspicuousness in such a way that the breakdown in their engagement is hardly noticed.

Figure 7.9. Wattling – equipment continuously encountered as conspicuous through momentary disruption to work as a result of coping with differentially suitable materials (frame extracted from the 'Chieftain's House' video).

Obstinacy

Obstinacy is more of a disruption than conspicuousness. It is revealed when equipment 'stands in the way' of the task at hand. The equipment that one wished to employ may require constant attention paying to it, for example if it is not immediately right for the job. This was observed throughout the 'Chieftain's House' project particularly in the fitting of the radius poles during the building of the wheel-beam. Very irregular timbers were used in this part of the construction process and they required a great deal of manoeuvring to get them to sit properly (Fig. 7.10.).

Figure 7.10. Obstinacy – trying to get the very irregularly shaped radius poles to fit.

This also applied to the rafters which, coupled with their size and weight, made them very difficult to handle, requiring constant attention. CJ puts it like this:

> We had to fight them to get the shape we wanted, on some of them, because if they just took their own line, that would have fallen down, it would have just dropped.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.1: Interview Responses - CJ, lines 350-352)

> At the time it was bloody frustrating and bloody annoying because the whole ball game had changed. When we're trying to struggle with these beams on site, and they were turning to where they wanted to naturally fall, and everybody was having to try and pull them back and hold them up; jumping about up there.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.1: Interview Responses - CJ, lines 409-414)

Or from MB's perspective:

> I wish I'd never suggested it; it was hard work trying to get a decent fit because you were handling the timbers so much. In actual fact if it weren't for the 'Tirfor' [hand winch] on the top that allowed it not to slip down too much, you could spin it a bit, and one of you had to sort of hold it over then while you sort of hacked a way at it then turn it back, it was a bugger until you'd got used to doing it and I wished I'd never suggested it. That was hard work.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, lines 703-710)

These sorts of instances which are related to practical, *i.e.* non explicit, problem solving during the carrying out of a task, appear to stay in the minds of the people who carry out the work and are a large component of the perception of difficulty in a project. As a result they have a prominence over and above the actual time that they take up during the course of the project as a whole leading again to a biased understanding of what the activity of building actually consists in most of the time.

Obtrusiveness

The clearest example of this, in terms of a 'missing' item of equipment, from the Castell Henllys project is in problems encountered in choice of timber for the rafters. The timber that had originally been earmarked for the rafters became inaccessible because they were not able to be cut before the bird nesting season, so just before the project was due to start a new and different set of timbers needed to be acquired. The consequences of this are clearly expressed by CJ:

> Well if you went over into the woods over there and saw the kind of trees we could have had. If you went and saw those originally, when we first saw them, cor, it was magic, you know. These things were 50/60 feet high, they were tapering all the same, and that's what you had in your mind's eye, until suddenly five or six weeks before - whenever it was - we couldn't get in there because it had gone out of the season that they wanted you to go in there, and they said "no, you can't go in there".
>
> (Appendix 6.2.1: Interview Responses - CJ, lines 386-394)

This represented a complete breakdown in their understandings of how the project was to progress and fundamentally altered the form that the building took and their understandings of it:

> ...they were going to be telegraph pole type timbers, and all be more or less standard, and then he thought, ...done one and copy them, but of course you had to put one of these in place, and every one is different. But now, you look at it and it's added to the beauty of the building. It would never have been anything like that if it had had standard poles in it. Similarly, up there, the beauty of that roof is - I think it's beautiful - is that all these timbers are all shapes and sizes...
>
> (Appendix 6.2.1: Interview Responses - CJ, lines 368-377)

CJ also says:

> That was the difficult part, in not being able to not have got really straight timbers, but the beauty of the structure is that they're not very straight timbers.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.1: Interview Responses - CJ, lines 353-356)

This manifestation of obtrusiveness meant, on a practical level, that other timbers had to be acquired and that they were more difficult to work with, but more importantly, that on completion, that building was understood to be more beautiful than they felt it would have been if the timbers that had been intended for the building had, in fact, been used (Fig 7.11.).

Figure 7.11. A thing of beauty?

The three stages of breakdown in everyday coping effect not only the day to day work but also how the building is understood. This effect is much more profound than the consequences of any pre-planning because these changing understandings have been lived through rather than pre-conceptualised.

7.2.15. Presence-at-hand

The two latter kinds of breakdown in the ways in which equipment are dealt with in the course of a task can ultimately lead to them being revealed as present-at-hand; the phenomenon that underpins explicit problem solving. There is a strong contrast between the interviews and the video of the 'Chieftains House' project whereby the former highlights the explicit problem solving aspects of the project and the latter is dominated by everyday coping. Presence-at-hand is illustrated in figure 7.12 below. For the three individuals standing around the wall post, the question of what to do about these posts reveals them as present-at-hand; they are not actively engaged in working on or with any of the items of equipment that are available. Their engagement is of a 'theoretical' rather than 'practical' nature, they have a problem that they have to stand back and think about and discuss explicitly.

Figure 7.12. Presence-at-hand – Explicit problem solving in the context of building of the roundhouse wall (frame extracted from the Castell Henllys 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction video).

CJ:

You want to do it with a couple of spirits before you start the middle pocket(?), so you can lash it on afterwards.

PB [Being paid no mind by MB]:
I was saying, thinking about these, the problem with these...

MB:
I won't be able to, I won't be able to because, I've got these bits down so I won't get the ropes on

PB:
...if one bit came loose that would mean the whole lot would be loose, it would be difficult to mend, do you see what I mean? It would be in the way wouldn't it?

(Appendix 1.2: 03a09:02-03a09:55 – UC 54, p. 41-42)

This phenomenon should be understood as an occasional consequence of the breakdown in skilled coping rather than as the fundamental structuring element of experimental reconstruction or, indeed, of roundhouse building in the Iron Age.

7.2.16. Circumspection

This describes the way in which people encounter things most of the time. For the activities surrounding reconstruction, it means that such activities, and the specific roles of the tools and materials that are a part of them, are understood primarily contextually rather than in an abstract theoretical way. This reinforces the secondary and derivative nature of explicit 'theoretical' understandings of reconstruction practice and further highlights current bias in the Interpretation and reporting of reconstruction projects.

7.3. PHENOMENOLOGICAL REFLEXIVITY IN RECONSTRUCTION PRACTICE

The reflexive element of this research focussed on three main questions 1. the influence of my self-interpretation of my understandings of reconstruction and the reconstructed roundhouse, 2. the influence of the self-interpretation of the person who shot the 'Chieftain's House' video on this research and 3. the influence of my prior understandings on the interview process.

7.3.1. Creating the Researcher

Through the steps outlined for the reflexive methodological content of the project I constructed an understanding of reconstructed roundhouses that changed over the course of fieldwork, the first season of which concerned the recording of 27 examples of reconstructed roundhouses currently standing in England, Scotland and Wales. My understandings of roundhouses were different at the start of the field season to those at the end of it. This is manifest in the recording methodology and the data generated. During the early stages, I had no clear idea of what constituted a roundhouse despite the fact that I thought that I did. This can be seen in the inconsistency of the 'standardised' images that make up the bulk of the record (Appendix 5) and in the sketches in my field note book. One thing that is interesting here is that I felt the need to standardise. This was probably my greatest concern throughout the survey project and is entirely consistent with my self-interpretation at the time as an archaeologist and dispassionate observer, except for one thing, and that is that the inconsistencies and level of concern demonstrate that I was not the dispassionate observer that I thought I was. I was, in fact, heavily absorbed into my objects of study and with that study itself and as a result I created a 'record' and an understanding of reconstructed roundhouses that was not really about the roundhouses themselves but about my interpretation of them. I created, if you like, a 'story' about myself; that I was an archaeologist and a research student at a prestigious university and that I had to uphold certain standards of objective research. Analysis of the result of that research suggests that I did that in-order-to 'live in to' that story. As a result, the record that was generated is more a record of that 'story', of a particular manifestation of a constructed identity, than of the reconstructed roundhouses that I surveyed. It is certainly not objective research although it can be very easily dressed up to appear as such.

7.3.2. The Influence of Self-interpretation on the Video Used for this Research

Despite the inability to locate the person who shot the film of the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction it was possible to come to some limited understandings of the

influences of his filming decisions on form of the final video and something about his self-interpretation. I had limited knowledge of who the camera operator was other than that he was a University of Lampeter undergraduate, that as part of his undergraduate dissertation project he was filming and surveying the construction of the 'Chieftain's House' and that his name was 'Rob'.

Filming, like any activity is subject to the same fundamental conditions that have been discussed in earlier chapters. In filming, Rob was engaging with things and Others, putting himself into different situations, engaging in tasks in order to produce a record of the reconstruction project. In fact, the record itself was not why he was doing it, in Heidegger's terms that would have been only its 'towards-this'; he was filming the project in order to pass his exam and gain an archaeology degree. As we have seen, what something is done in order to achieve is not the end of the story for any activity; ultimately everyday action is about self-interpretation. In Rob's case he was filming the reconstruction project for the sake of bolstering his self-interpretation as an archaeologist. Living into this constructed self-interpretation through what, for him, became the everyday activity of filming had a fundamental effect on what was filmed. The structure of the video indicates that Rob had fully adopted the normal understandings of what constitutes a roundhouse and its construction process on the terms of the archaeological community. This results in two principle characteristics; first the video is shot in relation to stages of construction (with omissions – not all are present) and second, it focuses on tasks and technologies, not the people that carry out those tasks and create those technologies. There are six major stages recorded: early decision making and materials preparation, post setting, wattling wall plate construction, roof superstructure construction, daubing and thatching. These stages are also prioritised through the number of UCs that make them up, this is more important than the absolute time that each stage occupies in the video. On the whole, the more UCs, the more 'interesting' a stage is, the less it is given to represent a received technology so thatching and daubing, are covered each with one or two UCs,

whereas the roof superstructure is covered in many. The roof superstructure stage is interesting for another reason and that is that it reveals Rob's concern with technologies. Throughout this stage, there is little activity represented but a great deal of attention is focussed on the technological details of the roof superstructure (see the latter half of 04a, Appendices Part III). The wattling sequences by contrast are task driven, a great many task focussed UCs make up the video for this stage of the project. Rob's influence on the video therefore, was to constrain the reality of the project to a series of pre-understood stages, and the traditional concerns of experimental archaeology with processes and technologies, thereby revealing his absorption into that community and his self-interpretation in those terms. The resultant video, therefore, is as much a record of Rob's self-interpretation in relation to that project as it is of the project itself, in many ways possibly more so; why, for example, were certain sections left out? Those sorts of decisions foreground Rob's concerns, not those of the project.

THEMES
Attention to Task
Interpretation of Past Practise
Interpretation of Self
Outstanding Event
Planning/Practice and Vice Versa
Role of Experience
Understanding of Appearance
Understanding of Constraints
Understanding of Environment
Understanding of Involvement
Understanding of Materials
Understanding of Others
Understanding of Resources
Understanding of Risk
Understanding of Role of Others
Understanding of Space/Place
Understanding of Tasks
Understanding of Technologies
Understanding of Time
Understanding of Tools

Table 7.1. Themes extracted from interview data.

7.3.3. My Influence on the Interview Process

Analysis of the questions and responses of the interview process revealed 20 themes that dominated the interviews with the informants as a group (Table 7.1.).

Comparative analysis of the relative frequencies of the types of questions asked and the types or responses received indicates that I lead the interviews in three main areas of enquiry 1. understandings of involvement, 2. understandings of tasks and 3. understandings of technologies (Figs. 7.13. and 7.14.). Signified by those instances that

occur above the 10% line, these clearly reveal my own preconceptions, at the time that the interviews were conducted, of what was important or interesting in relation to the project.



Figure 7.13. Relative frequencies of question themes by informant.



Figure 7.14. Relative frequencies of response themes by informant.

These results also indicate that enough room was left in the interviews for the informants to address their own concerns relative to my own, for example, CJ was most significantly concerned with the role of others in the project and I addressed MB's understanding of his involvement much more than he responded to it. On the

whole these results indicate that the interviews were quite well balanced despite my 'interference' with informants addressing significantly more concerns than they were questioned about or prompted on.

7.4. CONCLUSIONS

Those phenomena that were analysed and which constitute everyday action are not only real and observable, but they can be demonstrated to have a profound influence on the practice or roundhouse reconstruction which may be summarised as follows:

- The precise form that a reconstructed roundhouse takes is determined more by the absorption of those who take part (through their self-interpretation) than by the materials and technologies employed.
- Pairings are the most significant grouping which people adopt in the course of building.
- One element of peoples self-interpretation is bound up in their being or having been part of a reconstruction project.
- A second element of peoples self-interpretation during the course of a reconstruction project is bound up with the tools and materials that they use and the technologies that they employ.
- A third element of peoples self interpretation is bound up with and the other people involved in the reconstruction project.
- The 'end result' of a reconstruction project is unavoidable influenced by the social and temporal situatedness of those involved. It is not an explanation of the 'prime data' of the archaeological record.

- The tools and materials of a reconstruction project are always pre-understood in terms of the fulfilling of particular roles, whether or not those roles are actually fulfilled in practice.

- Those who conduct reconstruction projects have a tendency to become absorbed into the tools and materials of such projects, which has the effect of masking the true character of their involvement.

- Those involved in reconstruction projects do not, for the most part, 'know' their tools and materials 'theoretically' but rather understand them circumspectively in particular contexts.

- Those involved in a reconstruction project tend to fail to recognise the extent to which they are 'lost' in their roles and how those roles effect the project, it's outcomes and how these are understood and passed on.

- Reconstruction is a primarily interpretative exercise rather than an explanatory one. It does not explain what it sets out to explain, but inadvertently interprets that which it does not recognise as existing.

- Things matter to people. This means that even in the supposedly 'neutral' setting of the reconstruction project, none of the items of equipment involved have a 'neutral', meaningless character.

- Things are never mere things with no associations, meanings or references, they are instead items of equipment which have a role in contextualised definitions of people and their understandings or their roles.

- Reconstruction projects are dominated by skilled coping and only secondarily and occasionally do they involve explicit problem solving.

In addition, the reflexive element of the project has revealed the biases introduced into such phenomenological work through the data collection process. I find these to be significant in the construction of knowledge that is a result of carrying out a reconstruction project both in terms of the understandings that the reconstruction itself represents and these more explicit understanding that result from post-project analysis.

~CHAPTER 8~
BEING, MEANING AND BUILDING: THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ROUNDHOUSE IN THE IRON AGE

Conventional accounts of the building of roundhouses, particularly those derived from programmes of experimental research, see the process in terms of materials, technologies and construction stages. As an antidote to this rather dry, uninteresting, and as we have seen, ultimately misleading approach to a complex phenomenon, I have attempted to understand building in terms of ways of Being, relationships and interpretations of things. This study has, therefore, not so much been about roundhouses *per se* but about being involved in their building. Despite the focus of this thesis on the development of a methodology for analysing human engagement in building in the context of experimental archaeology, a number of ideas have come to light as a result of that development that may help to understand the building of roundhouses in the Iron Age. I offer these here, however tentatively, as directions for further research.

In the preceding chapter I discussed the consequences for understanding the practice of experimental reconstruction prompted by the development of an explicitly Heideggerian phenomenological methodology. I concluded that, fundamentally, the building of a roundhouse in the present is primarily about those involved enacting tightly contextualised understandings of what they do, what they are alongside and who they are with for-the-sake-of interpreting themselves *as* in some particular way. In that sense, it is little different from the structures of Being that underpin the building of a roundhouse in the Iron Age; this is the notion I wish to explore in this chapter with some preliminary thoughts on the ways in which a phenomenology of everyday practice might inform our understandings about roundhouse building in the Iron Age.

We might begin to explore Iron Age manifestations of the structures of Being that have been the focus of this thesis in relation to roundhouse building by way of the notion of the 'ritual of the everyday' and of everyday practice. This idea suggests that much of the ritual practices of the Iron Age were enmeshed in everyday practices, and may be 'fleshed out' with the structures of everyday action as they have been laid out philosophically/theoretically and observed and refined through the case study of the Castell Henllys 'Chieftains House' project. Through the philosophical and methodological exercise of defining a phenomenology of everyday practice we have, in effect, laid out the ontological structures of that way of Being and examined it in the context of the building of a roundhouse in the present in order that here, our concern can shift to the carrying out of skilled tasks, contextualised understanding of that skill and of equipment in the building of a roundhouse in the Iron Age.

8.1. BUILDING ROUNDHOUSES

The building of a roundhouse in the Iron Age was a meaningful activity. This meaning, I suggest, has two distinct but interrelated manifestations. On the one hand, the meaning imbued in building was personal and concerned with the self-interpretation of those involved while on the other, the activities and sequences of building were part of the broader symbolic understandings of the roundhouse. This broader symbolic meaning is that the roundhouse embodied concepts of the passage of time, the structure of the universe and elements of the social order (Fitzpatrick 1991, 1994, 1997; Giles and Parker Pearson 1999; Hill 1993, 1996a; Hingley 1990b; Oswald 1991, 1997; Parker Pearson 1996; Parker Pearson and Richards 1994a). These understandings are currently directed towards the roundhouse as a completed, inhabited structure but taken together with the idea of meaningful everyday practices they could also shed some light on the *building* of a roundhouse. The 'roundhouse as cosmology' and particularly Fitzpatrick's notion of the 'sunwise model' is one such idea. This argues that roundhouses embody certain cosmological referents which Fitzpatrick (1997) described in terms of a 'sunwise model' (Fig. 8.1.).



Figure 8.1. Illustration of the elements of the 'sunwise model' for the Iron Age roundhouse (original illustration after Fitzpatrick 1997: Figs. 9.1 and 9.2, 74-75).

One of the themes of this model, which can be seen elsewhere in the Iron Age *e.g.* the form of many hillforts, elements of the curvilinear art of the period, even possibly the detailing on the handles of certain tools such as the Glastonbury saw (Fig. 8.8. below) but which is perhaps at its most archaeologically visible in the roundhouse, is that of circularity. The 'sunwise model', when considered together with the meaning-giving character of everyday action, suggests that as well as being circular structures, meaningful as completed entities, Iron Age roundhouses were are also built in a circular manner; the building of the roundhouse also being part of a process of signification *i.e.* the building of a roundhouse was achieved in accordance with the beliefs embodied by the roundhouse and that each stage of building and act of building occurred in accordance with those beliefs.

A circular or cyclical method of building may indicate the way in which a roundhouse was built and the kinds of meanings associated with the building sequence. Following on from the arguments related to the pre-eminent significance of the doorway (Hill 1988, 1993, 1996a; Oswald 1991, 1997; Parker Pearson 1996; Parker Pearson and Richards 1994b) we might reasonably argue that when building begins the entrance/porch is set out first. This, particularly where foundation deposits also occur such as at Haddenham (Evans and Serjeantson 1988), can be understood as one of the few archaeologically visible 'deliberation stages' in the building of a roundhouse were the activities associated with it are overtly symbolic. Entrances have at least two posts (four in the case of many porched roundhouses) which may



Figure 8.2. Roundhouse entrance orientation (redrawn after Oswald 1991).

have been laid out with an axial line (Guilbert 1982) 'in mind'. Also 'in mind' during this 'deliberation stage' may have been the meaning associated with the spaces defined either side of the axial line. When one considers that roundhouses tend to be oriented either to the south or to the south-east with another significant spike to the west (Fig. 8.2.) the axial line of a particular house may determine in part the precise significance of that particular line *i.e.* whether it is oriented along the equinoxes or on the midsummer sunset/midwinter sunrise.

Looking again at roundhouse orientation it is clear that the majority of houses orientation cluster between these two points (Fig 8.2.). This may indicate that rather than precise layout on those points being of primary importance it is the *conceptual* alignment that is most significant *i.e.* it is not that a roundhouse faces east or south-east that is important, rather that it represents that orientation (Figs. 8.3. and 8.4.).

Figure 8.3. The conceptual orientation of Bodrifty House A to southeast (photograph by the author).



Figure 8.4. Illustration of conceptual axial alignment for roundhouses at New Barn Down; Bishops Canning Cross; Itford Hill; Newark Road, Fengate and West Plean (redrawn after Guilbert 1981).

As well as orientation, the cyclical character of time is likely to have been important in the building of a roundhouse. A cyclical understanding of time may have dictated that the posts were laid in a sequence beginning at the southernmost entrance post and cycling back to the northernmost entrance post. These considerations may

also have governed the next stage of building; the laying out of the main structural posts, resulting in these elements being located in a manner that followed the 'sunwise' cycle starting from the most symbolically powerful point, the entrance, and again working around the cycle of time to return to that point (Fig 8.5.). There are obviously two main types of building to consider here; the double-ring and clear-span variants. For double-ring buildings the main supporting posts are represented archaeologically by the inner ring of postholes whereas the supporting elements for clear-span buildings are part of the outer wall. I would argue that this does not alter the cyclical symbolism embedded in the building sequence although the sequence itself is clearly different; that symbolism is one of *encirclement*. Double-ringed roundhouses have a different specific construction sequence from clear-span roundhouses by virtue of having the additional structural element of the inner post ring, thereby having two sequences of encirclement.



Figure 8.5. Sunwise construction of the Pimperne House (redrawn after Harding, Blake and Reynolds 1993).

Throughout this thesis I have argued for meaning being embedded in skilled practice. Above, a case has been made for 'deliberation stages' in the building of a roundhouse, the first of which is the laying out of the building on the ground. These 'deliberation stages' punctuate and are contrasted with 'coping stages' which are characterised by the carrying out of tasks. Through these 'coping stages' meaning is not overtly expressed but rather 'actioned' also, the focus of these meaningful activities shifts from the overtly symbolic to the 'personal', where those who are involved in the work do what they do, in the way that they do it, for-the-sake-of defining themselves in some particular way, which includes an engagement with the broader symbolism that they understand to be actioning. The coping stages in this early part of the construction process are, for example, the digging of postholes/trenches and the placing of posts.

The encirclement phase of the building of a roundhouse is carried on, for double-ringed roundhouses, by the placement of the lintels on the tops of the inner ring posts and those of the of the wall-plate or tension-ring, while in clear-span roundhouses by the placing of the wall-plate or tension-ring. This again is done in a sunwise fashion, and I would argue, again starting and ending at the most significant point in the building in a sequence from the summer/autumn side of the entrance to the winter/spring side. Encirclement is completed by the walling process, closing the circle, a process which I would again argue is centred on the point of greatest significance and acted out following the sunwise passage of time. It may be that this stage 'stands in' for capping the inner ring on those building that do not have an inner ring thus maintaining consistency in the meaning assignations sequence, which for the house builders in the Iron Age is understood to govern the sequence in which a building is constructed. This encirclement phase of the digging of postholes, the placing of posts, lintels, wall-plates and walling is a 'coping stage' that follows on from the 'deliberation stage' of laying out. In the latter, meaning and symbolism are overt and 'theoretical' in the sense that they involve ideas over action, whereas in the

'coping stage' meaning is actioned through concernfully dealing with tasks, tools and materials.

After encirclement, there follows an *enclosure* phase. Before this second 'coping stage' can begin there is likely to have been a second 'deliberation stage' connected with the covering over of a space, perhaps conceptually akin to covering over a deposit in ditch or pit. At this stage, the second element of the conceptual orientation of the roundhouse is brought into being, realised through the positioning of the principle rafters. The coping stage of enclosure itself begins with the raising of the rafters. 'Principle rafters' are a structural element argued for by Reynolds on the basis of practical considerations in relation to the Pimperne House evidence (Harding, *et al.* 1993), but their existence beyond this specific example is more sustainable if they are taken to be a fundamental part of the meaning assignation of the building of a roundhouse. Reynolds also argues, on the evidence of the outer ring of 'scoops' around the Pimperne roundhouse, that these 'scoops' are formed by manoeuvring the



Figure 8.6. Conceptual orientation of the Pimperne House (redrawn after Harding, Blake and Reynolds 1993).

rafters into position in order to straighten and centre the roof. It is worth considering whether some of these 'scoops' *i.e.* those that relate to the positions of the principle rafters, are in fact the result of those rafters being lined up on the appropriate equinox, with the other 'scoops' the result of manoeuvring to match the other rafters with that specific alignment (Fig. 8.6. above). Taken together with the axial line of the house, the positioning of the principle rafters determines the key cosmological referents for a particular roundhouse (Fig. 8.7.).



Figure 8.7. Conceptual roundhouse orientation by both entrace and principle rafters: examples from Winklebury Camp (stippled area indicates possible extent of floor plan).

After this second 'deliberation stage' the 'coping stage' begins with the raising of the four principal rafters, aligned either on the cardinal points or on sunrise/sunset

axes. This is followed by the placement of the remaining rafters. The next stage of enclosure is the placement of the purlins, which like the building of the elements of the earthfast part of the roundhouse, is done in a circular sequence, it may in fact be that they are placed in a spiral (but this is something that has not yet been attempted in a reconstruction). The penultimate stage is the thatching and finally, the walls are daubed. It is through these 'coping stages' of encirclement and enclosure and their attendant deliberation stages, which take place before work begins, that the meaning of the building process and of the roundhouse itself as a meaningful thing is assigned.

Considering the process of building in terms of 'deliberation' and 'coping' stages reverses current conceptions of that process because it becomes apparent that 'coping stages' where practical action dominates, significantly outweigh 'deliberation stages' which mark only major shifts in concern from those activities having to do with encirclement to those having to do with enclosure. These elements of the building process, where action gives way to deliberation, should be seen as special punctuations of an otherwise 'un-thought' process. This has two implications: first, that the significance and the enacting of practices in line with that understood significance was not explicit for the majority of the building process. Rather that those significances were a structuring component of the ways in which the everyday practices associated with building were carried out. In other words, the builders are lost or absorbed into these meaning-giving understandings and the practices that accompany them to such an extent that every apparently mundane task or tool in the building of a roundhouse is imbued with meanings that were a normal part of how people understood building to take place.

Second, the contemplative punctuations of the 'deliberation stages' were unusual and therefore powerfully different parts of the building process. Coming back again to the idea of the 'ritual of the everyday' as informing/structuring practice in the Iron Age, *i.e.* that everyday activities are fundamentally meaningfully constituted, we

might consider this to be manifest in two ways. The first of these is through the notion of everydayness that has been developed through this thesis, and that the 'ritual of the everyday' therefore means that those phenomena that have been discussed as making up the constitution of everydayness are meaningful in the Iron Age. In accordance with this, Being with others, self-interpretation, understandings of tools and materials, understandings of the world and directedness towards things and others should all be seen as making up the foundations for the ritual practices, or more accurately ritualised manifestations of particular ways of Being and doing, that characterise Being an Iron Age person.

There are four simultaneous, intertwined 'methods' occurring in the building of a roundhouse in the Iron Age. One is a method for building a roundhouse; the physical, practical 'nuts and bolts' of how to build a roundhouse. The second is a method for the assignation of significance to a building through the process of building it. The third is a context specific method for enacting the rituals associated with everyday skilled coping and practices, and the fourth is method for enacting a consolidating self-interpreted ways of Being for those involved in building.

8.1.1. Planning

The idea that Iron Age roundhouses present a high degree of planning in their form and construction through the consistent observation of axial line symmetry and deliberate entrance orientation is well accepted. Despite this acceptance and the Interpretation of these phenomena as relating to the roundhouse as an embodiment of the Iron Age world view, there are still two outstanding questions, What does planning say about being involved in building? and, whether planning, although relatively archaeologically visible, does not, as a result of this visibility, skew our understandings of what it takes to build a roundhouse.

The need to plan, or to step back and consider something explicitly, represents a challenge, perceived or real, to everyday coping. It is underpinned by the cessation of everyday coping, by a perception that something cannot go ahead until it has been given explicit consideration. This is the character of the 'deliberation stages' preceding encirclement and enclosure manifest in the building of a roundhouse in the Iron Age. This may be understood as a new phenomena in the history of roundhouse building as it is, of course, entirely possible to build something without planning it especially, in the case of the roundhouse, where it represents an architectural tradition of some thousand year's duration. In the Iron Age, the meaning of the building has to be thought about explicitly both before construction commences and at specific stages during its construction as discussed above. Observable phenomena such as entrance orientation and axial line symmetry represent more an understanding at the broad level of 'society', these specifically Iron Age manifestation of roundhouse planning are also evidence of an individual or group who understands that it is not possible to build until some element of that building has been explicitly considered. As discussed above, it is conceivable that these 'deliberation stages' in construction, as breaks in everyday coping were more overtly ritualised. As such it is also suggestive of a change in the way that those who build roundhouses interpret themselves *vis á vis* those in the Bronze Age. Again this suggests self-interpretation in relation to an understanding of one's role in building and in society as a whole.

8.1.2. Sophistication, Skill and Speciality

Despite the growing acceptance of the idea that roundhouses in the Iron Age were conceptually sophisticated in terms of the meaningful referents related to symmetry and orientation, the buildings themselves are, on the whole, considered to be relatively simple; employing simple but effective technologies. While this may be true of the small roundhouses such as the large number of stake-built roundhouses uncovered at Danebury (Cunliffe and Poole 1991: 43), this is, perhaps, not the case with the large, sometimes double-ringed, roundhouses that either physically dominate

some sites, such as Castell Henllys (Mytum 1992; Mytum 2002), or are the main architectural feature of others, such as Little Woodbury (Bersu 1940) or Longbridge Deverill-Cow Down (Chadwick Hawkes 1994). It is generally accepted that these large roundhouses are a step up in sophistication from the smaller single-ring houses, while still relying on the same basic structural principles. But what do we really mean by 'sophistication'? For the Iron Age roundhouse, it is usually taken to mean a more sophisticated command of materials and technologies in order to create a structure that is as much, or more, about status and symbolism as it is about building a habitable dwelling. What has not been considered until now is what that sophistication consists in.

A phenomenological approach as practiced in this thesis would argue that sophistication in Iron Age roundhouses is a material manifestation of skill, coupled with a self-interpretation of those who build them of being a skilled person and not about materials and technologies *per se*. While it is perfectly possible to build a large roundhouse with only a moderate level of skill, the building that would result from such moderate skill would not be consistent with the characteristics of performance/ display that has come to be associated with such buildings in the Iron Age.

The sophistication of large Iron Age roundhouses is the result of skilled coping with materials, tools and technologies which can only come about as a result of the acts of building being dominated by the phenomenon of readiness-to-hand. In order to display this dominance, those acts have to be carried out by someone who understands themselves as a skilled person in relation to others who are understood as not skilled. This may suggest that certain types of roundhouses were built by highly skilled specialists, who were responsible for and have understandings of, a number of buildings, possibly in relatively restricted area. On example of this is perhaps the large double-ring roundhouses of 5th-7th century BC Wessex (Fitzpatrick 1994) *i.e.* Pimperne (Harding 1963; Harding, *et al.* 1993), Longbridge Deverill Cow Down

(Chadwick Hawkes 1994), Little Woodbury (Bersu 1940), Brighton Hill South Site X/Y (Coe and Newman 1992; Newman 1994), Old Down Farm (Davies 1981, 1994), Dunston Park (Fitzpatrick 1994) and possibly Crickley Hill B1 (Dixon 1972, 1973a, 1973b, 1976), Winklebury Camp (Smith 1977) and Balksbury Camp (Reynolds 1979; Wainright 1969). These buildings are large (over 10m in diameter), of relatively complex construction and, crucially, are unusual in the archaeological record as a whole, being temporally and geographically restricted, but remarkably similar in form. These large double-ring roundhouses may represent a break from the building traditions of the Bronze Age, where building was solely related to family units (Brück 1999) to certain buildings being constructed by those whose role it is to undertake that activity.

The notion that the large roundhouses of the early Iron Age were built by specialists raises the question of what these individuals received in return for that service. It rather implies that houses were a part of the exchange system of the period. There are a number of elements of the building of a house that are implicated in exchange. Firstly there is the house itself; being something built for one person/group by another, the house itself is effectively exchanged, but the question here is, What for? The skill, perhaps prestige and something like a 'transferable identity' of the builders is also part of this exchange. There are two further questions that arise out of this, 1. what is really being exchanged here? The house or the skill of the builder(s) or the identity of the builders? 2. again, what is being exchanged in return for this? If the overall Interpretation offered here is correct, the answer to this is most likely to be the skill or identity/reputation of the builder that is the basis for this exchange because this 'skill' is coupled with perceived special knowledges/understandings of the 'rules' governing the building of houses and access to the most appropriate materials in terms of a special set of references. This latter point raises the question about how 'things' *i.e.* materials and tools were understood in the Iron Age.

8.2. THINGS THAT MATTER: EQUIPMENT IN THE IRON AGE

The British Iron Age is awash with material culture when compared to other prehistoric periods in the region. Recent approaches to Iron Age material culture have begun to move away from attempts to classify and quantify them functionally and to consider their broader social roles and what they may have meant within and between British Iron Age societies (Bevan 1999b; Hill and Cumberpatch 1995). While the demonstrably symbolic has received attention (Hill 1989; Hingley 1990c), 'ordinary' or 'everyday' items have received little reconsideration in their contexts of use rather than deposition (but see *e.g.* Barrett 2000; Hill 1997). This is a major oversight for understanding the British Iron Age where ritual and symbol can be understood to reside in the actions and events of everyday dealing with things. This has a strong resonance with Heidegger's idea that things 'matter' to people and that they 'matter' most in the course of their everyday concernful dealings. Things are meaningful in everyday contexts in two senses. The first is related to self-interpretation and of one's role in society, the second is in ritual or in symbolism related to a shared belief system.

One of the clearest things to emerge from a phenomenology of everyday action is that people inhabit worlds that 'matter' to them. In addition to this general statement, it is also clear that despite the fact that the general structures of Being can be described theoretically and observed in action, there is no one universal way of Being that people have. Because Being is enacted in the world, and the world is one of care and interpretations (rather than being seen as a container like or geographic entity), the specific manifestations of an individual or groups ways of Being is constructed through the things and people that they care about, in a particular context. For example, during the interview process of the present research I became aware that by focussing only on the acts of reconstruction, I was not getting at anything like the 'whole story' with regard to the fullest possible range of ways of Being inhabited by the people that were interviewed. Equally, however, it became apparent that their being who they were

'outside' of the confines of the project heavily influenced and was influenced by the ways in which they saw themselves in more direct relation to that project.

During his interview PB, for example, would often digress to discuss at length woodland management in the Iron Age, this I interpret as being directly related to a part of his self interpretation that is associated with his former role as a woodland manager, so for him, woodlands matter, and he cannot consider the Iron Age without drawing both on this 'thing' that matters to him and his self interpretation in connection with it. The roundhouse, the tools and materials used to build it and the belief system that governed its construction are the material manifestation of a 'world of care' constructed in a similar manner. As such, it is reasonable to expect that those who built roundhouses in the Iron Age constructed their self understandings in relation to their involvement with and absorption in this world and that these understandings were particular to that context

As a result of this research, I take the notion that things matter to people and that through this caring about things and others people construct their meaningful worlds, to be broadly true. This means that in order to gain some insight into Iron Age ways of Being, houses, tools and materials need to be considered, not as technological or economic objects – as is commonly the case with explanations derived from experimental research – but as entities that 'matter', thus focussing research on who they 'matter' to.

8.2.2. Meaningful Materials

From Heidegger we get the idea that equipment is not only tools or other manufactured items of material culture but also supposedly 'raw' materials like timber, reed, straw, chalk, clay and animal products. From the Castell Henllys it is apparent that such materials were pre-understood primarily in terms of the roles that they are projected to play in the building of the roundhouse. This is illustrated

nicely by the 'story' attached to the timbers that were used in the superstructure of the 'Chieftain's House' which indicates that the timbers were not seen as trees, timbers or raw materials while they were still growing in the woodland, but already as posts, rafters, lintels etc.

Further than this, the timbers were selected by the project's engineer and carpenter so these pre-understandings were related directly both to the building project and the self-interpretations of these individuals.

> Well if you went over into the woods over there and saw the kind of trees we could have had. If you went and saw those originally, when we first saw them, cor, it was magic, you know. These things were 50/60 feet high, they were tapering all the same, and that's what you had in your mind's eye, until suddenly five or six weeks before - whenever it was - we couldn't get in there because it had gone out of the season that they wanted you to go in there, and they said "no, you can't go in there".
>
> (Appendix 6.2.1: Interview Responses - CJ, lines 386-394)

Or from MB's point of view:

> That's a nice shaped piece of wood wasn't it, look it's symmetrical near enough. It was made for the job. We went up and cut about four different ones, no, we brought four down to the bottom car park, I think it was about four, and that was the best shaped one of the lot. It just looked as though it was meant to go there.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, lines 1956-1962)

In a secular society such as our own, and certainly in the context of the 'Chieftain's House reconstruction project, this is the level at which these meaningful associations stop. This is unlikely to be the case in the Iron Age.

In a broad extrapolation from both the idea and the specific case, it is likely that the materials that went into building a roundhouse in the Iron Age – timbers, clay, reed/straw etc. – were not just understood as raw materials to be exploited but rather as 'meaningful materials' which played a part in constructing the self-interpretations of the people that interacted with them. A further extrapolation, necessary to approach the question of what the 'ritual of the everyday' consisted in in the Iron Age, might

lead to a consideration of the meaning of materials in the building of a roundhouse as operating at three levels: that the materials themselves were meaningful, that the places they came from were meaningful and that their inclusion and placement in the building of a roundhouse was also meaningful. Further, it is not inconceivable that the reasons that particular materials were incorporated into the building of a roundhouse were more directly related to their meaning than to their 'functionality'. In other words, what the materials used in building were *for* was not primarily to build a roundhouse but in-order-to construct and embody a world-view for-the-sake-of group and individual identities.

On the first point, one might conclude that particular timbers have particular meaningful associations; as clay from the earth and reed from the water for example. The latter example of reed being a meaningful building material is consistent with the idea that watery places were strongly symbolic during the Iron Age, so the use of reed in the roofing of a roundhouse may have been to a large extent governed by drawing on those symbolic associations over and above practical considerations, given also the fact that it is possible to thatch a roundhouse with a wide variety of materials.

This returns this discussion to a point raised earlier; that the materials for building were understood as having to come from particular meaningful places, *i.e.* it was not appropriate to take building materials from just anywhere. Rafters, for example, were taken because they were already understood as rafters and as playing a part in symbolic representation of the universe embodied in the roundhouse itself and not necessarily because they were perfectly straight or otherwise functionally 'ideal' raw materials. As such, materials for building a roundhouse were chosen by different criteria, an indication of which is visible in the large double-ring roundhouses of the early Iron Age in particular which are, on the whole, massively over engineered, and the roundhouse as a whole, which is such an inherently stable structure.

The stability of the basic design of the roundhouse is indicated, for example, by the Pimperne House at BAF's former 'demonstration area' which was found, on dismantling in 1990, to be resting on the ground surface, the posts having rotted away below ground level (Harding *et al.* 1993) and by the Glastonbury reconstructions at the Peat Moors Visitor Centre which stand independent of the peat on which they are constructed. In addition Cunliffe has drawn on this inherent stability to argue that the stake-built roundhouses of Danebury may have been moved around once they had become free of the ground, which he takes as a possible explanation for the absence of stake holes and wall slots at some of the house platforms (Cunliffe and Poole 1991: 48).

Although the default material is often oak for the main structural, and particularly earthfast, timbers used in roundhouse reconstructions, a wide variety of materials have, in fact, been used to construction, these include pine, alder, birch, ash and hazel (Table 8.1.). This does not indicate with any security that these were the materials that were used to construct roundhouses in the Iron Age but rather that it is possible to build a viable roundhouse structure with almost any timber, especially when considered alongside the inherent stability of the basic design.

Material	Reconstructed Roundhouse
Oak	LDCD, BMYGE, MYGE, CH1, CH2, CH3, CH4
Ash	MYG, MYGE, BMYGE, M13, M74, BOD, T1, T2
Hazel	BOD, T1
Birch	T2, MYGE, BG1, BG2
Pine	MM
Alder	BMYGE, M13, M74

Table 8.1. Structural materials used in reconstructed roundhouses in England, Scotland and Wales (excluding wattle).

This would seem to argue against a functional argument for the choice of building materials and point instead towards symbolic/meaningful understandings of materials as underpinning the choices of materials used. There is not currently a

great deal of archaeological evidence from the postholes of excavated roundhouses to indicate what materials were most commonly used for the posts. If such evidence does become available in the future this would not necessarily militate against this interpretation of building materials as symbolic or meaningful, but should be seen as providing greater insight as to precisely what materials were considered important for the building of a roundhouse.

Equally, this raises the question of whether this over-engineering is a result of the availability only of inferior materials or a manifestation of the fact that the builders cared little about what materials went into the buildings and compensated for this by overbuilding. This seems unlikely. Given the premise of the ritual of the everyday and the idea that things 'matter', it seems plausible that the over-engineering of the roundhouse accommodates the variation in materials used that was a result of a selection procedure that was not 'practical' but rather meaningful. This does not mean that practice cannot be meaningful; precisely the opposite is likely to be the case for the Iron Age *i.e.* that meaning resides in everyday practice as has been argued for above in relation to the building of a roundhouse.

If things did indeed 'matter' to the builders of roundhouses in the Iron Age, we might expect different things to matter in different ways, this may lead to the conclusion that not only do different kinds of materials have meaning in the broader sense, but that particular individual pieces may also have carried their own meaning. It may be that each structural element of the roundhouse may have meant or represented something; the main posts for example, each one perhaps standing for something, some idea or somebody, reflected in their materials, placement, construction sequence and human and symbolic referents.

8.2.3. Materials Acquisition

For those whose role it was to build and maintain certain roundhouses *e.g.* those of 5th-7th BC Wessex, everything that they did in relation to building a house was a part of their interpreted identities as builders and therefore meaningful in that sense as well as carrying more overt symbolic meaning. Given the possibility that every structural element in a roundhouse had a specific meaning, this involvement may have extended to the acquisition of the building materials for each individual roundhouse. Roundhouse builders in the Iron Age selected and cut the most appropriate timbers in accordance with what they believed was most appropriate, this in accordance with the meanings associated to particular materials, the cycle of time embodied in the building of the roundhouse and the places from which they were acquired.

Timber can be harvested during either the growing or dormant seasons and in each case the wood will have different characteristics. Wood cut during the growing season will contain a lot of sap and water. For large (structural size) timbers this means that they are very heavy to move, they will take a very long time to air and will shrink and crack considerably as they dry out, particularly if they are placed in a heated environment. For small diameter material like hazel, the extra sap and water means that they will be very flexible and will shrink and bind on application.

Timbers cut during the dormant season – particularly late in the season before the sap begins to rise in preparation for the growing season – will have less sap in them, be lighter, stiffer and will season more rapidly. This is what is required in a structural timber but not in hazel for wattling, for example.

So it is probable that the large structural timbers were cut in the winter during the dormant season and left to season until the spring/early summer. This raises the question of where it is left to season. Is it left where it is cut *i.e.* in the woodland, or is it moved to site and seasoned there? The next step in the sequence would then be

to cut the hazel/willow. Hazel or willow needs to be cut as close to the time of its use as possible to retain its flexibility. The real point here is that even considered only in terms of timber acquisition, a considerable amount of preparation is required, spanning at least a season. As indicated by the Pimperne, Longbridge Deverill Cow Down and Castell Henllys 'Chieftain's House' reconstructions, a large roundhouse can easily use in excess of 200 structural size timbers and a vast amount of hazel – in excess of 3000 poles for the Castell Henllys 'Chieftain's House' for example. This will obviously take some time to select and cut as well as extract from the woodland and move to site. The same applies to water reed, which needs to be cut in the winter and of which a huge amount is required. What this may suggest, at least for the building of the large Wessex double-ring roundhouses in the early Iron Age, is a selection and preparation season in the autumn a cutting and seasoning period over the winter, another cutting season in the spring and the house itself is built over spring/summer and the cycle starts again. This is more or less a full time job, which is a consideration that must form part of any argument for the existence of specialist builders. It is also interesting from the point of view of the cosmological referents of roundhouses discussed above *i.e.* that they embody and are built in accordance with ideas about the year/solar cycle and may also support the idea that this specialist group were understood to possess a set of understandings about buildings and materials over and above, or at least different from, those of the 'general population'.

8.2.4. Tools

There is good archaeological evidence for the range of woodworking tools available in the Iron Age, the best of many of the examples of individual tools coming from the site of Glastonbury Lake Village (Bulleid and Gray 1911, 1917) (Fig. 8.8.). The items in this 'toolkit' (although it should be stressed that no single toolkit containing these items in close association has yet been recovered) are: hammers, axes (socketed and shaft-hole), adzes, socketed gouges and chisels, billhooks, knives, saws, draw-knives, awls, spoon augers, files and drill bits (Earwood 1993: 202-211). This



Figure 8.8. Examples of Iron Age tools from Glastonbury Lake Village (from Bulleid and Gray 1917: pl IX, 153).

range of tools represents a good all-round woodworking toolkit. However, because it is a toolkit that is suitable for a wide range of woodworking applications, the toolkit in itself reveals little about what it was used for other than in the most general terms. However, if it considered in relation to situatedness and self-interpretation, more precise, contextualised interpretations of its use may be considered.

I have argued in previous chapters that Heidegger asks us to consider that items of equipment are not inherently *for* anything, rather that they are revealed as specifically suitable for something only when they are being manipulated by some individual or group in order to realise a particular goal, and this in relation to the self-interpretation of those who engage with them in their everyday dealings with them. This is the basis upon which the Iron Age woodworking toolkit may be Interpreted. Take MB's understanding of the roles of an axe for example:

> the axe was the main thing in the tool kit, if you lost your hammer you used your axe.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, lines 247-248)

> We drilled a hole in a piece of wood to size and then made all the dowels up there and pushed them through here, it was all done with an axe, not turned them, it was all done with an axe, split them and done with an axe.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, lines 266-270)

> 'Course all an axe is is a big wedge isn't it.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, line 1430)

> I mean, an axe is just a big chisel; you can use an axe as a chisel, you're just a bit confined for space.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, lines 2498-1499)

The broadly usable woodworking toolkit of the Iron Age may be understood to be more or less specialised depending on who is using it, in what context and why. Specialism or suitability-for is, therefore, understood through use and the self-interpretation of the user and is not to be found in the particular physical characteristics of the tools themselves (see *e.g.* Saunders's discussion of the saw recovered at Cadbury Castle, Barrett, *et al.* 2000: 230) The sorts of situations that Iron Age roundhouse builders found themselves in and the sorts of self-interpretations that they adopted suggests that in this context – within the in-order-to framework of the building of a roundhouse – those toolkits that were used by the builders may have been understood to be specialised for that task.

A further implication of this, and following on from the idea that things 'matter' to people, it can be suggested first that particular toolkits probably existed, despite their being no archaeological evidence for them at present, and second, that these toolkits were probably important or meaningful to those who possessed them and may have been imbued with a biography; one at least that was related to the use-history of the tool. Even something as multi-purpose as an axe is likely to have been defined in terms of its suitability for something and its meaning to somebody in the context of what, for the most part, it was understood to be suitable for and what it was used in-order-to achieve.

The difficulty for archaeology is that this cannot be 'seen' directly in the archaeological record for the Iron Age, so we need to look elsewhere for possible manifestation of this phenomenon. Some indication is given of this possibility in MB's interview during which he states, with some pride, that he still has and uses the axe that he used to build the Castell Henllys 'Chieftain's House' three years after the event – he later took me to his workshop to show it to me. That axe had become, not just another axe, but the one he used to build the Castell Henllys roundhouse with. For MB that particular axe, in contrast with the many others that he possessed, had acquired a special significance through having been connected with that project; this in the context of a 'throwaway' society where tools are 'supposed' to be merely functional objects and not imbued with either meaning or biography.

> Axe. Most of it were done with an axe, it's the easiest way because once you get to use an axe it's a lovely instrument to use. It used to be part of a joiners toolkit when I started, the axe was the main thing in the tool kit, if you lost your hammer you used your axe. But anyway, that's how we did it; all with an axe. I've got the axe in the shed there, my own axe...
>
> (Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, lines 244-250)

This hardly constitutes conclusive 'proof' that tools were meaningful in the Iron Age, but it does at least suggest that possibility in a society within which everyday actions and associations were meaningful.

We are given to thinking that the naming of things makes them significant, however, it is apparent from observation drawn from this research that in the course of everyday dealings with things in one particular situation or another, such significance often comes from their associations rather than their proper names. This is something that was anticipated theoretically on the basis of Heidegger's idea that equipment is only revealed as that particular thing that it is through its specific, contextual manipulation. Observation indicates that tools are not, for the most part, referred to in practice by their assigned or proper names; rather they are indicated through their specific manipulability in context. In practice, where an item of equipment is referred to, it is often indicated to others by phrases such as "that over there" or "the

squidgy thing" or "the long handle thing" or some such (all of which are examples from the 'Chieftain's House' data) rather than "the post" or "the lintel" or "the barking iron". Most often they are simply indicated as "this" or "that", indicating that what is important about the item of equipment is not what it is supposed to be *for* but rather how it is interpreted through a particular context of use. This is a strong indicator that contextualised understands of things come from their use within that specific context rather than from some un-malleable, pre-defined and language based knowledge of what they 'really' are. This is further borne out in the interviews where references to tools, being given some three years after the event and out of context, are predominantly through the tools' proper names.

The Iron Age woodworking toolkit is not, therefore, to be seen as a functionally specialised toolkit, the use of which is defined by a language-based set of rules. No amount of experimenting with such a tool kit in the conventional sense would indicate a particular use to which it is best suited; suitability and functionality does not lie inherently in the tools themselves. In order to understand suitability and speciality for something the woodworking toolkit of the Iron Age must be considered in relation to how it was interpreted by different possible users; how it fits in to a variety of possible 'worlds'. A person who is highly skilled in building, for whom the toolkit was used mostly in this role, might consider the particular toolkit that they use – possibly in perceived contrast to other physically identical toolkits as used by others – as specially suited to that role, whereas a moderately skilled user, for whom the toolkit is understood as usable in a variety of roles, may consider it to be generally usable rather than specialised.

Much has been made of "meaningful material culture" in archaeology over the last 20 years. This has tended to concentrate on overtly symbolic objects and those made from prestige materials or that are otherwise 'expensive' or unusable in a functional sense. Heidegger's ideas prompt us to consider that ordinary everyday objects that

display none of these characteristics are also meaningful. This is particularly relevant for the Iron Age, giving greater substance to the notion of the 'ritual of the everyday' which at present is confined solely to actions and events. By adding meaningful tools, materials and associations to this a fuller picture of what the ritual of the everyday in the Iron Age consist in may be suggested.

The meaningful associations of everyday objects and relationships in the Iron Age are likely to have been directly related to the interpretations of the roles within society of individuals and groups. It is through the meanings and associations imbued in everyday things through their use in particular roles that people construct their understandings of who they are in relation to everyone else in society and the tools, materials and other items of equipment through which they understand their worlds.

A final point concerning materials tools and technologies understood as items of equipment is the implication that this has for the definition of material culture. Because of the projecting character of human engagements with things, there are conceivably many circumstances under which apparently unmodified 'natural' items may be understood as having a role in-order-to achieve something and thus already material culture. I addition, if an item of equipment is something that has a role within an in-order-to structure of some task or project and that role is defined by people's understandings of what is involved in fulfilling that role, then one very important and much overlooked item of material culture is the hole; not the cut or its edges, but the hole itself.

8.3. BEING A ROUNDHOUSE BUILDER IN THE IRON AGE

From Heidegger I take the idea that people's interpretations of themselves is constructed through adopted ways of Being that are related to the society into which they are thrown, their absorption into culturally acceptable ways of acting and their engagements with material culture. In the Iron Age, the building of a roundhouse can

therefore be understood to be one of the ways in which certain individuals and groups of people structure their interpretations of themselves and their roles in society.

As regards the roundhouses of the Iron Age themselves, they can be broadly divided into two types, double-ring *i.e.* those that have an internal ring of posts supporting the roof structure and a separate outer wall of some kind and single-ring or clear-span buildings that take the weight of the roof structure on the outer wall. Clear-span buildings are considerably more numerous than double-ring buildings *e.g.* the number of clear-span buildings at Danebury alone (73) outnumbers the total number of double-ring buildings securely identified for the Iron Age in Britain as whole (Cunliffe and Poole 1991; Guilbert 1981). In addition to shear numbers, the geographical distribution and date range of large double-ring roundhouses is restricted to Wessex in the 7th to 5th centuries BC (Fitzpatrick 1994) *i.e.* Pimperne (Harding 1963; Harding, *et al.* 1993), Longbridge Deverill Cow Down (Chadwick Hawkes 1994), Little Woodbury (Bersu 1940), Brighton Hill South Site X/Y (Coe and Newman 1992; Newman 1994), Old Down Farm (Davies 1981, 1994) and Dunston Park (Fitzpatrick 1994), whereas clear-span buildings are common throughout the period. Taken together, these distinctions suggest that the two types of building were understood quite differently and may point towards two of the many possible ways of Being an Iron Age person. One is being a full time 'specialist' (for want of a better term) roundhouse builder, in the case of the large double-ring buildings of the early Iron Age, while the other, for the clear-span buildings that dominate the settlement record overall, is being an occasional builder who might otherwise be specialists in other crafts, food producers etc.

The roundhouse 'specialist' given the small number of buildings and limited temporal and geographical distribution, may be a unique interpreted identity to that time and place. This phenomenon may be a manifestation of a localised transformation in the roundhouse building tradition and change in the social/cosmological/ideational significance of the roundhouse itself from that of the Bronze Age from the communal

(Brück 1999) to the personal and 'commissioned'. The clear-span roundhouse may represent a continuity of form (at least in terms of the archaeologically observable postholes, ring gullies, platforms *etc.*) but not in ways of Being involved with these buildings. What I have been attempting to argue for here is that the roundhouse building tradition of the Iron Age is defined by a different way of Being involved with the building of those structures to that of the Bronze Age; that is that they are not built only to acquire their significance when complete, rather the practices and involvement in the building of a roundhouse in the Iron Age is integral to the assignation of the significance of a building.

The self-interpreted way of Being for the 'specialist' builders is different from that of the 'ordinary' member of society. As a result, they occupy different interpreted worlds. For the 'specialist' their world is structured through their particular understandings of the tools and materials that they use to enact their roles and the people that are referenced in that enacting, which for them are those that 'commission' the building. In contrast, the world of the 'ordinary' member of society is much broader with a greater range of possible self-interpretations and references and involvements with a greater range of others.

For the full time builders, the meanings that they associated with the building of a roundhouse are likely to be very different to those understood by 'ordinary' members of society. This is because 'ordinary' people probably took part in only one, possibly two, buildings in their lifetimes (given a conservative estimate of 35-40 years for the lifespan of a roundhouse (Reynolds 2001 pers. comm.) and these buildings were intimately bound up in the life of the family, whereas the full time builders would have built a number of buildings in the course of their 'careers' and their identities would therefore be spread across a range of different buildings in different places none of which they inhabited themselves.

This latter point rather raises the question of where these specialists lived, and if they are so capable of building large elaborate roundhouses, would we expect their buildings to be the same or similar and so could we 'find' them archaeologically. On the latter question, it is unlikely that these people would be archaeologically visible in this way because the large houses are built for people who have command of a greater range of resources than are available to the rest of society no matter how specialised. There are also likely to be social rules attached to the building of houses and it may not have been appropriate for one to build one's house without regard for those restrictions. Roundhouse builders are therefore likely to have lived in houses that are archaeologically much like the rest. We can, however, expect the builders' own houses to embody their interpreted sense of self even if this may never be archaeologically visible.

This raises the point that the expressions of peoples adopted ways of being would have been highly visible in that part of the roundhouse that does not survive archaeologically. Because of this we might also expect that the large roundhouses of the early Iron Age, because they are 'commissioned' by one person/group/family and built by another, to contain expressions of two distinct ways of Being; one associated with the 'commissioner' and one with the builder. That belonging to the commissioner is likely to have been the dominant expression, at least the one most visible to the rest of society, but there may also have been, in amongst this, that of the builder.

This has the possibility of taking two forms, one more visible (although not archaeologically) than the other. First, it may be that particular builders had 'signatures', in the way that a Norman Foster building is identifiable from any other, for example. It may have been part of the prestige attached to, or role associated with, a large roundhouse that this signature is visible; that the rest of society knows that it was built by this person/pair. Less visible will be the expressions of power or subversion over imposed conventions that the builder 'hides' in the structure. One

might expect this particularly in a building where the builder is not empowered to express themselves; where their 'style' or 'signature' is repressed, and it may, of course, be that this was the only expression. The small roundhouses associated with families are likely to be different in that one would expect to see the expression of the family's identity built into the structure. This all raises the prospect that although roundhouses of whatever class all look very similar archaeologically, could have appeared quite different in the Iron Age.



Figure 8.9. The particular technological solution to the 'ring-beam' as employed in the Bodrifty House (photograph and sketches by the author).

As an indicator of this we might turn to the roundhouse reconstructions that exist currently in Britain. It has often been remarked that a lot of the reconstructed roundhouses look very much the same, which is because a good number of them were built by, with advice or inspiration from the later Peter Reynolds and contain elements that amount to his 'signature', the clearest of which is the ring-beam. These houses are quite recognisable structurally, regardless of any exterior decoration, and given that there are a number of technical solutions to building a roundhouse, as evidenced by all those currently standing (Appendix 5), it is quite possible that, in the Iron Age, the particular solutions employed were a major part of the signature of particular buildings, Bodrifty (Fig. 8.9.)

and the Castell Henllys 'Chieftain's House' being two reconstructed examples of this, rather than such things as decorations that one might normally associate with defining difference.

Another indicator has been drawn from the analysis of the 'Chieftain's House' data, particularly from the observation of MB, the carpenter that built it. The 'designs' for the Castell Henllys roundhouse were very vague, being for the most part only simple line drawings created by the project engineer, CJ. The form of the building is much more directly related to MB and in particular his understanding of himself as a carpenter and, crucially, wheelwright. The most telling structural element of the CH Chieftain's house in this regard is the 'wheel-beam'. Interestingly even the name that they chose to give this structure is directly associated with MB, his skills and the way he sees himself. The wheel-beam is MB's solution/alternative to the more familiar Reynolds ring-beam. Some of this is due to the fact that the Castell Henllys 'Chieftain's House' is a clear span structure that has no internal supporting posts, but this does not detract from the fact that it is an interpretation of the basic idea of a ring-beam *i.e.* a circular load bearing structure, by a man who sees himself as a wheelwright. It is striking, just how much this structure looks like a wheel (Fig. 8.10.), and it is unlikely that, had anybody else built it, it would have taken this particular form.

Figure 8.10. The unmistakably wheel-like 'wheel-beam' in the 'Chieftain's House'.

The idea of hidden expressions of identity is also drawn form the Castell Henllys data and again from MB who, as his "little joke" (from PB's point of view at least), used Roman numerals as carpenters marks for matching up the various structural elements (Fig. 8.11.).



Figure 8.11. MB's "little joke". Roman numerals as carpenter's marks positioned in the tension-ring timber just below the rafter.

> Yeah, in Roman numerals, you've seen those did you? My initials are on it as well, and Allie's and... I think all the boys should put their names on it. It wasn't this sort of boss and two boys as it really should have been, I was in charge of the two boys but we all worked together on it.
>
> (Appendix 6.2.3: Interview Responses - MB, lines 286-259)

This is a clear expression of MB doing something for the sake of being who he is, to use Heidegger's language, because only he and a small group of other people know that this was done and the reasons for it. They are not readily visible in the building although they can be found if they are sought. The choice of Roman numerals doesn't serve any practical function, although their use a carpenters marks does. It is entirely about MB building as much of himself as he understands himself to be into the roundhouse.

8.4. CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have attempted to consider some of the implications for interpreting the building of a roundhouse in the Iron Age raised by the ideas and observations generated by this research in light of the notion of the ritual of the everyday in Iron Age society. To summarise: building a roundhouse was a meaningful activity that structured the self interpretations of those who took part in it. This self-interpretation in turn played a part in structuring understandings of tools, materials and others in the context of the act of building. Building itself was understood to be a meaningful process during which, and through the specific processes of which, the building was a assigned meaning and significance. Much of this assignation was done in thoroughly absorbed engagement with tools and materials but this absorbed meaning assignation was punctuated by 'deliberation stages' at special points in the process where it was understood that building could not progress until such deliberation had been carried out, and that this deliberation was more overtly ritual in character than the normal process of building manifest as 'coping stages' which characterise the 'everyday' construction practices.

I have discussed also the archaeological manifestations of a process that is determined by interpreted ways of Being specific to the Iron Age which we might recognise and understand as planning and building sophistication. Also indicated in this discussion is the purpose behind conducting a phenomenology of everyday activity. In relation to the Iron Age this is because the idea of the "ritual of the everyday" suggests that all the structures of everydayness that might be identified, and that have in previous chapters been demonstrated to be observable, are precisely those which make Being a roundhouse builder in the Iron Age meaningful and possible. This also means that the building of a roundhouse may have been one of the most important/significant things that a person/family does in the course of their lives, and that who they are, or how they understand themselves is intimately bound up with this activity.

PART V: SUMMARY AND PROSPECTS

~CHAPTER 9~
SUMMARY REMARKS

This thesis has sought to critique the ontology and methodology of experimental reconstruction and outline the development of a specifically Heideggerian ontology and phenomenological methodology for the analysis of human engagement in the building of a roundhouse through the use of multi media data. Based on the application of that methodology it has also offered reconsiderations both of what the practice of experimental reconstruction consist in and how building in the Iron Age may have been enacted and understood.

The tread that binds this research together is ontology. Although the focus of this thesis may, on the surface, have appeared to concern the reconstruction and interpretation of the Iron Age roundhouse, the subtext of what appears herein concerns an extended critique of the Cartesian ontology of subject and object as it underpins the theory, practice and interpretation of experimental archaeology. What I have attempted to do in this work is to deconstruct the ontology of subject and object in the context of roundhouse reconstruction, to discuss an alternative ontology as laid out by Heidegger in *Being and Time* and to develop one way in which to action that ontological scheme.

At present, the Cartesian ontology of subject and object utterly dominates experimental (and most other) archaeological practices. This has meant that the 'human element' is pre-understood in experimental practice as unknowable and thus actively excluded from research. It has also resulted in a mechanistic view of things (objects) as mere things and nothing more; that they have essential qualities that determine what they are outside of human engagement with them. This is a particularly monstrous

error which has resulted in the illusion that experimental archaeology can reveal the 'prime data' of the archaeological record for what it 'really' is.

In addition to the critique of Cartesianism this thesis represents an attempt to propose and to detail an alternative ontological scheme which, in the form of Heidegger's ontology, has been put forward as the basis upon which to re-ground the theory and practice of experimental archaeology. While recognising that people can and do see things in terms of subject and object, I have suggested that this is not the primary or usual way in which things and people are encountered in the world; that things do not have inherent essential qualities that determine the way in which they are understood by those that engage with them. An experimental archaeology that adheres solely to a subject/object dualism will never be able to account for the phenomena of interpretation of and involvement with things. This is a major unacknowledged problem for experimental archaeology, particularly in relation to field based experiments, where one of the necessary conditions for such work is the involvement of people with things.

Heidegger's ontology draws attention to that involvement. Rather than positing a subject on the one hand and an object on the other, neither one of which is involved with the other, Heidegger posits the Being of Dasein, equipment, world and time, each of which are equiprimordial and characterised by their relatedness, not their separability. This has the effect of focussing attention on the phenomena associated with involvement thereby allowing for experimental archaeology to account for the influence of human involvement in its practices and interpretations.

This re-focussing has, however, presented a problem in terms of how it may be achieved, which this research has attempted to overcome. Realising an understanding of the Cartesian subject/object ontology through hypothesis testing methodologies is now so familiar, particularly in experimental archaeology, that it has become

completely naturalised into those practices. The same cannot be said for Heidegger's ontology which in archaeology remains, to a large extent, a collection of concepts without an explicit way of integrating them in programmes of research.

Beyond the subtext of a critique of Cartesian ontology and the proposal of a Heideggerian alternative, an explicit way of 'doing' a Heideggerian archaeology in the context of field based experiments generally and roundhouse reconstruction in particular, has been the focus of this research. The resultant methodology is phenomenological in character in that it presents both a *way* of study and *what* of that study which in each case concerns phenomena. It has been proposed that a pre-theoretical mode of understanding underpins people's engagements with things in the carrying out of tasks in particular contexts, and that this mode of understanding may be both observed and analysed in light of a number of specific phenomena that are seen to ground everyday skilled coping. The methodology presented has been directed towards illuminating these phenomenological structures of engagement and analysing them in the context of the reconstruction of an Iron Age roundhouse in Wales.

In a broader sense, the Heideggerian methodology developed during this research is intended as a contribution to phenomenological discourses in archaeology which at present lack any explicit articulation of how phenomenological research is carried out. Throughout, I have been particularly concerned with accountability in phenomenological research and with explicit data generation and analysis, both of which have been the main areas of critique levelled at phenomenological approaches. Accountability, *i.e.* the ability for other researchers to follow the course of a particular piece of research and re-analyse and reinterpret it can be achieved through the use of appropriate source materials – which for this project have mainly been video, dialogue and interview transcriptions – and through the use of QDA software. A lack of explicit data generation has, perhaps, been the greatest target in the critique of phenomenological approaches in archaeology. In developing the methodology presented here I have been

at pains to indicate that phenomenology can indeed generate vast quantities of data and have included an example of that data in the form of the appendices in order, partly, to re-enforce that point.

At the root of explicitness and accountability is the phenomenological 'subject'. I have suggested, by focussing on the interpreted worlds of those other than myself, that the essentially Husserlian phenomenological 'I' that is hidden in most such approaches should be replaced with a Heideggerian 'they'; an 'I' being confined to the explicit analysis of one's own involvement and influence on a project. This, in effect, proposes a 'third person' phenomenology which is in stark contrast to the 'first person' phenomenologies currently in evidence in the literature.

On the 'outcome' of a Heideggerian phenomenological methodology in terms of the practice of experimental reconstruction, the process of 'doing' a Heideggerian phenomenology as described and discussed herein had lead to the possibility of concretely demonstrating, rather than simply proposing, that reconstruction practice is grounded in and determined by the involvements and self-interpretation of those involved rather than by materials constraints, technologies and environment as is usually argued. It has thereby also demonstrated that the 'human element' of such projects cannot reasonably be discounted in any account of the 'results' of such a project. Experimental archaeology, conceived of in terms of a Heideggerian ontology, cannot be argued to explain the past but observation of particular manifestations of the phenomena that underpin everyday skilled coping suggest possibilities for their past manifestation. The main basis for this argument is that people always find themselves in some particular situation or another and that these situations are characterised by care. Things 'matter' to people in their situated engagement with them, which for the building of a roundhouse in the Iron Age has been taken to indicate that every tool, material and element involved in their building as well as every action, however apparently mundane, was also meaningful. Iron Age roundhouses may, as a result,

be understood to be physical manifestations of care and of the self-interpretation of those who 'had to do' with them. That people do what they do for-the-sake-of Being who they interpret themselves to be in some particular way is the key to understanding the Interpretative content of this research. Ultimately, this research itself is what it is in-order-to elucidate a position and approach that is for-the-sake-of my own particular self-interpretation as a Heideggerian experimental archaeologist.

Beyond by own self-interpretation are the possibilities raised for further research by Heidegger's ontology and the methodology presented here to realise it in practice. The most obvious future path is its application to other programs of field-based experimental research such as those concerning metallurgy and ceramics, for example, where people are involved in the creation of things in order to come to some understanding of past practices and involvement in those practices. Alternatively, the methodology may be further developed, applied and refined in relation to other archaeological field practices, particularly excavation. The methodology, as developed to its current state, concerns the observation and analysis of interpretative human engagement, manifest in everyday practice, using multi-media data (video, audio, transcription) as a primary data source. Where video archives of excavation practices exist (such as those of the excavations at Çatalhöyük, Turkey) and where they might feasibly be created, the methodology could be developed in order to come to a contextualised understanding of what it means to be an archaeologist through excavation, how this is related to the practises, equipment, places and others involved and how it affects excavator's and specialist's understandings of the site being excavated both in the past and in the present. By using multi-media data as a primary data source in the way that has been suggested in relation to this research, such a project would introduce a way of accounting for the interpretative character of the everyday practices of excavators and specialists as they are acted out; something that is not possible through real-time observation or post-hoc interview analysis alone.

Multi-media data, particularly video, is usually only used either as a mnemonic device, *e.g.* to remind informants about what they may have been thinking about in a particular context, or for illustrative purposes in seminars or conference presentations *e.g.* ethnographic films; it is rarely used as a primary data source in its own right (this is the case at Çatalhöyük). As has been demonstrated, video can be used not only as a record of 'what they did' (which is often as far as it goes where it is used at all) but also of how people construct contextualised understandings of themselves, the things that they are involved with, the places that they inhabit and the worlds that are referenced through these engagements and understandings. This is perhaps the most fruitful possible future application of the methodology as it directly concerns the very meat and bones of archaeology as a discipline.

In this research I have attempted primarily to add to Heideggerian and phenomenological discourses in archaeology by being explicit about my motivations and my methods but in so doing add to current understandings of the ontological underpinnings of experimental archaeology, consider carefully what it does and does not say about the past and to offer some suggestions for the way in which roundhouse building in the Iron Age may be understood to have been acted out.

At the conclusion of this research I feel that the alternative ontological scheme offered by Heidegger in *Being and Time* and my own methodologising of it offers a strong and internally coherent alternative to the familiar Cartesian subject and object and the resultant hypothesis testing framework of experimental archaeology. Where human engagement with the making of things is to be taken seriously as a foundational part of those practices and something which may be researched transparently and rigorously, the Heideggerian phenomenological methodology developed during the course of this project may be fruitfully employed. It is in-order-to realise these goals that I, in part, offer this account of my research in the particular form that it takes.

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APPENDICES PART I

Contents:

The reader may find that an interesting way to negotiate this appendix is by searching the PDF by key words or phrases prompted by a reading of the main text.

APPENDICES PART II

Contents:

The reader may find that an interesting way to negotiate this appendix is by searching the PDF by key words or phrases prompted by a reading of the main text.



'Chieftain's House Reconstruction Video 02a

This CD contains Master Clip 02a of the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction video.

The video features 19 'Units of Continuity' (UCs) that are defined by camera cuts. Eleven of these contain dialogue which is transcribed into separate primary text documents. The Video in this clip was filmed between August and October 1998 by a then Lampeter undergraduate named Robert. The video remains the property of Castell Henllys Iron Age Fort and is used by kind permission of Phil Bennett.

'Chieftain's House Reconstruction Video 02b

This CD contains Master Clip 02b of the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction video.

The video features 25 'Units of Continuity' (UCs) that are defined by camera cuts. Twenty two of these contain dialogue which is transcribed into separate primary text documents. The Video in this clip was filmed between August and October 1998 by a then Lampeter undergraduate named Robert. The video remains the property of Castell Henllys Iron Age Fort and is used by kind permission of Phil Bennett.



'Chieftain's House Reconstruction Video 03a

This CD contains Master Clip 03a of the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction video.

The video features 34 'Units of Continuity' (UCs) that are defined by camera cuts. Twenty one of these contain dialogue which is transcribed into separate primary text documents. The Video in this clip was filmed between August and October 1998 by a then Lampeter undergraduate named Robert. The video remains the property of Castell Henllys Iron Age Fort and is used by kind permission of Phil Bennett.

'Chieftain's House Reconstruction Video 03b

This CD contains Master Clip 03b of the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction video.

The video features 28 'Units of Continuity' (UCs) that are defined by camera cuts. Twenty two of these contain dialogue which is transcribed into separate primary text documents. The Video in this clip was filmed between August and October 1998 by a then Lampeter undergraduate named Robert. The video remains the property of Castell Henllys Iron Age Fort and is used by kind permission of Phil Bennett.

'Chieftain's House Reconstruction Video 04a

This CD contains Master Clip 04a of the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction video.

The video features 34 'Units of Continuity' (UCs) that are defined by camera cuts. The video features 54 'Units of Continuity' (UCs) that are defined by camera cuts. Thirty three of these contain dialogue which is transcribed into separate primary text documents. The Video in this clip was filmed between August and October 1998 by a then Lampeter undergraduate named Robert. The video remains the property of Castell Henllys Iron Age Fort and is used by kind permission of Phil Bennett.

'Chieftain's House Reconstruction Video 04b

This CD contains Master Clip 04b of the 'Chieftain's House' reconstruction video.

The video features 34 'Units of Continuity' (UCs) that are defined by camera cuts. The video features Forty five 'Units of Continuity' (UCs) that are defined by camera cuts. Eight of these contain dialogue which is transcribed into separate primary text documents. The Video in this clip was filmed between August and October 1998 by a then Lampeter undergraduate named Robert. The video remains the property of Castell Henllys Iron Age Fort and is used by kind permission of Phil Bennett.